[Shadow_Group] Fw: CHINA MAKES A BIG MOVE INTO

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www.MiddleEast.org<http://www.middleeast.org/>

CHINA MAKES A BIG MOVE INTO  
THE MIDDLE EAST 

China Rocks the Geopolitical Middle East Boat 
"The quantum leap of China into the Middle East  
and Caspian energy markets has become a  
fait accompli, no matter how disturbed its  
biggest trade partner, the US, over its  
geopolitical ramifications." 


MIDDLEEAST.ORG - MER - Washington - 10 November: As the Americans expend
their power, their money, their blood, and their credibility -- the
miserable siege of Falluja and Iraq but the latest example --  both
Europe and China are on the march.  Europe is more often discussed, but
the Chinese have been taking important steps into Africa in recent years,
and now they are doing so into the Middle East in a bigger way than ever
via Iran.  
      The world stage is becoming far more complicated far more quickly
than is generally appreciated.    With an economy expanding at an amazing
9% yearly, and in fact with considerable and growing leverage over the
Americans economically and financially that is not usually discussed,
China is positioning itself for the future 
      And Iran, seriously now threatened by the U.S.-Israeli alliance, 
is working with China, as well as with Europe, to outflank the Americans
and in the short-term to buy itself more crucial time to strengthen and
to have at least a credible deterrent. With the U.S. and Israel
determined to keep all combinations of regional powers from threatening
their imperial dominance in the Middle East, the new involvements of both
China and the Europeans are major developments sure to greatly affect the
years ahead. 



 




ASIA TIMES - 6 November 2004:   TEHRAN - Speaking of business as unusual.
A mere two months ago, the news of a China-Kazakhstan pipeline agreement,
worth US$3.5 billion, raised some eyebrows in the world press, some
hinting that China's economic foreign policy may be on the verge of a new
leap forward. A clue to the fact that such anticipation may have totally
understated the case was last week's signing of a mega-gas deal between
Beijing and Tehran worth $100 billion. Billed as the "deal of century" by
various commentators, this agreement is likely to increase by another $50
billion to $100 billion, bringing the total close to $200 billion, when a
similar oil agreement, currently being negotiated, is inked not too far
from now.  

The gas deal entails the annual export of some 10 million tons of Iranian
liquefied natural gas (LNG) for a 25-year period, as well as the
participation, by China's state oil company, in such projects as
exploration and drilling, petrochemical and gas industries, pipelines,
services and the like. The export of LNG requires special cargo ships,
however, and Iran is currently investing several billion dollars adding
to its small LNG-equipped fleet.  

Still, per the admission of the head of the Iranian Tanker Co, Mohammad
Souri, Iran needed to purchase another 87 vessels by 2010, in addition to
the 10 already purchased, in order to fulfill the needs of its growing
LNG market. Iran has an estimated 26.6-trillion-cubic-meter gas
reservoir, the second-largest in the world, about half of which is in
offshore zones and the other half onshore.  

It is perhaps too early to digest fully the various economic, political
and even geostrategic implications of this stunning development, widely
considered a major blow to the Bush administration's economic sanctions
on Iran and particularly on Iran's energy sector, notwithstanding the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) penalizing foreign companies daring to
invest more than $20 million in Iran's oil and gas industry.  

While it is unclear what the scope of China's direct investment in Iran's
energy sector will turn out to be, it is fairly certain that China's
participation in the Yad Avaran field alone will exceed the ILSA's
ceiling; this field's oil reservoir is estimated to be 17 billion barrels
and is capable of producing 300 to 400 barrels per day. And this is
besides the giant South Pars field, which Iran shares with Qatar, alone
possessing close to 8% of the world's gas reserves. To open a parenthesis
here, until now Tehran has been complaining that Qatar has been outpacing
Iran in exploiting its resource 6-1. In fact, Iran's unhappiness over
Qatar's unbalanced access to the South Pars led to a discrete warning by
Iran's deputy oil minister and, soon thereafter, Qatar complied with
Iran's request for a joint "technical committee" that has yet to yield
any result.  

For a United States increasingly pointing at China as the next biggest
challenge to its Pax Americana, the Iran-China energy cooperation cannot
but be interpreted as an ominous sign of emerging new trends in an area
considered vital to US national interests. But, then again, this cuts
both ways, that is, the deal should, logically speaking, stimulate others
who may still consider Iran untrustworthy or too radical to enter into
big projects on a long term basis. Iran's biggest foreign agreement prior
to this gas agreement with China was a long-term $25 billion gas deal
with Turkey, which has encountered snags, principally over the price,
recently, compared with Iran's various trade agreements with Spain, Italy
and others, typically with a life-span of five to seven years.  

Thus some Iranian officials are hopeful that the China deal can lead to a
fundamental rethinking of the risks of doing business with Iran on the
part of European countries, India, Japan, and even Russia. Concerning
India, which signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran initially in
1993 for a 2,670-kilometer pipeline, with more than 700km traversing
Pakistani territory, the Iran-China deal will undoubtedly give a greater
push to New Delhi to follow Beijing's lead and thus make sure that the
"peace pipeline" is finally implemented. The same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to Russia, which has as of late been dragging its feet somewhat
on Iran's nuclear reactor, bandwagoning with the US and Group of Eight
(G8) countries on the thorny issue of Iran's uranium-enrichment program.
The Russians must now factor in the possibility of being supplanted by
China if they lose the confidence of Tehran and appear willing to trade
favors with Washington over Iran. Russia's Gazprom may now finally set
aside its stubborn resistance to the idea of entering major joint
ventures with Iran.  

Iran appears more and more interested to join the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) and form a powerful axis with its twin pillars, China
and Russia, as a counterweight to a US power "unchained". The SCO
comprises China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan.  

