[mobglob-discuss] Revolutionary Socialists and the Venezuelan revolution

[Andy Lehrer]

http://www.socialistworld.net

web site of the committee for a workers' international
21 June 2004

Venezuela

Revolutionary Socialists and the Venezuelan revolution

The revolutionary crisis in Venezuela has entered a new and critical phase.
The left-populist regime of President Hugo Chávez appears to have taken a
left turn in the face of a renewed threat from reaction.

Tony Saunois, CWI

On two occasions, an attempted coup in April 2002 and during an employers¹
lockout between December 2002 and January 2003, the working class and poor,
through their own spontaneous mass movements from below, defeated these
attempts at reaction. These reactionary attacks on the regime have now been
followed by others. Firstly, a plot was exposed involving over 100 members
of right-wing death squads from Colombia. This force entered Venezuela in
collusion with sections of the ruling class in Caracas and was part of a
plot to destabilise the Chávez regime and assassinate him. It was this
threat that provoked a turn to the left by Chávez. As we have explained in
'Venezuela - a new phase in the revolution' (24 May 2004) Chávez for the
first time directly attacked capitalism and raised the issue of arming the
population. 

These latest threats against the Chávez regime are taking place in a
Œdemocratic¹ guise. The opposition has Œsucceeded¹ in obtaining the
necessary 2.44 million signatures needed under the ŒBolivarian¹ constitution
to force a referendum on Chávez¹s Presidency. This is part of a twin track
approach by US imperialism and reaction to overthrow Chávez. One involves
the attempts to overthrow him by a coup whilst the other, to remove him by
the Œlegal¹ constitutional route. The referendum on his rule is further
evidence of the creeping counter-revolution which is under way in Venezuela.

These dramatic events are of crucial importance to the Latin American and
international working class. The CWI has frequently analysed these
developments at each turn of events and positively argued for the programme,
ideas, and actions that the working class needs to take in order to defeat
the threat of reaction, overthrow capitalism and establish a workers¹ and
peasants¹ government that will begin the task of building socialism. The
questions of revolution and counter-revolution which are posed in Venezuela
raise many decisive questions for Marxists. In particular, how to analyse
and approach such processes and, most importantly, what are the tasks of
revolutionary socialists in such crucial situations. There are therefore
many lessons for the international working class to be drawn from what is
happening in Venezuela.

The International Marxist Tendency, (IMT), and especially one of its main
leaders, Alan Woods, have produced a series of articles and other material
dealing with events in Venezuela. Although this group is not of great
significance in itself, nevertheless the ideas that it has put forward, in
particular on the role of Hugo Chávez and the approach Marxists should take
towards him, echo ideas which are quite widespread amongst socialists and
others opposing imperialism and capitalism. For this reason the CWI has
decided to produce these comments dealing with the revolution and
counter-revolution in Venezuela and comment on some of the ideas and methods
advocated by Alan Woods and the IMT. We welcome any constructive and
informed criticism to these comments as part of the discussion about the
lessons of the revolutionary process in Venezuela.

In his material Woods frequently denounces what he refers to as Œsects¹ or
Œsectarians¹, who he never specifies. Presumably he is referring to the
various groups and parties in Latin America who adhere to Trotskyism, many
of which have larger forces than his own organisation. The CWI does not
agree with many of the methods and ideas defended by these organisations.
Yet, Woods falls into the same trap as the Fourth International, FI, until
recently known as the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, USFI,
the international Trotskyist organisation of Ernest Mandel) fell into on
other occasions in their attitude towards various political trends usually
associated with sections of the Stalinists and reformists and adopted an
uncritical approach towards them.

For example, in Yugoslavia in 1948, they wrongly regarded Tito as an
Œunconscious¹ Trotskyist when he and his regime came into conflict with
Stalin in the Soviet Union. Michael Raptis, known as Pablo, then Secretary
of the ISFI at the time (forerunner of the USFI/FI), also adopted an
uncritical approach towards the leadership of the Algerian revolution
between 1960-65. Pablo acted as an official adviser to the radical
nationalist President Ben Bella, and was Minister for Abandoned Properties.
He eventually broke with Trotskyism and in the 1970¹s became an adviser to
the leaders of the Greek Socialist Party, PASOK, Andreas Papandreou. Woods
has attempted to play the same role in relation to Chávez but without a
ministerial portfolio.

The role of revolutionary socialists

Important lessons can be learned from the wrong methods and ideas defended
by the IMT relating to Venezuela. One of the most important questions is the
role and responsibilities of revolutionary socialist organisations when
intervening in periods of intense class conflict such as exists in Venezuela
today.

The IMT have launched a solidarity campaign; ŒHands off Venezuela¹ which
seems to have been endorsed by Hugo Chávez. Chávez, in his weekly TV
Presidential broadcast ŒAlo Presidente¹, has made quite extensive reference
to a book written by Woods, ŒReason in Revolt¹. Alan Woods, who recently
visited Venezuela, has met and dined with Chávez and produced a quite
extensive account of this event, ŒEncounters with Hugo Chávez¹ (29 April
2004). Since then he has also produced a series of articles including a
two-part ŒTheses on revolution and counter-revolution in Venezuela¹ (20 May
2004) and more recently an article on the referendum, ŒVenezuela: Bolivarian
masses anger at referendum decision¹ (04 June 2004).

This material reveals two main features about the methods of this grouping
and the analysis it makes of events in Venezuela. Firstly, it shows a
pronounced opportunism, especially in the approach it takes towards Hugo
Chávez. This includes, for Marxists and workers in general, a repugnant
Œcult of the personality¹. (A glance at the website of this organisation
illustrates that this is one of the hallmarks of this organisation in
dealing with its own leaders.)

The second feature is an extremely dangerous tendency for a group which
claims to defend the methods and ideas of Marxism, to Œdress up¹ or ignore
some of the complications and difficulties in the revolutionary events which
are shaking Venezuela. Consequently important weaknesses and deficiencies in
the movement ­ in particular the lack of a socialist consciousness and
leadership, and what consequences this has had for the movement, are simply
brushed aside.

The CWI, from the election of Chávez in 1998, has taken a positive approach
to these events. We have fully recognised and frequently commented on the
significance and importance of events in Venezuela. Yet the task of Marxists
is not to ignore or refuse to comment on weaknesses, complications and
obstacles faced by the movement, or incorrect policies and actions advocated
by political parties and individual leaders.

Throughout Woods¹s material there are generally correct points which all
those supporting Marxist ideas would agree with. The articles are also
peppered with a veneer of Œinsurance clauses¹, generally correct statements
and mild warnings about Chávez, and perspectives for the movement in
Venezuela. However, when these are stripped away what is revealed is that
the principal political objective of the IMT and Woods is to act as
left-wing advisers to Chávez and to try and build their own organisation on
his coat-tails. This method can also allow Chávez to use this grouping as a
left cover to justify his policies and programme. Rather than emphasising
the need for independent action and a revolutionary socialist programme to
be carried through primarily working from below (which if Chávez then
supported, all well and good), their main objective is to advise Chávez what
to do and convince him to carry this out largely from above.

