[security-news] Bulletin #8 - October 7th, 2002
security-news-admin at resist.ca
security-news-admin at resist.ca
Mon Oct 7 13:53:57 PDT 2002
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Security-news <security-news at resist.ca>
A security bulletin for autonomous resistance movements
Produced by the folks who bring you http://security.tao.ca
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October 7th, 2002
It really hasn't taken long to see the ramifications of 9/11 on activism
in North America. Two of the articles in this week's issue are news about
specific incidents which would not have been publically allowable
pre-terrorism hysteria in North America. The crackdown on civil liberties
in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere is becoming more and more
apparent every day. Activists not allowed on airplanes? A new "Aboriginal
Extremism Unit" in Canada? Anti-terrorist state forces being used to raid
activist's homes? Here we find the daily intensification of the police
state as it impacts the lives of those who dissent. Good security culture
in our movements is important now like ever before - communities
everywhere need to start dialogues about how to protect and support each
other in the onslaught of state repression.
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Security-news: Issue #8 - Contents
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* Security tip of the week: Introducing counter-surveillance
* News & Analysis: Anti-Terrorist Unit Uses Excessive Force On
Indigenous Family
* News & Analysis: No-fly blacklist snares political activists
* How-to: Talk about security culture and practice in your community
*****
Security Tip of the Week: Counter-surveillance
*****
Counter-surveillance is the practice of avoiding or making surveillance
difficult to carry out. A central component of surveillance relies on
pattern analysis - the examination of a subject's patterns to determine
aspects about their method of operation, locations at key points in time
and many other "clues". Central to any counter-surveillance efforts
breaking personal patterns as much as is possible. This masks regular
activity, so making it harder to practice routine surveillance. But it
also masks the times when you may undertake activities out of the
ordinary. (For more on this topic, check out http:// )
*****
News & Analysis: Anti-Terrorist Unit Uses Excessive Force On Indigenous
Family
Press Release, October 3, 2002
*****
PRESS RELEASE STATEMENT
At 6:00 am Saturday, September, 21st 2002, members of the Integrated
National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) raided the residence of
Nitanis Desjarlais and John Rampanen in Port Alberni, British Columbia.
With the assistance of the RCMP Emergency Response Team, local RCMP,
ambulance, and fire departments, a warrant to search for unauthorized
firearms was executed.
This police raid was conducted as a follow-up to allegations that Mr.
Rampanen was "stockpiling arms". The quiet neighborhood of Mr. Rampanen
and his common-law wife Ms. Desjarlais, located on the outskirts of Port
Alberni, was evacuated during the early hours of September 21st, as a
safety precaution during the police raid. Fortunately, Mr. Rampanen and
Ms. Desjarlais along with their twelve year old son, two year old
daughter and new-born son were not present in their home during the time
of incursion.
At 9:45 am on the same day, members of INSET along with local RCMP
officers, visited the residence of Mr. Rampanens' parents, also located
in Port Alberni. Upon arrival, INSET officers became aware of the
presence of Ms. Desjarlais and Mr. Rampanen and immediately began
questioning Ms. Desjarlais. Ms. Desjarlais was taken outside of the house
and asked if she knew that John Rampanen was involved in Native Issues.
She replied that she did and that she herself was involved and
sarcastically asked if it was a crime to be involved in Native Issues, to
no reply from INSET. Approximately 10 minutes into the questioning, the
inquiring INSET officer received a telephone call reporting that the
searched residence was "clear". At which point Ms. Desjarlais was
informed by an INSET member that "it would be a shame for (her) children
to grow up without parents".
At this point, INSET officers approached Mr. Rampanen and informed him of
the execution of a search warrant on his residence. They further informed
him that allegations were made that he was "stockpiling arms" and that
they did not know the identity of the person or persons behind the
"malicious allegation". They included that there was considerable damage
inflicted upon the front entrance to the house and that any damages
incurred would be covered by the RCMP. Mr. Rampanen was reminded of the
"concern that he should have towards the safety of (his) children" and
that if he was in possession of any unauthorized firearms that he would
be given the opportunity to surrender them without repercussions. Mr.
Rampanen replied that he does not possess any firearms, that his house
and all of his belongings had already been thoroughly searched, and that
that should be evidence that he was not "stockpiling arms".
When asked if this sort of action was to be expected every time a
malicious allegation was made in regards to Mr. Rampanen, INSET replied
that, "after today's actions, we would have to say yes". Mr. Rampanen
stated that "it was because of (his) concern for the safety of (his)
children that he did not stockpile weapons", and further, suggested that
there are more civilized methods that could be applied when dealing with
these types of concerns.
