[tadamon-l] Lebanon: Doha Agreement | Economic Crisis

[Tadamon!]

* Doha Agreement | Economic Crisis
Broadcasts from Beirut V: An interview with Professor Karim Makdisi.

http://tadamon.resist.ca/index.php/post/1492/

An interview with Lebanese political commentator and professor Karim 
Makdisi offering a critique on the recently signed political agreement on 
Lebanon's future signed in Doha, Qatar as without long term substance. As 
media outlets across the world followed closely the most recent political 
conflict in Lebanon, seldom was the countries major economic crisis 
mentioned, with a national debt at around $45 billion, Lebanon maintains 
one of the highest per capita national debts in the world.

Neo-liberal economic policies adopted by successive movements after 
Lebanon's 15 year civil-war have left the country in economic ruins. As 
the western-backed government and the Hezbollah-lead opposition battled 
for political power in Lebanon throughout recent months, both mainstream 
political movements seldom placed the growing poverty rates, crumbling 
economy and staggering emigration rates front and center.

This interview with professor and political commentator Karim Makdisi 
offers a rare joint critique tuned towards both mainstream political 
factions in Lebanon in regards to economic and social policies that have 
left large numbers of Lebanese unemployed and often in poverty.


Stefan Christoff: Throughout recent weeks Lebanon has been dragged through 
another major political crisis, a conflict pitting the western-backed 
government lead until by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora against a political 
opposition lead by Hezbollah. In your recent article, "In the wake of the 
Doha truce" you touched on larger issues facing Lebanon, the ongoing 
economic crisis, corruption in the country and the ongoing effects 
stemming from the 2006 Israeli attack on Lebanon. Can you talk about the 
major issues that you feel have been missing from mainstream media 
reporting on the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon?

Karim Makdisi: Lebanon is facing several critical issues. First there is a 
tremendous social and economic crisis in this country, there is a 
forty-five billion dollar debt, one of the largest debts per capita in the 
world, resulting from over a decade of neo-liberal economic policies that 
simply didn't work throughout the 1990's.

In truth there is little opposition towards the economic policies that the 
government is putting forward, that is to say that the opposition in 
Lebanon is more or less in agreement with the government in regards to 
social and economic policy. Both the opposition and the government have 
attempted to sweep the main social and economic issues facing Lebanon 
under the carpet. This is one major issue.

Stefan Christoff: Concerning this point. Can you explain how the current 
social and economic crisis in Lebanon impacts people's daily lives in the 
country?

Karim Makdisi: Over the past couple years unemployment rates have gone up 
between 15-20%, as Lebanon's economy is suffering due to major internal 
political crisis or military conflict in this country. Also there is a 
tremendous emigration happening, especially young people or youth who are 
leaving in droves, in search for jobs, a better life, a bit more stability 
than is possible to find in Lebanon today.

Poverty has risen dramatically in Lebanon in recent years, especially in 
areas outside of Beirut, in Northern Lebanon, in Southern Lebanon, in the 
Bekka valley and also in certain Beirut suburbs. Poverty has risen 
tremendously. State services from electricity, to phones, to water have 
all suffered also. Today there are many electricity cuts, also many water 
shortages and the summer season hasn't yet began where traditionally there 
has always been regular water shortages and electricity cuts, so in this 
regard many are expecting a severe summer.

Also Lebanon is experiencing an environmental catastrophe today, both 
resulting from the Israeli attack in 2006 but also more generally an 
environmental disaster brought upon Lebanon over the past years. Lebanon's 
coast line has been almost entirely privatized or destroyed due to 
pollution. Lebanon.s mountains are also being privatized. Many forests in 
Lebanon have been cut up. Air pollution is very, very high, while multiple 
important international environmental agreements have not been implemented 
in Lebanon.

Now the goal isn't to paint a drastic picture however it's clear that 
today in Lebanon many social, environmental and economic indicators have 
simply been plunging in the past several years. This is not simply due to 
the political crisis over the past couple years, which has clearly made 
things much worse, but also due to very bad policies created during the 
1990's within the supposed boom period for Lebanon.

All these major issues haven't been addressed by either side. Even the 
opposition, including Hezbollah, except on the margins doesn't really 
mention or talk about the economic crisis. Actually this latest conflict 
covered up a very important issue in Lebanon.