In his article, ŒMarxists and the Venezuelan Revolution¹ (April 2004), we
are correctly told by Alan Woods "The revolution has carried out an
ambitious programme of reforms in the interests of the masses, but has not
yet abolished capitalism. That constitutes its major weakness and the
greatest threat to its future." In ŒTheses on revolution and
counter-revolution in Venezuela - Part One', we are also told: "All attempts
at compromise are futile", and "The revolution has not yet passed the point
of no return. All the gains made by the masses under the Chávez government
can still be liquidated." A programme to establish a workers¹ democracy is
also put forward which we would not disagree with.

However, alongside this Œinsurance clause¹ we find the real objective ­ to
start primarily at the top and convince Chávez of the need for a
revolutionary socialist programme. This was hinted at before Woods met
Chávez in an article he wrote in 2002 ŒVenezuela between revolution and
counter-revolution¹. Here he advises: ŒHugo Chávez should base himself on
the masses and the soldiers who are with the masses Š. Do not trust those
who pose as loyalists but who advocate a policy of conciliation with the
enemy and complain about the Œmasses going too far¹! Remember the fate of
Salvador AllendeŠ" While this in itself is a correct point, Wood¹s real
message is, ŒDo not trust them, trust us we will give you better advice!¹

Following his meeting and dinner with Chávez in ŒEncounters with Hugo
Chávez¹, Woods returns to this theme: "The reformist and social democratic
elements are weak or non-existent in the rank and file but strong at the
top. They are constantly giving Chávez incorrect advice ­ advice that can
ruin the revolution." While it is unlikely that reformism is Œnon-existent¹
in the rank and file, for Woods the whole issue of the struggle between the
classes is reduced to a struggle to win the ear of Hugo Chávez!

In the same article he sets himself laudable criteria and tells us that he
approaches the Venezuelan revolution:"Not as an external observer, and
certainly not as a sycophant and flatterer. Flattery is the enemy of
revolutions because it is the enemy of truth, and revolutions need above all
to know the truth. The phenomenon of Œrevolutionary tourism¹ I find
profoundly abhorrentŠ.At the same time the true friends of the revolution
Šwill always speak their minds without fear. Where we consider that the
right road is being taken, we will praise. Where we think that mistakes are
being made, we will give friendly but firm criticism. What other kind of
behaviour should be expected of real revolutionaries and internationalists?"
(ŒEncounters with Hugo Chávez¹).

Indeed! However, unfortunately he does not live up to his own criteria. This
report of his meeting with Chávez is in fact revealing about both Chávez and
Woods. In it, Woods does not shy away from any self-flattery. Having
introduced himself to Chávez as author of his book, ŒReason in Revolt¹ he
proudly quotes Chávez: "ŠA broad smile lit up his face. ŒThat is a fantastic
book I congratulate you¹. Then he announced: "You must all read this book!"
Woods continues that Chávez "Šspoke with obvious enthusiasm: "You know I
have got that book at my bedside and I am reading it every nightŠ" Chávez
continues quoting from the book referring to a section dealing with a
critical point in chemistry where a certain amount of energy is needed to
bring about a qualitative change (known as Gibb¹s energy) ­ which Chávez
apparently refers to regularly.

Chávez grasps the need for a qualitative leap?

Following such praise from a President what conclusion is drawn by Woods? He
says it is no accident that Chávez refers to this section because the
Venezuelan revolution has also reached a critical point (which is correct
TS). But, he continues, "Chávez has grasped the fact that the revolution
needs to make a qualitative leap, and that is why that passage in the book
grasped his attention." (emphasis ­ TS).

Perhaps for this reason the leadership of the Pakistani section of the IMT,
whose MP for the People¹s Party of Pakistan Manzoor Ahmed was in Venezuela
with Woods, is verbally claiming that Chávez is now a member of the IMT!

Exactly what Chávez has grasped is not revealed. If he has understood the
need for a qualitative leap in the revolution then what is the evidence for
it? Nothing is offered by Woods to substantiate such a bold claim. The
reader is left to speculate on what such a qualitative leap should comprise.

The flattery heaped on Woods by Chávez is then responded to in kind in his
second encounter with Chávez. In 2002 in the article, ŒVenezuela between
revolution and counter-revolution¹ we were told: "Undoubtedly, a great
responsibility rests on the shoulders of the President." Then following
Wood¹s meeting and dinner with him in 2004 we are told: "Hugo Chávez is the
man at the centre of the storm. No matter what one thinks about this man, he
has broken the dam and opened the floodgates. He alone has dared to confront
the power of the oligarchy and defy the might of American imperialism."
(ŒMarxism and the Venezuelan Revolution¹, emphasis ­ TS).

So it is all down to Chávez, the masses are simply sidelined. Chávez Œbroke
the dam¹. It is as though Chávez just led the way and the masses followed.
Chávez, when elected in 1998, acted as a catalyst (which he was able to do
as Woods correctly says, because of the vacuum which existed and still
exists), around which all of the anger and opposition to the ruling class
and neo-liberalism gravitated. He was thrust into power by the masses
reflecting the seething demand for change and an end to the old order. Of
course, Chávez helped embolden the movement by giving expression to the
demand for change. From a poor background he speaks the language of workers,
rather than the arrogant and contemptuous attitude towards workers of former
political leaders. Chávez articulates the sentiments and feelings of the
oppressed and downtrodden. He undoubtedly feels like a breath of fresh air
for the Venezuelan masses and they enthusiastically support him. But the
mass movement itself then, in turn, pushed Chávez forward.

Under pressure from the working class and the mass movement he may still be
pushed in a more radical or left direction. It is, as Woods says, a
dialectical relationship although he does not explain what he means by this.
In dialectics truth is always concrete. Marxists need to ask concretely what
has been the role of Chávez at each critical turn in the situation. This
crucial question is not addressed by Woods other than to say that he has
played a Œprogressive role¹.

Woods seems mesmerised by Chávez and his relationship with the masses and,
we are informed, would like to write a book on the subject. The masses, he
says, "Identify themselves with him as the man who first awakened them to
political life and who has given voice to their aspirations. They personify
the Revolution in him." (Marxists and the Venezuelan Revolution 4 April
2004.)

There is no doubt that the masses in Venezuela see Chávez as championing
their interests against the corrupt parasites who have previously governed
Venezuela. However, the support, enthusiasm and illusions which exist in
Chávez are not some new historical phenomena. There are many examples of
such levels of support for leaders of the movement, in many cases leaders
that were far more left wing than Chávez has been up until now. Some went
further in challenging capitalism, describing themselves as socialists and
even Marxists. Allende enjoyed massive support from the Chilean workers
during the revolution between 1970 - 73. Five hundred thousand marched in
Santiago just days before the coup on September 11, 1973. "Allende, Allende
el pueblo ti defiende!" ­ Allende, Allende the people will defend you! - was
chanted as they marched past the Presidential Palace.

George Papandreou senior, who founded PASOK in 1974, argued in 1975: "If by
the word Marxist we mean the method of analysis which we inherited from
Marx, which talks of class struggles, of the structure of powerŠwe are
obliged as a socialist movement to say YES." Mario Soares, the leader of the
Portuguese Socialist Party following the revolution in 1974, proclaimed the
party to be Marxist and offered to show anybody the door who did not accept
this. What of the radical nationalist Peronist leaders like Eva Peron,
affectionately known to the masses in Argentina as Evita, or of Che Guevara?

