[Shadow_Group] What Bush Can Do to Salvage Iraq

[shadowgroup-l at lists.resist.ca]

What Bush Can Do to Salvage Iraq
By David Ignatius
Friday, November 5, 2004; Page A25 

FROM:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26835-2004Nov4.html<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26835-2004Nov4.html>
As George Bush said in his victory speech, "a new term
is a new opportunity." Unfortunately, it will begin
with the same old wretched problem of Iraq. 

I hope the president will take time to ponder the Iraq
conundrum anew, now that he has won the freedom to
craft a true strategy rather than a slogan. His "stay
the course" rhetoric may have energized the Republican
base, but it didn't answer the question of the typical
soldier on the ground: How do we win this thing, and,
if we can't, how do we get out? 

_____Today's Op-Eds_____ 

 After Arafat, What? (Post, Nov. 5, 2004) 
 Using All of a Mandate . . . (Post, Nov. 5, 2004) 
 Democrats In a Divided Land (Post, Nov. 5, 2004) 
 . . . He Didn't Get (Post, Nov. 5, 2004) 
 What Bush Can Do to Salvage Iraq (Post, Nov. 5,
2004) 
 
 
 

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_____More Ignatius_____ 

 The Real 'October Surprise' (The Washington Post,
Nov 2, 2004) 
 After Arafat, Upheaval (The Washington Post, Oct 29,
2004) 
 A Gaddafi Cover-Up (The Washington Post, Oct 26,
2004) 
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The irony is that Bush can make bold decisions about
Iraq now in a way that a victorious John Kerry could
not have done. It's the Nixon-to-China phenomenon.
Bush doesn't have to prove he's tough on Iraq. His
only obligation is to do what makes sense. But what is
that, exactly? 

Iraq has become a Catch-22: The definition of victory
is a stable Iraqi government that can maintain
security without depending on U.S. troops. But a
viable Iraqi government, again almost by definition,
will be one that can claim it ended the U.S.
occupation and restored Iraq's dignity and
independence. 

Ayad Allawi, Iraq's interim prime minister, is caught
in this double bind. The more he depends on U.S. help,
the less legitimate he appears in Iraqi eyes. For that
reason, Allawi has been pushing to accelerate the
training of Iraqi security forces -- especially two
armored divisions he thinks are crucial. I'm told the
Iraqi leader was so upset about this issue that when
Donald Rumsfeld visited Baghdad last month, Allawi
briefly suggested he might not run in January's
elections. 

After a strong start last summer, Allawi knows he is
losing the confidence of Iraqis. In a poll completed a
month ago, the percentage of Iraqis who said the
interim government was effective had fallen to 43
percent, compared with 63 percent in July. A
frustrated Allawi sent a letter to Bush in October
complaining that the training of Iraqi forces wouldn't
be completed until well after the elections scheduled
in late January, "which is simply too late," according
to excerpts published in the New Yorker. 

The locus of the Iraqi Catch-22 is the city of
Fallujah. In addition to being the center of the
anti-American insurgency, it's a symbol of Sunni
Muslims' resistance to what they fear will be future
domination by Iraq's Shiite majority. Fallujah may be
the decisive battle of the war, but it's an especially
delicate one. An American-led "victory" that razes the
city could further alienate the Sunnis and poison the
chances for political reconciliation. That's why
Allawi wants the armored units so badly -- so that
Iraqi tanks can lead the way into Fallujah and make it
look less like an American operation. 

U.S. Marines, joined by about 4,000 Iraqi troops, are
poised to attack the city. U.S. commanders in Baghdad
believe the troops are ready to roll, but the attack
isn't likely until after Ramadan ends in about 10
days. Allawi and the Americans will probably make a
last effort at negotiation; they know military victory
in Fallujah might come at the cost of political
defeat. 

So what's the right course now in Iraq? As is so often
the case in the Middle East, the trick is riding two
horses at once. America must keep faith with the
Shiite majority, which rightly expects to play a
decisive role after decades of oppression. But at the
same time, the United States must reassure Sunnis that
they have a place in the new Iraq. 

Allawi and his American advisers sensibly have been
reaching out to Sunni leaders; Jordan, with U.S.
support, will be hosting a quiet gathering of Iraqi
Sunnis next week. The Sunnis may account for only 20
percent of the population, but if they aren't included
in writing Iraq's new constitution, the violence will
continue. Thus administration officials should give up
their hope that they can rely on Iraq's other two
ethnic groups, the Kurds and Shiites, to make
January's elections a success. 

The key to stability is regaining the support of
Iraq's silent majority -- the long-suffering,
secular-minded Sunnis and Shiites referred to by some
U.S. and British intelligence analysts as the POIs,
which is short for "pissed-off Iraqis." These POIs are
angry at American occupation, and they want it to end.


So here's my recommendation for President Bush: He
should announce that when a new Iraqi government is
elected, he is prepared to negotiate the terms and
timetable of American withdrawal. If handled wisely,
that approach would be an American victory, and an
Iraqi victory, as well. 

davidignatius at washpost.com<mailto:davidignatius at washpost.com>




 



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