Mr. Rampanen and Ms. Desjarlais have been actively involved in Indigenous
issues for a number of years through organizations such as; the Union of
BC Indian Chiefs, United Native Nations, Native Youth Movement,
Indigenous Sovereignty Network, and the Westcoast Warrior Society. Mr.
Rampanen has also been actively involved in drug and alcohol
rehabilitation programs directed towards Indigenous youth, as well as,
educational and informational workshops throughout Indigenous
communities. Ms. Desjarlais is an emerging videographer and specializes
in documentaries focusing on concerns and issues arising from various
Indigenous Nations. The young couple have just recently moved to
Vancouver Island where they plan on raising their children.
Later, during the evening of the same day and the morning of Sunday,
September 22nd, other members of the Westcoast Warrior Society and their
families were also approached by INSET officers. Similar remarks
regarding the safety and concern of their children, and suggestive
statements regarding firearms were also expressed during these visits.
After incidents arising from the weekend of September 21st, Mr. Rampanen
and Ms. Desjarlais are still trying to ensure that these types of
aggressive actions are not wrongfully exercised upon those involved
within matters relating to Indigenous rights. They feel that these sorts
of unnecessary tactics only contribute negatively towards the already
fragile relationship between Indigenous Nations and the Government of
Canada.
INSET is a unit that emerged after September 11th and has a budget of 64
million dollars for a five year period. more info on INSET at RCMP
website.
*****
News & Analysis: No-fly blacklist snares political activists
by Alan Gathright, Chronicle Staff Writer
Friday, September 27, 2002
*****
A federal "No Fly" list, intended to keep terrorists from boarding
planes, is snaring peace activists at San Francisco International and
other U.S. airports, triggering complaints that civil liberties are being
trampled.
And while several federal agencies acknowledge that they contribute names
to the congressionally mandated list, none of them, when contacted by The
Chronicle, could or would say which agency is responsible for managing
the list.
One detainment forced a group of 20 Wisconsin anti-war activists to miss
their flight, delaying their trip to meet with congressional
representatives by a day. That case and others are raising questionsv
about the criteria federal authorities use to place people on the list,
and whether people who exercise their constitutional right to dissent are
being lumped together with terrorists.
"What's scariest to me is that there could be this gross interruption of
civil rights and nobody is really in charge," said Sarah Backus, an
organizer of the Wisconsin group. "That's really 1984-ish." Federal law
enforcement officials deny targeting dissidents. They suggested that the
activists were stopped not because their names are on the list, but
because their names resemble those of suspected criminals or terrorists.
Congress mandated the list as part of last year's Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, after two Sept. 11 hijackers on a federal
"watch list" used their real names to board the jetliner that crashed
into the Pentagon. The alerts about the two men, however, were not
relayed to the airlines.
The detaining of activists has stirred concern among members of Congress
and civil liberties advocates.
They want to know what safeguards exist to prevent innocent people from
being branded "a threat to civil aviation or national security."
NO ACCOUNTABILITY
And they are troubled by the bureaucratic nightmare that people stumble
into as they go from one government agency to another in a maddening
search to find out who is the official keeper of the no-fly list.
"The problem is that this list has no public accountability: People don't
know why their names are put on or how to get their names off," said
Jayashri Srikantiah, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union
of Northern California. "We have heard complaints from people who
triggered the list a first time and then were cleared by security to fly.
But when they fly again, their name is triggered again."
Several federal agencies. including the CIA, FBI, INS and State
Department, contribute names to the list. But no one at those agencies
could say who is responsible for managing the list or who can remove
names of people who have been cleared by authorities.
Transportation Security Administration spokesman David Steigman initially
said his agency did not have a no-fly list, but after conferring with
colleagues, modified his response: His agency does not contribute to the
no- fly list, he said, but simply relays names collected by other federal
agencies to airlines and airports. "We are just a funnel," he said,
estimating that fewer than 1,000 names are on the list.
"TSA has access to it. We do not maintain it." He couldn't say who does.
Steigman added he cannot state the criteria for placing someone on the
list, because it's "special security information not releasable (to the
public)."
However, FBI spokesman Bill Carter said the Transportation Security
Administration oversees the no-fly list: "You're asking me about
something TSA manages. You'd have to ask TSA their criteria as far as
allowing individuals on an airplane or not." In addition to their alarm
that no agency seems to be in charge of the list, critics are worried by
the many agencies and airlines that can access it.
"The fact that so many people potentially have access to the list," ACLU
lawyer Srikantiah said, "creates a large potential for abuse."
At least two dozen activists who have been stopped -- none have been
arrested, say they support sensible steps to bolster aviation security.
But they criticize the no-fly list as being, at worst, a Big Brother
campaign to muzzle dissent and, at best, a bureaucratic exercise that
distracts airport security from looking for real bad guys.