Of course the leadership of a mass revolutionary party and of individuals is
critical during the process of revolution and counter-revolution. Yet at the
end of the day it was not the popularity of these leaders or simply the way
they "interacted" with the masses which was decisive. The acid test was the
programme and actions advocated by them, in the run up to and at the
critical moment of revolution and counter-revolution. Unfortunately, the
ideas, policies and programme they advocated were not those which could take
the working class forward to carry through the socialist revolution.

Some like Allende were heroically killed in the course of the struggle. Che
Guevara was and remains extremely popular and heroically fought for
socialism but unfortunately with the wrong methods. Others like Papandreou
fully embraced capitalism and moved to the right. Although there are many
differences between these and other leaders, the central issue was that they
lacked the programme, perspective and methods necessary for the working
class to win power and carry through the socialist revolution.

Venezuela, the Cuban revolution and hybrid regimes.

To claim that Chávez alone has defied the Venezuelan oligarchy and the power
of imperialism is to say the least somewhat Œover egging the pudding¹. This
not only sidelines the working class mass movement, it exaggerates how far
the Chávez regime has actually gone in Œdefying the oligarchy and
imperialism¹. Chávez¹s regime certainly is a thorn in the side of US
imperialism, Bush and the ruling classes of Latin America who want his
government removed. Venezuela has been one of the main advocates for higher
oil prices and the US evidently does not want such an Œuntrustworthy¹ regime
in control of one of its largest suppliers of imported oil. The Chávez
regime has also been a problem for US imperialism in Colombia and opposed
the US intervention in Iraq.

However, it has not yet gone as far as other regimes in challenging
imperialist interests. Following the revolution, the Cuban regime of Castro,
under massive pressure from the masses and because of the embargo imposed by
US imperialism, went much further and nationalised Cuban and US companies
and abolished capitalism ­ albeit through the establishment of a regime
which was based not upon a workers¹ democracy but a bureaucratic privileged
layer.

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, which came to power having smashed the
Somoza state machine, also went much further than Chávez and nationalised
some important sections of the economy including some US interests. Yet
capitalism was not overthrown (unlike Cuba) and this eventually allowed the
counter-revolution to triumph, with the ruling class regaining control of
the state machine and society. This was with the collusion of the Sandinista
leadership (see CWI material on Nicaragua).

In Chile under Allende important US interests were nationalised along with
40% of the economy. These and other regimes were forced by the pressure of
the mass movement to go much further in Œdefying¹ US imperialism than Chávez
has thus far been prepared to go.

In ŒEncounters with Hugo Chávez¹, an exaggerated assessment of the stage of
the revolution in Venezuela and Chávez¹s role in this is made. We are told:
"Hugo Chávez¹s Bolivarian Revolution is a direct threat to US imperialism
because of the example it gives to the oppressed masses in the rest of Latin
America." In the same article Woods also refers to his own speeches in which
he argued that the Venezuelan revolution is "an inspiration to the workers
of the whole world: you have accomplished miracles; the driving force of the
revolution is the working class and the masses, and that is the secret of
its future success. However, the revolution has not been finished and will
not be finished unless and until you destroy the economic power of the
bankers and capitalistsŠ" (emphasis - TS).

It is true that the masses in Venezuela have conducted tremendous struggles
and taken important initiatvies, especially in defeating the attempted coup
(April 2002) and bosses lockout (December 2002/January 2003). It is also
true that the future success of the revolution lies in destroying the
economic power of the capitalists. However, this has not yet happened and,
what is more to the point, it is not yet threatened by Chávez. The
Venezuelan revolution has the potential to develop in this way but it has
not yet done so and therefore is not yet posing a direct and immediate
threat to the interests of imperialism. This does not mean that US
imperialism is content to leave Chávez in power. On the contrary, US
imperialism and the representatives of Latin American capitalism, like Fox
in Mexico, Lagos in Chile and even Lula in Brazil, have all abandoned Chávez
and want to see an end to his regime. They fear above all that the movement
of the masses in Venezuela will drive the situation further to the left and
may then directly threaten their interests. They are also fearful of the
example the struggle of the Venezuelan masses will give to the workers in
their own countries.

These fears are well justified. The pressure of the masses to take the
revolution forward and the threat of reaction may drive the Chávez regime to
more directly threaten capitalist interests by, for example, nationalising
important sectors of the economy.

However, this has not yet taken place. The rhythm of the struggle between
revolution and counter-revolution may now put this on the agenda but this is
not automatic and it is not certain it will develop if the
counter-revolution is able to secure a victory before these processes
develop. For Woods however, the process is apparently all predetermined
irrespective of the outcome of the struggle between the class and the role
of the leadership. He concludes ŒTheses on revolution and counter-revolution
in Venezuela ­ part one¹ saying: "The Venezuelan revolution, following the
excellent example of the American Revolution (1776) will likewise not
hesitate to take measures to eliminate the economic power of the
counter-revolutionary minority." Yet, this is exactly what Chávez has done ­
hesitated to take the measures necessary to eliminate the economic power of
the counter-revolutionaries. Moreover, in 1776 a social revolution was not
carried through. Property confiscated from the pro-British capitalists was
given to the bourgeoisie who supported the establishment of an independent
capitalist USA. 

The outcome of any revolution is not preordained and depends on many
factors, not the least important of which is the consciousness of the masses
and the role of the leadership. The fact that the revolution is not yet
challenging capitalism is a factor which has also weakened the international
impact of the revolution on the consciousness of the working class.
Unfortunately, it is simply not true that the movement in Venezuela has yet
been an inspiration to the workers of the whole world. It simply does not
compare with the impact of the Cuban revolution or even events in Chile
under Allende on the international working class.

There is undoubtedly sympathy and support for Chávez and opposition to
imperialism¹s attempt to overthrow his regime especially in Latin America.
However, the working class has not been inspired or motivated to anything
like the same extent as they were during the Cuban, Chilean or even
Nicaraguan revolutions and others.

The decisive factor which has diminished the impact of events in Venezuela
and even limited how far the revolution has gone in Venezuela is that the
movement there has not yet embraced the idea of the socialist alternative to
capitalism. Neither has Chávez yet struck major blows against the interests
of imperialism. The revolution is not consciously or clearly under the
leadership of the working class. An additional factor is also the throwing
back in socialist consciousness internationally and absence of powerful
parties of the working class which would be able to mobilise international
support for the Venezuelan workers.

The masses have moved against the old corrupt political elite, against
neo-liberalism and even against the system. These are extremely significant
developments and represent the first steps in a new wave of struggle by the
working class in Venezuela and Latin America as a whole. But they have not
embraced the idea of the alternative of socialism.

This is in contrast to other revolutionary movements in the past. The
revolution in Cuba rapidly evolved in this direction and therefore had a
much greater international impact than Venezuela has so far done. In Cuba,
capitalism was overthrown and consequently the lives of the masses were
transformed. Illiteracy was abolished, a free health system was introduced,
food and adequate housing were provided and life expectancy was raised to
levels comparable with the industrialised capitalist countries. The former
ruling elite around Batista was forced to flee and the playground for US
businessmen was closed to them. These gains were made possible because of
the introduction of a state-owned planned economy which received economic
subsidies from the Soviet Union.

However, despite these tremendous gains, which resulted in overwhelming
international support and sympathy for the Cuban revolution, it did not
result in the establishment of a genuine workers¹ democracy where society
was democratically controlled and managed by the working class. Instead, a
privileged bureaucratic layer ran society, with the broad mass support of
the population but without the existence of a workers¹ democracy where the
working class democratically and consciously controlled and planned society.
A clear perspective and policy to spread the revolution internationally and
especially through Latin America by the establishment of a democratic
Socialist Federation of Latin America was also lacking.