China, Russia and Iran share deep misgivings about the perception of the
United States as a "benevolent hegemon" and tend to see a "rogue
superpower" instead. Even short of joining forces formally, the main
outlines of such an axis can be discerned from their convergence of
threat perception due to, among other things, Russia's disquiet over the
post-September 11, 2001, US incursions in its traditional
Caucasus-Central Asian "turf", and China's continuing unease over the
Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; this is not to mention China's fixed gaze at
a "new Silk Road" allowing it unfettered access to the Middle East and
Eurasia, this as part and parcel of what is often billed as "the new
great game" in Eurasia. Indeed, what China's recent deals with both
Kazakhstan (pertaining to Caspian energy) and Iran (pertaining to Persian
Gulf resources) signifies is that the pundits had gotten it wrong until
now: the purview of the new great game is not limited to the Central
Asia-Caspian Sea basin, but rather has a broader, more integrated,
purview increasingly enveloping even the Persian Gulf. Increasingly, the
image of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a sort of frontline state in a
post-Cold War global lineup against US hegemony is becoming prevalent
among Chinese and Russian foreign-policy thinkers.  

For the moment, however, the Iran-Russia-China axis is more a tissue of
think-tanks than full-fledged policy, and the mere trade interdependence
of the US and China, as well as Russia's growing energy ties to the US
alone, not to mention its weariness over any perceived Chinese
"overstretch", militate against a grand alliance pitted against the
Western superpower. In fact, the Cold War-type alliances are highly
unlikely to be replicated in the current milieu of globalization and
complex interdependence; instead, what is likely to emerge in the future
are issue-focused or, for the lack of a better word, issue-area alliances
whereby, to give an example, the above-said axis may be inspired into
existence along geostrategic considerations somewhat apart from purely
economic considerations.  

Hence what the SCO means on the security front and how significant it
will be hinges on a complex, and complicated, set of factors that may
eventually culminate in its expansion, from the current group of six, as
well as greater, alliance-like, cooperation. It is noteworthy that in
Central Asia-Caucasus, the trend is toward security diversification and
even multipolarism, reflected in the US and Russian bases not too far
from each other. In this multipolar sub-order, neither the US is capable
of exerting hegemony, nor is Russia's semi-hegemonic sway without
competition. In the Caspian Sea basin, for example, Kazakhstan has opted
to take part in several distinct, and contrasting, security networks,
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace
program, the Commonwealth of Independent States' Collective Security
Organization, the SCO, and membership in OSCE (Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe).  

Kazakhstan is not, however, an exception, but seemingly indicative of an
expanding new rule of the (security and strategic) game played out
throughout Central Asia-Caucasus. Economically, both Kazakhstan and
Russia are members of the Central Asia Economic Cooperation Organization,
and all the Central Asian states are also members of the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO), which was founded by the trio of Iran,
Turkey and Pakistan. Certain economic alliances are, henceforth, taking
shape, alongside the budding security arrangements, which have their own
tempo, rationale and security potential. Concerning the latter, in 1998,
the ECO embarked on low security cooperation among its members on drug
trafficking and this may soon be expanded to information-sharing on
terrorism. Also, Iran has also entered into low security agreements with
some of its Persian Gulf neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  

The SCO initially was established to deal with border disputes and is now
well on its way to focusing on (Islamist) terrorism, drug trafficking and
regional insecurity. Meanwhile, the US, not to be outdone, has been
sowing its own bilateral military and security arrangements with various
regional countries such as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, as well as promoting the Guuam Group, which includes
Azerbaijan and Georgia, formed alongside the BTC (Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan)
pipeline as a counterweight to Russian influence. Consequently, the
overall picture that emerges before us is, as stated above, a unique
multi-trend of military and security multipolarism defying the logic of
Pax Americana. In this picture, Iran represents one of the poles of
attraction, seeking its own sphere of influence by, for instance,
entering into a military agreement with Turkmenistan in 1994, and,
simultaneously, exploring the larger option of how to coalesce with other
powers in order to offset the debilitating consequences of
(post-September 11) unbounded Americanization of regional politics.  

A glance at Chinese security narratives, and it becomes patently obvious
that Beijing shares Iran's deep worries about US unipolarism culminating
in, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, unilateral militarism. Various advocates
of US preeminence, such as William Kristol, openly write that the US
should "work for the fall of the Communist Party oligarchy in China".
Unhinged from the containment of Soviet power, the roots of US
unilateralism, and its military manifestation of "preemption", must be
located in the logic of unipolarism, thinly disguised by the "coalition
of the willing" in Iraq; the latter is, in fact, as aptly put by various
critics of US foreign policy, more like a coalition of the coerced and
bribed than anything else.  

But, realistically speaking, what are the prospects for any regional and
or continental realignment leading to the erasure of US unipolarism,
notwithstanding the US military and economic colossus bent on preventing,
on a doctrinal level, the emergence of any challenger to its global
domination now or in the future? The strategic debates in all three
countries, Russia, China and Iran, feature similar concerns and question
marks. For one thing, all three have to contend with the difficulty of
sorting the disjunctions between the different sets of national
interests, above all economic, ideological and strategic interests. This
aside, a pertinent question is who will win over Russia, Washington,
which pursues a coupling role with Moscow vis-a-vis Beijing, or Beijing,
trying to wrest away Moscow from Washington? For now, Russia does not
particularly feel compelled to choose between stark options, yet the
situation may be altered in China's direction in case the present drift
of US power incursions are heightened in the future. The answer to the
above question should be delegated to the future. For now, however, the
quantum leap of China into the Middle East and Caspian energy markets has
become a fait accompli, no matter how disturbed its biggest trade
partner, the US, over its geopolitical ramifications.  

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions
in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy
Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former
deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003. He teaches political
science at Tehran University.

 
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