"I think it's a combination of an attempt to silence dissent by scaring
people and probably a lot of bumbling and inept implementation of some
bad security protocols," said Rebecca Gordon, 50, a veteran San Francisco
human rights activist and co-founder of War Times, a San Francisco
publication distributed nationally and on the Internet.
Gordon and fellow War Times co-founder Jan Adams, 55, were briefly
detained and questioned by police at San Francisco International Airport
Aug. 7 after checking in at the American Trans Air counter for a flight
to Boston. While they were eventually allowed to fly, their boarding
passes were marked with a red "S", for "search"which subjected them to
more scrutiny at SFO and during a layover in Chicago.
Before Adams' return flight from Boston's Logan International, she was
trailed to the gate by a police officer and an airline official and
searched yet again.
While Gordon, Adams and several of the detained activists acknowledged
minor past arrests or citations for participating in nonviolent sit-in or
other trespassing protests, FBI spokesman Carter said individuals would
have to be "involved in criminal activity"not just civil disobedience, to
be banned from U.S. airlines.
DEFINING AN ACTIVIST
But, Carter added, "When you say 'activists,' what type of activity are
they involved in? Are they involved in criminal activity to disrupt a
particular meeting? . . . Do you plan on blowing up a building? Do you
plan on breaking windows or throwing rocks? Some people consider that
civil disobedience, some people consider that criminal activity."
Critics question whether Sister Virgine Lawinger, a 74-year-old Catholic
nun, is the kind of "air pirate" lawmakers had in mind when they passed
the law. Lawinger, one of the Wisconsin activists stopped at the
Milwaukee airport on April 19, said she didn't get upset when two
sheriff's deputies escorted her for questioning.
"We didn't initially say too much about the detainment, because we do
respect the need to be careful (about airline security)," the nun
recounted.
"They just said your name is flagged and we have to clear it. And from
that moment on no one ever gave me any clarification of what that meant
and why. I guess that was our frustration."
Five months later, the 20 members of Peace Action Wisconsin still haven't
been told why they were detained. Even local sheriff's deputies and
airline officials admitted confusion about why the group was stopped,
when only one member's name resembled one on the no-fly list.
At the time, a Midwest Express Airlines spokeswoman told a Wisconsin
magazine, the Progressive, that a group member's name was similar to one
on the list and "the (Transportation Security Administration) made the
decision that since this was a group, we should rescreen all of them."
At a congressional hearing in May, Wisconsin Sen. Russ Feingold pressed
FBI Director Robert Mueller about the Milwaukee incident, asking him
pointedly for an assurance that the agency was not including people on
the list because they had expressed opinions contrary to the policies of
the U.S. government.
Mueller's response: "We would never put a person on the watch list solely
because they sought to express their First Amendment rights and their
views."
DATABASE OF SUSPICION
The law orders the head of the Transportation Security Administration to
work with federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies to share
database information on individuals "who may pose a risk to
transportation or national security" and relay it to airlines, airports
and local law enforcement. It also requires airlines to use the list to
identify suspect passengers and "notify appropriate law enforcement
agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft or take other
appropriate action."
In November, Nancy Oden, a Green Party USA official in Maine, wound up
being a suspect passenger and was barred from flying out of the Bangor
airport to Chicago, where she planned to attend a Green Party meeting and
make a presentation about "pesticides as weapons of war." Oden said a
National Guardsman grabbed her arm when she tried to help a security
screener searching her bags with a stuck zipper. The middle-aged woman,
who said she was conservatively dressed and wore no anti-war buttons,
said the guardsman seemed to know her activist background. "He started
spouting this pro-war nonsense: 'Don't you understand that we have to get
them before they get us? Don't you understand what happened on Sept. 11?"
Airport officials said at the time that Oden was barred from boarding
because she was uncooperative with security procedures, which she denies.
Instead, Oden pointed out that the American Airlines ticket clerk, who
marked her boarding pass with an "S" had acknowledged she wasn't picked
by random.
"You were going to be searched no matter what. Your name was checked on
the list," he said, according to Oden.
"The only reason I could come up with is that the FBI is reactivating
their old anti-war activists' files," said Oden, who protested the
Vietnam War as a young office worker in Washington, D.C. "It is
intimidation.
It's just like years ago when the FBI built a file about me and they
called my landlord and my co-workers. . . . They did that with everyone
in the anti-war movement."
A TOOL FOR TERROR
In his testimony before Congress, Mueller described the watch list as an
necessary tool for tracking individuals who had not committed a crime but
were suspected of terrorist links. "It is critically important," he said,
"that we have state and locals (police) identify a person has been
stopped, not necessarily detained, but get us the information that the
person has been stopped at a particular place."
None of this makes the peace activists feel any safer -- about flying or
about their right to disagree with their government.
"It's probably bad for (airport) security," said Sister Virgine.