The establishment of such a bureaucratic regime was possible because
although there was and is massive support for the revolution, the working
class was not consciously leading the revolution and there was no mass
revolutionary socialist party, unlike the Russian Revolution in October
1917. In Cuba, the revolution was therefore carried through in a distorted
way under the leadership of the guerrilla fighters around Fidel Castro. In
Chile, although capitalism was not overthrown, the movement rapidly unfolded
under the banner of socialism and was clearly led by the working class. This
is not yet the case in Venezuela or in other massive upheavals in Latin
America such as Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador.

The weakness of socialist consciousness in these recent movements has
complicated how the revolutionary events have unfolded in Venezuela. It has
given rise to a far more protracted struggle. The absence of a revolutionary
socialist alternative can lead to many ebbs and flows in the class struggle.
It can mean that the clash between the classes can be fought out over quite
a protracted period of time. In some countries, because of the deadlock
between the classes which can arise from this situation it can lead to the
emergence of hybrid regimes. Such regimes can clash with capitalism and
imperialism and can encroach on their economic and class interests but do
not lead to the overthrow of capitalism and establishment a regime of
workers¹ democracy.

The emergence of these types of regimes is a possibility in the next period
in some countries. A deep crisis of capitalism and massive radicalisation in
society can push petty bourgeois leaders, including sections of the armed
forces, to go much further than they intended in attacking the interests of
capitalism. However, if in such conditions the working class does not
embrace the idea of the socialist revolution and a mass revolutionary
socialist party is absent, a certain Œstalemate¹ in the class struggle can
develop for a period. This stalemate cannot last indefinitely and would
eventually lead either to the working class taking power or capitalism being
able to fully reassert its control over society.

There is an element of this today in Venezuela. Although capitalism has not
been overthrown, important reforms have been introduced. Millions of acres
of land have been distributed to peasant co-operatives. Three million
additional young people have been given secondary and primary education.
Over one million have been lifted out of illiteracy. These reforms (largely
made possible because of the oil revenues and because of some support the
regime has received from Cuba) have all won enthusiastic support from the
masses. At the same time the regime has made only limited encroachments
against the capitalists economically.

Yet the ruling class has partially lost control of the state machine. A
limited purge of the military officer caste, judiciary and powerful
management of the state-owned Oil Company PVDSA has taken place. There is a
division within the armed forces amongst the officer caste. A section of
junior officers is urging Chávez to go further to the left. Others led by
General Raúl Baduel are urging the regime to proceed very cautiously and
accept a "constitutionalist path". Another layer also wants Chávez out and
supports the opposition. The old corrupt political parties are no longer in
control. But the revolution has not yet moved to directly challenge the
capitalist system or embrace the idea of socialism.

The reactionary forces have been weakened and split and, as yet, have not
been able to strike a decisive blow at the revolution. These weaknesses of
reaction were reinforced by the two defeats it suffered at the hands of the
masses. (the attempted coup in April 2002 and the Œlockout¹ in December
2002-January 2003). This resulted in a certain standoff or stalemate in the
struggle but the situation is still favourable for the revolutionary
movement. This situation cannot continue indefinitely but may still last for
a time. The striking thing in Venezuela is that this situation has continued
for so long without the forces of reaction being able to strike a decisive
blow at the movement. A significant factor in this has been the
preoccupation of US imperialism with the crisis in Iraq which has so far
prevented the Bush administration acting more decisively against Chávez.

Following each defeat of reaction it has re-grouped and prepared to strike
again. The Œlegal¹ attempt to remove Chávez by a referendum is the latest in
a series of attempts. Imperialism and capitalism will not simply give up.
They will prepare to strike again and again until they are successful.
Despite the limited reforms which his government has been able to introduce,
a sharp economic crisis has developed ­ compounded by the economic sabotage
of the ruling class and US imperialism. This has inevitably eroded some
support for Chávez ­ especially amongst the middle class. Two thirds of the
population still live below the poverty line. Unemployment remains at
approximately 25% and from the standpoint of the middle class, most
importantly, inflation has reached 26% and will probably go even higher.

Initially Chávez enjoyed the overwhelming support of well over 60% of the
population. The failure of the regime to break from capitalism has meant
that it has not been able to overcome the underlying social, economic and
political crisis in society. This has eroded the position of the middle
class economically. The social instability which exists and the regime¹s
failure to resolve it has driven sections of the middle class to begin to
look else where for a solution and support the opposition or sections of it.
Chávez has consequently seen his support amongst the middle class eaten away
and eroded. A revolutionary socialist programme would include an appeal to
the middle class to support a workers¹ and peasants¹ government. It would
offer to use the talents of the doctors, architects, technicians,
scientists, etc. into an emergency socialist plan to rebuild the economy.

The middle class has a tendency to vacillate between the ruling class and
the working class reflecting its position in society. Having looked to
Chávez for a solution to the turmoil in society, if his regime cannot offer
them the perspective of a solution they will fall into antipathy and look
elsewhere. This process has begun to develop in Venezuela. At a certain
stage, even sections of the working class can become affected by this if the
crisis is not resolved. Such developments give the forces of
counter-revolution the social basis needed to eventually strike a decisive
blow. This now comprises the greatest threat to the revolution.

Absence of an alternative model

In the past, under similar pressures, some regimes in the neo-colonial world
moved to overthrow capitalism and landlordism but in a distorted way. As
explained earlier this took place in Cuba.

However, it was only possible for such regimes to emerge because of the
existence of the Stalinist states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In
these countries there existed a nationalised planned economy ruled by
bureaucratic one-party elites in the name of 'socialism'. These provided a
'model' of an alternative to capitalism and imperialism for some counties of
the neo-colonial world. However, the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the loss of any
Œmodel¹ to follow prevents the emergence of new regimes today.

This can mean under conditions of an intense crisis of capitalism in some
countries in the neo-colonial world Œhybrid¹ or bonapartist regimes, which
under the pressure of the masses can act against the interests of capitalism
and imperialism, as described above may emerge which can last for a
relatively lengthy period of time. The situation, however, would eventually
need to be resolved one way or the other.

As explained above, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua during the 1980s
illustrates this process. Capitalism was not snuffed out and it was
eventually able to regain control of society. This process took ten years.
It is not likely that Chávez will have ten years. The struggle will be
resolved in one way or the other. Either the working class will move to take
power and carry through the socialist revolution or the Venezuelan ruling
class with the help of US imperialism will eventually strike a decisive blow
and regain control.

Chávez has been able to sustain massive support and the masses have so far
been able to defeat the attempts of reaction to overthrow the government.
However, the situation is becoming more acute as the crisis deepens. The
current stalemate cannot continue indefinitely.

The CWI has explained on many occasions the weakening or throwing back of
socialist consciousness following the collapse of the bureaucratic regimes
and restoration of capitalism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Despite the distorted character of the Œsocialism¹ which existed in these
states they acted counterweight to imperialism, and were seen by the masses
as an alternative system to capitalism. They were seen in this way
especially in the neo-colonial world of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and
illustrated that an alternative to capitalism was possible.