Trade unions in Lebanon had called for strikes across the country in 
response to; the unemployment crisis, the economic crisis, the farce of a 
minimum wage which still is only a couple hundred dollars a month, nothing 
in Lebanon. All these important issues were to be raised through a general 
strike, however these issues were superseded by a larger political fight 
that happened last week. However all these issues in their fundamental 
terms remain issues that the opposition hasn't really touched.

It's not comforting for a citizen to know that this Doha agreement really 
doesn't cover any of these important issues, essentially doesn't cover the 
issues that are of real interest to citizens, to normal people in this 
country. However in the short term the Doha agreement provides great 
relief in Lebanon as it postpones any military conflict on the ground.

Stefan Christoff: Now concerning the Qatar negotiations and the agreement 
that has been struck. In reading about the negotiations or viewing reports 
it seems that despite all the Lebanese political representatives being in 
Qatar, there was little democratic participation in working to resolve the 
current crisis, a process that would actually involved people in Lebanon. 
Could you comment on this?

Karim Makdisi: Doha agreement was created within any involvement from 
ordinary Lebanese, there was no role for civil society. Clearly the 
political classes that were negotiating the agreement had very little 
concern for ordinary people in general. This reality in Doha articulates 
the distance between the political class in Lebanon and ordinary people as 
the role for non-political workers in Doha was extremely limited.

Each time Lebanon faces a political crisis, each time that Lebanese 
politicians are in a major disagreement they have had to travel outside of 
the country. This occurred with the Taif Agreement in Saudi Arabia at the 
end of the civil war in 1990. This phenomenon occurred again recently with 
the leaders traveling to France to negotiate, also traveling to many other 
countries in recent years for political discussions. Never holding serious 
talks or negotiations in Lebanon.

Now Lebanon's politicians have traveled to Doha, Qatar to agree on 
something which is allegedly a purely Lebanese internal affair. However 
this external negotiation process certainly illustrates something 
fundamentally wrong with the political situation here in Lebanon. No 
mechanism is built into the Lebanese political system to resolve disputes, 
to resolve disagreements within the political class, internally within 
Lebanon. Lebanon's constitution doesn't provide for it, the political 
process doesn't provide for it.

Lebanon always needs to have an international or regional patron, the 
external factor, to hold things together. In this most recent case it was 
Qatar. Throughout the 1990's Lebanese politicians use to often run to 
Syria to resolve disputes. Despite the rhetoric in recent times, any time 
there was a dispute in Lebanon all the political leaders would get into 
their cars and travel to Damascus to have the issue resolved in Syria then 
return.

Lebanon's political class has always relied on some regional or 
international patron and this reality has been reinforced in Doha. This 
agreements spells an entrenchment for Lebanon's sectarian system, also 
this agreement continues a long history of disenfranchising Lebanon's 
people.

Unfortunately this reality is a damming picture for all civil society 
actions in Lebanon throughout the 1990's.

Today it's clear that civil society has failed in Lebanon and that the 
major international organizations or donors have also failed as donors 
backed civil society organizations which are really quite superficial, 
which really have no political depth or strong analysis.

Stefan Christoff: Let's expand on this last point that you mentioned, 
Lebanese civil society. Lebanon has hundreds if not thousands of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the country, also 
within the Palestinian refugee camps, millions if not billions in 
development aid is flooding into the country, especially after the 2006 
war. Could you discuss the civil society or NGO role in Lebanese politics 
today?

Karim Makdisi: 'Civil society' is a buzz word that came out during the 
1990.s after Lebanon.s civil-war, something that attracted tremendous 
funding from outside organizations, international organizations, foreign 
governments including the U.N., the E.U. Major financing was poured into 
what were dubbed 'civil society organizations' in Lebanon.

Lebanon's civil society as a unified body could be understood as a 
political network that is independent from the state, working on the 
ground on important issues impacting people and local communities. Today 
civil society has failed in Lebanon, despite multiple efforts to form an 
effective civil society network in the country that could influence the 
government and international organizations, these NGOs have failed to 
wield any real political power or capability to organize people in 
Lebanon.

Clearly there are some notable exceptions to the rule, as there are always 
good people working on the ground carrying out good work, this is 
unquestionable.

All this international funding sent to Lebanon after the civil-war simply 
created a couple super civil society organizations, in the environmental 
sector, in the social sector, the developmental sector often removed from 
real people's needs. These super civil society organizations essentially 
spent most of their energy in conferences and workshops dealing with E.U., 
U.N. and other agendas outside Lebanon, spending much time writing 
fundraising documents, basically catering to external political agendas 
not serving people in Lebanon directly.