"Stopping us took a lot of staff away from checking out what else was
going on in that airport."
Ultimately, she said, "To not have dissent in a country like this would
be an attack on one of our most precious freedoms. This is the essence of
being an American citizen, the right to dissent."
*****
How to: Talk about security culture and practice in your community
by: kendra at resist.ca
*****
Security practice and culture are the type of topics that if handled
badly can be offensive to the individuals involved, and divisive within
communities struggling to build trust. How we handle security discussions
in our communities is as important as the type of security culture we
practice - because it is only through supportive education that our
communities will learn and grow in a healthy and secure way.
Usually, the topic of security only comes up when someone has
unmistakably breached it in a way that community members feel the need to
discuss it with the individual. This of course leads to a situation where
someone is put on the spot and will inevitably become defensive and angry
about being "called out". In communities where other people are
practicing bad security culture, the individual may feel they are being
unfairly targeted. These feelings are not particularly conducive to a
mode of learning or receiving direction from fellow travellers and
friends. To compound the problem, it is often the case that those who are
most "concerned" with security take a very macho approach to the subject
and may be using their own security conciousness as a way of showing
others they are "in the know" or politically experienced in other ways.
The central problem is that security discussions aren't happening
regularly in our movements as community-based dialogues and workshops,
and so often we wait until someone has breached security in a significant
way before we speak about the lack of security practice. Realisticaly, we
cannot expect people who are new to activism or the concept of security
culture to have this specialized knowledge unless we are being proactive
in providing community-based education.
The following recommendations are some things to think about when
preparing security practice and culture workshops in your community.
Workshop facilitators should be trusted and respected members of their
community - otherwise information won't be taken seriously. As a workshop
facilitator you should:
* Structure discussions about security culture as a dialogue with other
members of the community rather than lecturing to people about what is
"right" and "wrong".
* Provide (if possible) local community examples of surveillance or
infiltration and ways the community defeated it. If you have no local
examples, there are many interesting stories out there to gather - it is
important to show how good security practices have protected others.
* Provide hand-outs or point people to online resources that can look at
on their own time.
* Break workshops down in a way that makes sense. If demand exists in
your community, doing a workshop on security culture and then following
it up with workshops on specific workshops on security practices is the
best approach. Trying to cram a full discussion of how to use PGP into a
workshop on general security culture is a bad idea and will ultimately
confuse people into believing that security culture is solely about
technology.
* Keep discussions open and stop people from looking around the room for
the "spook". These are community educationals, not paranoia inducing
sessions.
* Keep machismo and bravado in the room to a minimum. The most effective
workshops in this respect are those which have a good gender balance and
different cultural perspectives represented. Outreach is key to involving
a healthy cross-section of the local community.
* Use role-playing wherever possible. Many legal collectives across North
America carry out role-playing workshops to teach activists how to deal
with police interrogation and other nasty situations. It would be worth
teaming up with your local legal collective to do a series of workshops.
Role-plays are an effective way to keep people engaged in a topic and
really learning in a hands-on way.
* Allow participants to practice what they are being taught in all areas
- particularly technical. A lecture about using PGP will not be nearly as
effective as a hands-on demonstration.
* Try to do workshops tailored to organizational needs where possible.
If communities regularly allow disucssions and education about security
practice and culture to become part of the fabric of community
organizing, necessary discussions with individuals who have breached good
security practice will be easier to handle.
No matter what type of security training a community has as a whole,
there will always be individuals who engage in poor practice either
because the lack knowledge and training or because they don't take the
subject seriously. It may become necessary to talk to individuals
one-on-one about their security problems if they persist. The following
tips may help in this situation:
* Approach the subject as soon as possible after the security
breach/incident occurs. Sometimes simply saying quietly to someone "i
don't know if i would talk about that here" is enough to let them know
they are talking about something they shouldn't. Not every breach
requires a "formal" discussion so use your discretion in dealing with a
given incident.
* Individuals may be delegated to deal with a certain discussion. These
people should be trusted and respected in the community.
* The individual should be approached as non-confrontationally as
possible, and in a discreet setting. Individuals should not be called out
in public meetings or on mailing lists for their behaviour (except
possibly in chronic cases - but this can be risky). A one-on-one is
usually the best method since it prevents a person from feeling they are
being ganged up on.
* Security discussions are not an opportunity to brow-beat or cut-down
the work of individuals in a community. They should not be used as a way
to undercut work when other political motivations are at play.
Generally, respect for each other is paramount to any sticky political
situation. Maintaining respect for the person you are talking to will
generally help to keep defensiveness and hostility to a minmum.
There are many other points that could be made on the topic of how to
talk about security culture and practice in our communities, however I
hope this article provides a starting place for thinking about when,
where and how you will make these discussions happen where you are.
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