The collapse of those regimes, coupled with the open acceptance of
capitalism by all of the former workers¹ parties, had the effect of
massively undermining the idea of socialism as an alternative to capitalism.
This process affected Latin America as it did other continents. The
consequences of these developments shaped the whole of the 1990s when the
Œmarket¹ appeared dominant and unchallengeable.

This situation is changing rapidly. The deepening crisis of capitalism and
imperialism has now opened a new era of struggle by the masses against
neo-liberalism and the capitalist market. This is especially the case in
Latin America. The CWI is confident that, as these struggles develop, and
through a combination of the experience of the working class and the
conscious intervention of socialists, the idea of the need for the
alternative of socialism will win massive support in the future. The
deepening crisis of capitalism on a world scale and the sharpening rhythm of
the class struggle mean that this can happen quite rapidly in the next
period and in some countries possibly very rapidly ­ including Venezuela.

Socialist consciousness and the subjective factor

However, the absence of a socialist consciousness has been one of the main
weaknesses in the stormy upheavals in Venezuela. The fact that revolutionary
events have been under the banner of ŒBolivar¹ rather than socialism is a
reflection of these processes and one of its weaknesses, which has been an
important factor that has so far held it back from going further to
challenge capitalism.

Woods correctly poses the need to resolve the absence of the subjective
factor in the building of a revolutionary socialist party. There is no doubt
that a mass Marxist party with a revolutionary socialist programme is of
critical importance. Lenin outlined four conditions necessary for a
successful socialist revolution: the ruling class needs to be split; the
working class must be willing to wage a decisive struggle and carry out the
revolution; the middle class needs to be vacillating or neutralised; and
there needs to be a mass revolutionary socialist party in existence ­ what
Marxists refer to as the conscious subjective factor. Some elements of these
factors are present in Venezuela today.

The ruling class is split; although the middle class has vacillated and
wavered big sections of it have now, however, moved into opposition to
Chávez because of the impasse in the revolution; although the working class
has shown a tremendous fighting capacity, unlike the Russian Revolution in
October 1917, its most active layer has yet to embrace the idea of socialism
as a means of inflicting a decisive defeat on the ruling class; there is, of
course, no mass revolutionary socialist party.

A related question to the subjective factor ­ the need for a mass
revolutionary party - is the issue of the political and socialist
consciousness of the masses. This has generally been absent from the
movements in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and some other Latin American
countries in the recent period. This is mainly due to the negative
consequences of the collapse of the former Stalinist states and the absence
of a powerful mass revolutionary socialist party which can explain the
alternative. The absence of a dominant socialist consciousness amongst the
masses ­ at least up until now ­ for Marxists has objective consequences
which have resulted in complexities and obstacles that need to be overcome
in the Venezuelan revolution. Woods simply ignores these features of the
movement.

The CWI does not draw overly pessimistic conclusions from the throwing back
of socialist consciousness which took place during the 1990s. On the
contrary, the events in Venezuela open a new chapter in the struggle against
capitalism where consciousness will develop and socialism can re-conquer
mass support. Marxists and the CWI have an optimistic perspective but we
must also have a realistic appraisal of the events which have thus far
unfolded. Only by facing up to the weaknesses and complexities present in
the mass movements that have rocked Latin America will it be possible to
have an accurate assessment of events and the tasks facing revolutionary
socialists. This means featuring all of the positive aspects of the mass
movement and to see the potential within it but not becoming intoxicated by
it.

Woods informs us that he presented Chávez with some books with a personal
inscription by him which Chávez describes as a "...wonderful dedication".
Chávez is, "transparently honest. His sincerity is absolutely clear, as is
his dedication to the cause of the revolution and his hatred of injustice
and oppression." We are also told of how hard Chávez works, his love of
books ­ even bad books. A health warning is then added: "Of course, none of
these qualities in and of themselves are sufficient to guarantee the victory
of the revolution, but they certainly explain his tremendous popularity with
the masses."

Chávez may have all of these qualities but we do not have a "sincerometer"
to measure the sincerity of an individual. In the last analysis it is the
ideas, programme and methods advocated by an individual and the action which
flow from them, especially a leader of a movement such as that is taking
place in Venezuela, which will determine the role they will play in the
class struggle. Without a revolutionary socialist programme and method the
laudable intentions of Chávez will not be realised.

Moreover, the continued lack of such a programme and method will eventually
open the door for a victory by reactionary forces. This is not what Chávez
intends, any more than it was Allende¹s intention in Chile. However, it will
be the consequence of the weakness of his programme and method. His regime
and the masses face the threat of a creeping counter-revolution, which as
the April coup attempt showed can assume a much sharper form at a certain
stage. Revolutions are not carried through in slow motion contrary to the
picture being presented by Chávez¹s actions so far.. At a critical stage
they need to make a decisive break with the old system and overthrow it.
This can take place even where the leadership is not consciously preparing
to do this. 

The Cuban revolution illustrates this process. A series of tit for tat blows
and counter blows between US imperialism and Castro¹s regime successively
gave the revolution a new impetus and drove it further forward until
industry was nationalised and a centralised plan was introduced which
resulted in capitalism being overthrown in 1959 - 60. If the revolution
fails to advance and take decisive blows that result in the overthrow of
capitalism, then the counterrevolution can prepare its forces and eventually
successfully strike back and defeat it.

The urgency of the Venezuelan working class acting independently and
embracing a revolutionary socialist programme is now posed as the most
important question. The price of failure for the working class is too high
to stake on winning the ear of one person alone, to carry through from above
the tasks of the socialist revolution. They need to be carried through by
the masses from below.

The April coup and Chávez

In such explosive situations as currently exist in Venezuela it is not just
words but deeds and actions which test the role of all parties and
individuals. Critical conjunctures occur in the course of the class struggle
which, reveal the strengths and weakness of all the contending forces. At
one critical point Chávez, despite his Œhonest¹ and Œgood intentions¹,
revealed his underlying weakness. He had not unfortunately Œgrasped¹ the
need for the revolution to make a Œqualitative¹ leap. That critical point
was the attempted coup in 2002.

The role of Marxists in such a situation is to point out weaknesses, not to
be negative, but in order to help the working class and mass movement
overcome them, thereby taking the revolution forward on the basis of a
genuine socialist programme. If, by adopting such a programme, the working
class can win the support of leaders such as Chávez so much the better.
However, this will be done on the basis of explaining the incorrectness of
the ideas and methods of such leaders, not by trying to advise them and
masking what their exact role has been. Neither will it be realised by
trying to persuade them to carry out the socialist revolution from above.

The attempted coup in 2002 revealed two things. Firstly, it demonstrated the
tremendous potential power of the working class. Secondly, it showed
Chávez¹s weaknesses and inability to take the revolution forward. Chávez was
saved and the coup defeated by the spontaneous mass movement of the working
class, not because of what he or his co-leaders did.

In his interview with Chávez, Woods quotes him relating what happened during
the attempted coup when he was arrested. Some of these reminiscences are of
interest. However, critically there is no reference to the lessons, if any,
that Chávez has drawn from this decisive episode. Significantly, Woods does
not give any indication as to whether he challenged Chávez on this.

The attempted coup against Chávez was defeated not by himself alone. It was
the intervention of the working class and urban poor who flooded onto the
streets and marched to the Mira Flores Presidential palace to oppose the
coup and demand Chávez be re-instated. Workers marched chanting: "The same
ones are back again!" and "The cream at the top ­ the thieves of the old
regime have returned!" This mass spontaneous movement of workers was
accompanied by a revolt of important sections of the rank and file of the
armed forces.