In parallel numerous small, local and relatively isolated civil society 
groups or NGOs working on the ground, isolated from these larger or more 
well funded civil society groups emerged. These smaller civil society 
organizations took action but clearly their resources are limited and 
today they have almost zero popular political backing, so their influence 
is extremely limited, extremely isolated to particular small areas where 
they fill specific needs.

In response to this reality, Islamic organizations in Lebanon but also 
similarly throughout the Middle East understood that there was a serious 
gap between these small local local organizations and these super civil 
society organizations, major NGOs backed by institutions like the E.U. or 
the World Bank.

Islamic organizations were able to work more throughly on the ground, 
directing money into creating important social organizations, mobilizing 
local support, mobilizing people towards action, gaining more and more 
support on the ground.

In talking about Hezbollah, aside from the famous military wing, it's also 
maintains a very successful network of social organizations on the ground 
in Lebanon. For example Hezbollah's networks or organizations affiliated 
with the party work on projects such as rebuilding agricultural tracts in 
southern Lebanon or in the Bekka, on providing pensions to certain people 
in Lebanon. All these programs are technically what the Lebanese state is 
suppose to be undertaking, not only during the past few years but long 
before also.

An effective national civil-society in Lebanon would channel all this 
international money pouring into Lebanon, all this donor money into real 
projects that are politically independent but actually improve the lives 
of people on the ground, while also challenging public or government 
policy in a way to force it to become more manageable, more equatable to 
people. This is especially important for people in the outer-areas in 
Lebanon.

Stefan Christoff: Now concerning the socio-economic policy of the 
opposition and Lebanon's government, the two major political currents in 
the country. You talked about both factions having similar economic 
positions. You also outlined the large network of social services that 
Hezbollah is involved in supporting or maintaining, that many people view 
to being a key to the movement's popular support. In this context could 
you expand on your thoughts concerning Hezbollah's economic policies. Are 
they really similar to the government's position given the large focus on 
social welfare throughout the country?

Karim Makdisi: In saying that the opposition and the government's economic 
policies are similar I mean similar in regards to general policy. 
Hezbollah until now hasn't offered any comprehensive substitutes to the 
neo-liberal policies that this country has had over the past 15 to 20 
years.

At times Hezbollah is critical towards government economic policy, towards 
certain policies or programs, however they have not offered a clearly 
different vision for the country. In effect Hezbollah has gone along with 
multiple privatization schemes pushed by the government, gone along with a 
multiple neo-liberal policies that this government and previous 
governments have enforced throughout recent years.

Hezbollah has made it clear that as long as their political gains are won 
they aren't really going to fight for major change regarding economic 
policies, this has been their record until now. Certainly Hezbollah's 
record isn't exactly the same as March 14th, however we still wait to see 
if they have any real changes to offer on the social or economic front, 
changes to address Lebanon's economic crisis.

Now concerning Hezbollah's social services. Certainly Hezbollah has 
provided many social services, they are very, very good in this respect, 
however they are mainly directed to communities loyal to the party. In 
other words their social services to a large extent reinforce sectarian 
divisions in the country, Hezbollah has catered to communities that 
support them because the state has often been absent within these 
communities not just today but for decades.

A real economic alternative would cater not only to one community but to 
the entire country across sectarian divisions. Building national civil 
society organizations that can provide to everybody regardless of their 
sect or location in Lebanon. Building a national civil society that is 
able to influence public policy, remain independent and be critical 
towards the government. Civil society in Lebanon should be a watchdog to 
the government, it should provide real alternatives and should be at all 
times independent from the government, from the state.

Hezbollah has certainly done a much better job in comparison to the other 
political parties or movements have be able to do across various regions 
in Lebanon. Often Hezbollah has provided much better services than what 
the state has provided however often these services are catering only to 
their own constituents therefore reinforcing Lebanon's sectarian logic.

Stefan Christoff: Let's jump back to the negotiations in Qatar this past 
week. Now mainstream media coverage concerning the recent negotiations in 
Qatar certainly hasn't addressed many issues that you have addressed in 
this interview. Given that a national unity government will be 
established, wondering your thoughts on the possibility that the critical 
social, environmental or economic issues you have outlined will be 
addressed by a unity government, which certainly will include Hezbollah.