The Spanish daily paper El País carried a report illustrating what happened
when Chávez was imprisoned on Ochila Island. A young rank and file soldier
waited until the officers had left the room and then asked Chávez: "Look, my
Commandante, clarify one thing for me. Is it true that you have resigned?"
Chávez replied, "No son, I have not resigned and I will not resign." The
soldier then said, "But this is what is being said throughout the country.
They say you resigned and left the country." The soldier asked him to write
something and leave it in the rubbish bin and he would return and get it
laterŠ The soldier then faxed this statement from Chávez to Caracas where
thousands were distributed amongst the demonstrators." (El País, 15 April
2002).

The Financial Times reported that the Palace Guard remained loyal to Chávez
because they were disgusted when they saw, "...Carmona and the oligarchs
come in and begin pouring champagne and whisky. The guards hated that."
(Financial Times, 15 April 2002.)

In December 2001, amidst rumours of a coup conspiracy, Chávez had declared:
"ŠI will not be toppled like the Chilean President Salvador Allende". Like
Chile in 1973, there was widespread speculation about a coup attempt. Chávez
evidently saw the danger. However, what did he do to try and prevent it? No
rank and file soldiers committees were formed to purge the coup
conspirators. The workers were not formed into armed militias.

It is only necessary to see the video news reports of the attempted coup at
the time to see that Chávez was amongst the most surprised at his own
re-instatement to the Presidency. The excellent documentary ŒChávez ­ inside
the coup¹ (By Kim Barley and Donncha O¹Brian) broadcast by the Irish
television network RTE1 makes this very clear and clearly shows that it was
a mass movement of the working class and urban poor which defeated reaction.

Woods rightly argues: "After the defeat of the coup it would have been
possible to carry out a socialist revolution swiftly and painlessly.
Unfortunately, the opportunity was lostŠ." (ŒMarxists and the Venezuelan
Revolution¹, 4 April 2004).

But who lost the opportunity? Unfortunately, when Chávez was taken from his
captors by the working class and put back into the Presidential Palace his
first appeal was for "national unityŠnational reconciliation and for people
to return to their homes". Some of the pro-coup former managers were
re-appointed to the board of the state oil company, PVDSA! In other words he
tried to reach a compromise with the ruling class and imperialism and made
no attempt to take the revolution forward to challenge capitalism.

Chávez¹s role, at this critical conjuncture, is not commented on at all by
Woods. Peppered throughout the articles of IMT are correct general
formulations such as "The working class must at all times preserve and build
its own class organisations, its unions, factory committees etcŠThe Marxist
wing of the movement will maintain its full political independence ­ its own
papers, magazines, book, leafletsŠ" . Socialism is argued for as a necessity
but behind the Marxist and revolutionary phraseology lies the real
objective, which is to advise Chávez.

In the rush to get his ear, they neglect a detailed analysis and criticism
of his role at each critical conjuncture of the movement. This opportunistic
method leaves the working class less prepared to overcome the weaknesses,
doubts and hesitations of Œhonest¹ leaders like Chávez.

Unfortunately, Chávez¹s incorrect policy following the attempted coup in
2002, has been repeated by him when faced with the struggle over the
referendum. The opposition, with the endorsement of the electoral
commission, CNE, claim that they have secured sufficient signatures to force
a recall referendum. It is crystal clear that the figures obtained by them
are based on a massive fraud. Within a few days of the results being
declared in which the opposition got 16,000 signatures more than those
needed to force a referendum it has been revealed that 11,000 names
discovered so far are in fact those of dead people! More are being revealed
each day. 

Yet, despite this fraud Chávez agreed to proceed with the referendum arguing
he will win it and it will strengthen the legitimacy of his regime. This was
an incorrect policy in our opinion. Despite this mistake, it seems that the
move may back-fire on the opposition if Chávez defeats the opposition ­
which is possible or even likely. However the reactionary forces will not
accept this result an d will denounce his victory as a fraud and prepare new
attempts to overthrow him. Rather than accept this result it would have been
far better to strengthen the community organisations and build workers¹
elected councils, to link these up locally, on a citywide basis, regionally
and nationally and go onto the offensive. Together with rank and file
committees of the soldiers these bodies should establish an armed workers¹
militia and take the necessary step to take the revolution forward and
overthrow capitalism. (See ŒVenezuela ­ a decisive turn in the crisis¹ 10
June 2004 for a full analysis by the CWI.)

Unfortunately, Chávez repeated the same mistake he made at the time of the
coup and tried to appease the reactionary forces. On this occasion Woods has
summoned the courage to say that, "We think that this is a mistake."
(ŒVenezuela: Bolivarian masses anger at referendum decision¹, 4 June 2004.)
In ŒTheses on revolution and counter-revolution in Venezuela -Part Two¹,
written on 20 May 2004, Woods also, somewhat belatedly, criticises Chávez
for his role during the coup. He writes: "After the first coup Hugo Chávez
tried to be conciliatory to the reactionaries. He tried to negotiate with
them and even reinstated the old directors of the PVDSA. They rewarded him
by organising the bosses lock out Š" Maybe Woods in the light of his recent
criticism of Chávez would like also to revise his contention that, "Chávez
has grasped the need for the revolution to make a qualitative leap"?

We are told that "There are many things that indicate that Chávez is
preparing a sharp turn to the left" (Encounters with Hugo Chávez) which is
certainly a possibility in the crisis which is developing. However, the
issues that arise from this possibility are left hanging in mid-air by him.
A move to the left could be forced upon him by a combination of massive
pressure from below combined with a possible attempt to overthrow his
government. But if such a shift to the left did not go as far as to
overthrow capitalism it would pose all of the same contradictions in a
sharpened form. It would rouse the wrath of imperialism still further and
pose in a sharper way the need to complete the tasks of the socialist
revolution.

Woods refers to recent speeches by Chávez in which he speaks ambiguously
about the need to break with, "the capitalist schema which has been sown in
the countryŠ and the need to democratise the economy in order to transform
the socio-economic modelŠ." It is unclear if Chávez is saying he supports
breaking with capitalism or simply changing the Œschema¹ for a more Œhumane
system¹ within the framework of capitalism. But still, there is no
indication of what his programme is.

The arming of the masses

Woods quotes Chávez calling for "A general arming of the people through the
reserve forces and the Army, which will guarantee that we will fulfil our
historic mission and that the revolution will not be betrayed" (Correro de
Caracas, April 2004, emphasis in the original). Chávez has argued that,
"Every fisherman, student, every member of the people, must learn how to use
a rifle, because it is the concept of the armed people together with the
National Armed Forces to defend the sacred soil of Venezuela"

This is a crucial question at this conjuncture in Venezuela. Like all other
issues during such a sharp clash between revolution, and counter-revolution
the decisive issue is not only a general declaration but concrete actions
and deeds. These apparently revolutionary sounding declarations also need a
closer examination. They include some features typical to what Marxists have
analysed as Œcentrist¹ leaders in the past. Centrism uses Marxist and
revolutionary language but acts in the same way as the reformists in deeds.
It is vague and imprecise and usually lacks clear or concrete demands and
especially actions. The emergence of powerful left centrist parties
indicates an attempt by the rank and file to embrace genuine Marxist ideas.

Centrist leaders, however, can use revolutionary sounding language as a
means of averting independent revolutionary actions by the working class.
Despite the revolutionary sounding phrases of centrist leaders in the past,
when it came to actual deeds these leaders acted as the reformists or
vacillated with disastrous consequences for the revolution. This was the
case with Serrati during the Italian revolution in 1920 and Andres Nin the
leader of the POUM (Unified Workers¹ Marxist Party) in the Spanish Civil War
in 1936 - 7. Such figures as Nin and Serrati were far to the left of Chávez
and openly proclaimed their adherence to Marxism and socialism.

It remains to be seen if Chávez actually proceeds to undertake the arming of
the working class and the general population. From the available information
there is no indication that anything concrete is being undertaken. A speech
supporting it is not enough.

In Chile, prior to the coup in 1973, the masses demanded arms to defend the
revolution. Five hundred thousand marched before the Presidential Palace
demanding guns. The leaders of the movement at the time repeatedly claimed
that arms were being obtained or that they had them and they would be
distributed "when the time was right". A layer of activists had some arms.
Some factories had even established defence squads. However, even this was
not enough. When the decisive moment struck no arms appeared and the working
class was left defenceless.

When reaction threatened, in Barcelona in 1936, the working class went onto
the offensive. The army barracks were stormed and the working class took
control of the city and defeated reaction. Reaction eventually triumphed
because of the wrong policies of the Socialist (PSOE) and Communist (PCE)
Parties and the mistakes of the POUM (Unified Marxist Workers¹ Party).

In Chile in 1973, rather than go onto the offensive and march to La Moneda
Presidential Palace to confront the counter-revolution the workers,
following the advice of their leaders, went to the factories to Œturn them
into fortresses of the revolution¹ only to be slaughtered there by the
pro-coup sections of the army. Allende had prepared a noose for his own neck
when he signed the constitutional pact with the bourgeois parties which,
amongst other things, bound him not to interfere with the armed forces. In
the run- up to the coup rank-and-file sailors and junior officers, from
Concepción, uncovered the plot. They presented Allende with it along with a
counter-plan to take the fleet out to sea and prevent it. The rank-and-file
sailors were arrested and tortured for their efforts to prevent the coup
which eventually took place on September 11, 1973.

The speech of Chávez cited by Woods is extremely vague. Is Chávez urging
that the reserve forces and the army distribute arms to the working class or
is he in fact saying that the mobilisation of the Reserves will be the basis
of the arming of the population, i.e. a mobilisation of a section of the
existing state machine? It is totally unclear if Chávez is calling for the
establishment of a workers¹ militia and he speaks only vaguely of the
Œconcept¹ of the armed people.

The Venezuela section of the IMT ­ Revolutionary Marxist Current ­ RCM was a
merger between ŒEl Topo Obrero¹ ­ Workers¹ Mole - and ŒEl Militante¹, has a
journal called ŒEl Topo Obrero¹. It carried a lead article on its front
page, a picture of Chávez, and a quote from him which dominated the page. It
is reminiscent of all of the vacuous centrist phrases of the leaders in
Chile 30 years ago. "Each fisherman, each student and every person should
learn how to use a rifle because this is the concept of the people under
arms." 

In Chile the movement went beyond a Œconcept¹. The industrial ŒCordones¹
(elected committees of delegates from the factories which linked up on a
district and citywide basis) defence groups were organised in many factories
and in some shanty towns where some limited military training took place.
However, tragically, even this was not enough. The mass arming of the
working class through the establishment of a workers¹ militia under the
democratic check and control of elected workers committees ­ in Chile the
ŒCordones¹ ­ is necessary. Arms could be obtained by linking with the rank
and file of the army and navy and the establishment of rank-and-file
committees of the army, navy and air force. The arming of the working class
represents an important stage in the revolution and is of great importance
when the situation demands it. Without a correct programme to carry through
the socialist revolution even this is not sufficient to ensure victory for
the working class.

The Œconcept¹ of an armed people needs to be transformed into concrete
action and not be left at the level of mere phrases. It should not be
forgotten, as explained above, that Chávez has already promised they would
not do to him what they did to Allende. But for the intervention of the
working class from below reaction would already have succeeded in doing just
that. 

These are not therefore Œhair-splitting¹ points. What does the Œconcept of
the armed people¹ actually mean? What is Chávez actually doing to arm the
masses? It is necessary to strengthen the community organisations, the UNT
trade unions and to build workers¹ councils or committees to be made up of
elected delegates from all workplaces, rank-and-file soldiers from the
barracks, universities and shanty towns, and through these each workplace,
university, and shanty town should establish armed detachments. These should
draw in those sections of the army and reserves that support the masses but
be under the control of the working class. The rank-and-file soldiers¹
committees need to begin to distribute arms to the workers¹ organisations
and arrest officers who are found to be plotting with the
counter-revolution.

Chávez gives no indication of what the command structure of the Œconcept of
the armed people¹ would be or who would control it. A workers¹ militia would
need to be under the control and accountability of elected and democratic
organisations of the working class. Without this check, any armed group
formed will inevitably develop tendencies to act arbitrarily and, if not
accountable for its actions, will develop elitist and authoritarian methods.
This is a particular danger if large components of such a force are drawn
from sections of the military apparatus as would be likely in the case of
Venezuela. 

It also seems that there is another dangerous method being employed by
Chávez. Prior to this, at the time of the coup in April 2002, the masses
poured onto the streets to defend Chávez only to be sent home again
afterwards. The Œlockout¹ was broken by the masses again being summoned and
taking their own independent action. However, again following this second
defeat of reaction by the masses, decisive measures were not taken to take
the revolution forward to overthrow capitalism. Following these events the
threat from the paramilitaries was answered by the calling of mass rallies
and support for the Œconcept¹ of the armed people but as yet they have not
been armed. Now, having accepted the referendum, Chávez is mobilising the
masses in a campaign to defeat reaction at the ballot box.

The mass movement cannot be repeatedly turned on and off like a tap in this
way at each critical stage when reaction threatens. The masses have thus far
continued to answer the call at each decisive battle. However, they cannot
be summoned to action only to be stood down again repeatedly. Without a
clear programme and perspective to take the revolution forward and overthrow
capitalism, the movement will eventually tire, become exhausted and even
demoralised. The longer striking a decisive blow against reaction is
delayed, the greater will be the scope for the forces of reaction to
re-group and mobilise their forces.

The absence of a programme and perspective to take the revolution decisively
forward is also posing another danger. It is not preparing the working class
and the masses of the rest of Latin America for the struggle needed to
defeat reaction in Venezuela, imperialism and the Latin American ruling
classes who are all conspiring to overthrow the Chávez regime. The role of
US imperialism and the ruling classes of the rest of the continent in trying
to defeat the revolution in Venezuela poses this as an urgent necessity.
These reactionary forces cannot be defeated by the masses of Venezuela
alone. 

Woods tells us that Chávez is preparing a TV channel to broadcast throughout
the continent. This is welcome but, on its¹ own, is not enough. It is
necessary to build direct links with the working class in the Latin American
countries to explain to them a clear programme and the steps that the
revolution will take to overthrow capitalism and establish a democratic
socialist regime. Cháves¹s regime is not taking the steps needed to build
direct links with the working class in other countries and build an
international workers solidarity campaign.