Karim Makdisi: Unfortunately no. This Qatar agreement, assuming it holds 
which it should for the short term, is simply a redistribution of some 
power here and there in Lebanon between the opposition and March 14th. In 
other words it includes slight changes on the margins for the political 
class. This agreement doesn't address at all the concerns of citizens or 
of ordinary people in Lebanon concerning the issues that we have been 
addressing in this interview. Honestly it's difficult to see a way that 
this agreement can address these critical issues in any meaningful way.

Clearly once a national unity government is formed there must be consensus 
on different policies. However until now it's clear that any policy that 
comes out is going to be quite similar to the types of policies that 
prevailed during the 1990's, economic policies lead by the World Bank, the 
IMF, the E.U. and the U.N. Policies that will certainly be about increased 
liberalization for Lebanon's markets and privatization that will 
ultimately worsen our economic situation.

It's hard to see very much changing in this respect, regarding the overall 
policy. Hezbollah might critique these policies from time to time, they 
might use anti-corruption rhetoric to demand more transparency which 
clearly makes much better.

However the overall developmental or social policy wont change, as it 
hasn't even been discussed. Doha agreement ignores many key issues, core 
issues that many people in Lebanon would like to see addressed. This 
process means the continued disenfranchisement for the majority in 
Lebanon, while a celebration for a political class that has brought this 
country either war on state corruption since the end of Lebanon's 
civil-war.

For fifteen years we had war throughout the 1970's and 1980's, then we had 
a tremendous level of corruption and theft of state property during the 
1990's. Now over the past couple years we have had a total political 
breakdown which has lead to many, many social problems. All this means 
once again the political class that brought us into this mess aren't going 
to be held accountable.

If you recall the end to Lebanon's civil war in 1990, there was a general 
amnesty law that under which all the war criminals or leaders for various 
militias received no legal sanction and even some at time were 
incorporated directly into the government in the name of national unity.

Now again we are again facing a similar situation, in which all the people 
who are responsible for the economic crisis in Lebanon, for the political 
crisis, for all that's happened to Lebanon internally in recent years are 
all going to be brought back into government. All the political leaders 
are going to shake hands, kiss each other and they will move on.

However the people's lives that have been most severely impacted, those 
who have gone from being middle class to being poor in a snap, those that 
have emigrated, those that have been killed or have suffered, all these 
people are once again are going to be dropped.

In the absence of a strong civil society in Lebanon, that's able to 
pick-up the slack and press the government on these critical issues, I 
don't see that with the absence of this independent social force that 
these fundamental questions will become resolved.

Stefan Christoff: In this interview series on Lebanon, Tadamon! recently 
featured an interview with journalist Anthony Shadid, who explained that 
it's not possible to understand or view the current crisis in Lebanon 
without understanding it's relationship to the Middle East region and 
specifically to the role that the U.S. played in Iraq, leading to the 
institutionalization of the current wave of sectarianism across the Middle 
East. Let's talk about the wider regional context to the current situation 
in Lebanon from your perspective.

Karim Makdisi: Lebanon's conflict has both an internal dimension which we 
have been discussing but also an external one. There is no question that 
the current crisis in Lebanon is connected to the larger U.S. 'war on 
terror', which has only brought instability and violence across the region 
throughout the past several years.

A main instrument that the U.S. Administration has used in it's war in 
this region is an effort to institutionalize the riff between Sunni and 
Shi'ite, in an attempt to try to create a buffer against Iran through 
promoting Sunni tribalism, a clear and documented effort to insight 
tensions between the two Muslim communities.

In Lebanon such major tensions between Sunni and Shi'ite communities 
didn't really exist before the most recent internal conflict. Today 
political problems are taking increasingly sectarian tones. During 
Lebanon.s civil-war people internationally would talk about it as a 
Christian-Muslim conflict which it never was as such, now internationally 
people are talking about the current situation as a Sunni vs. Shi'ite 
conflict, however it's really not this it's a political conflict in which 
the U.S. and it's allies in the region use sectarian language as a 
divide-and-rule tactic.

In this sense the current conflict in Lebanon can not be divorced from the 
larger regional and international picture. From Iraq to Afghanistan, from 
Somali to Eritrea, from Palestine to certainly and of course Lebanon, all 
these conflicts are connected and they will never be resolved until the 
U.S. changes policy in the region.

* Broadcasts from Beirut: A Tadamon! interview project aiming to highlight 
progressive voices from the ground in Lebanon on the ongoing conflict, 
voices independent from major political parties.

Karim Makdisi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political 
Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut. He 
can be reached at: km18(at)aub.edu.lb

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