These and other dangers appear as a closed book for Woods. He seems to have
become so enamoured with the radical sections of the military and with
Chávez in particular that he does not consider it necessary to deal with
such Œdetails¹.

As Woods correctly points out, the arming of the working class in itself
does not guarantee victory for the revolution. The working class in Spain
was armed and yet Franco¹s fascist forces still emerged triumphant in the
civil war. This was because of the treacherous role played by the PCE, PSOE
and also because of the mistakes of the POUM, led by Andres Nin. This
centrist party, which formally adhered to Marxist ideology, whose leader,
Nin, had discussed with Trotsky and at one stage supported his ideas,
conducted quite a heroic struggle and opposed the wrong ideas and methods of
the Stalinists. It used very Œrevolutionary¹ language.

However, at the decisive moment it ended up joining a Œpopular front¹ ­ a
coalition government including capitalist parties in Catalonia.
Consequently, the POUM and its leader Nin also carried an important
responsibility for the defeat of the Spanish working class because of its
incorrect policies and methods they defended. However, despite the
Œsincerity¹ of Nin, who was much further to the left than Chávez, Trotsky
still openly and explicitly criticised his mistakes and wrong methods. He
did not mask them and only offer his advice but argued for the need to build
a genuinely revolutionary party and fight for a genuinely revolutionary
socialist programme to be adopted in deeds as well as on paper.

It is not only Chávez who is speaking in terms of vague concepts rather than
a precise programme for the revolution. Following the merger of the two
groups which formed the RCM, the IMTs¹ group in Venezuela, a founding
statement of the RCM argued: "The Marxists have explained from the beginning
that the only serious way to defend the revolutionary process is not by
negotiating with the capitalists (as often the Chávez government has
attempted), but rather by deepening the revolution through socialist
measuresŠIt can be summed up in the understanding of the need to deepen the
revolution and to move towards socialismŠ"

They conclude the statement: "We must deepen the revolution through the
struggle for the demands and the democratic rights of the workers and the
people, advancing towards socialism!" (Unification of the revolutionary
currents El Topo Obrero and El Militante 6 January 2004).

What is meant by deepening the revolution and moving towards socialism? Such
a vague formulation can be interpreted in many ways. This is the same
terminology used in the past by the Stalinists to justify Œa two stages¹
theory of reaching socialism through incremental steps, of firstly building
Œdemocracy¹ and only then moving towards socialism step by step. This policy
has always resulted in a catastrophe for the working class. All Marxists
support all of the struggles for democratic rights of the working class. But
to conquer them and maintain them and end the poverty and exploitation
suffered under capitalism, these struggles need to be linked with a
programme to break from capitalism and for the working class to take power
and establish a workers¹ democracy.

The need for a clear socialist programme

So how does El Topo Obrero suggest the working class Œadvances¹ towards
socialism? We are presented with a mishmash of demands and steps to be
taken. Some of these, we are told, "Would be the nationalisation of the
banking and financial sector under social control, the nationalisation under
workers¹ control of private industry, and the running of the oil company
under workers control and management." What does Œsocial control¹ mean? It
is sufficiently vague to mean all things to all people. Why the difference
between how the banks should be run and how industry should be run? Why
should the PVDSA be run on the basis of workers¹ management and control and
industry only on the basis of workers¹ control?

The CWI has argued in our material concretely for the nationalisation of the
decisive sectors of industry and the banking sector, to be run on the basis
of democratic workers¹ control and management. In the crucially important
oil company (PVDSA), which is already nationalised, a purge of the existing
directors is needed. An important element of the day-to-day running of the
company is in the hands of the workers. This must be strengthened to full
control and the introduction of a democratic system of workers¹ management
needs to be established. The managing board of PVDSA needs to be made up of
representatives of the workers in the industry, representatives of the
working class in general and a workers¹ government. Through this, the
election of all officials subject to recall by the working class and for no
official to receive more than the average wage of a skilled worker need to
be applied. (See ŒVenezuela ­ the eye of the storm¹, February 2000 and other
articles.) 

Another important demand is for the nationalisation of the pro-coup media
under democratic workers¹ control and management. A virtual dictatorship
exists in the media in Venezuela which is overwhelmingly in the hands of
reactionary capitalists who have not been timid in their use of this weapon
against the revolution. The four main independent TV networks are all owned
by high profile businessmen who actively support the opposition. They were
ordered to pay US$2 million in taxes for providing free advertising to
support the Œlockout¹. Unfortunately, rather than take decisive measures to
break the power of "the four horsemen of the apocalypse", as Chávez has
dubbed the press tycoons, the government has introduced regulations to try
and control the media campaign. It also plans to boost spending and
resources for the state channels.

However, these measures have had little effect. Some of the government¹s
proposals have even given a propaganda weapon to the opposition and are
potentially undemocratic and could also be used against those who criticise
the regime from the left. One proposal for example demands the "respectful
portrayal of government officials"! A far better and democratic step would
be to nationalise the press and TV networks under democratic workers¹
control and management and then allocate resources and facilities on the
basis of support to each political party and group.

Analogies with the Portuguese revolution

Woods, it seems, is reluctant to raise criticism of other military forces on
the left who have made mistakes. In his analysis ŒMarxists and the
Venezuelan Revolution¹ he draws a direct parallel between events in
Venezuela and the magnificent Portuguese revolution in 1974/5.

He polemicises against unnamed sectarians who, he says, argue Œwe must not
have anything to do with army officers¹. The approach to this question and
the army in general is particularly important in Venezuela. The role of the
left-wing or radical sections of the army has been critical in Venezuela.
There is a strong radical populist tradition amongst the armed forces in
some Latin American countries ­ including Venezuela, Peru and some others -
that the CWI has commented on in our analysis of events in Venezuela and
other material.

If there are groups who say we must have nothing to do with such forces then
this is obviously wrong. Sections of the army, including its officers,
especially its junior officers can, and have, played an important role. The
rotten, decaying capitalist class, in some countries, has pushed them to
take action against capitalism. Some can be won to the ideas of socialism
and support the working class.

However, this does not mean that revolutionary socialists should turn a
blind eye to the mistakes and weaknesses of these forces. This incredibly is
what Woods does in his comments relating to the Portuguese revolution.
Firstly, he simply ignores crucial differences relating to socialist
consciousness and how far the revolution went in overthrowing capitalism in
Portugal compared with Venezuela. Then he proceeds to brush aside any
mistakes or incorrect methods used by the left-wing of the Armed Forces
Movement (MFA) in Portugal.

He quotes from a document written by Ted Grant in 1975 on the Portuguese
Revolution. One quote he gives relates to events on 11 March, 1975, when
reactionary officers attempted a coup. The workers took to the streets, the
army rebelled against the attempted coup and it collapsed. Grant correctly
says that not a single regiment could be found to act for the
counter-revolution.

Woods then concludes that "...the same lines would apply exactly to
Venezuela two years agoŠOne has only to change the names." This is not
accurate in relation to Venezuela. The paratroop regiment rebelled against
the coup as did the Presidential guard. However, the situation in the rest
of the armed forces remained unclear and many regiments only declared
against the coup once it had been defeated.

However, more importantly was what followed the attempted coups in Portugal
and Venezuela. In Portugal the revolution gathered a massive momentum and
took an enormous turn to the left. The attempted coup took place on 11 March
and was followed immediately by workers occupying the factories, shipyards
and banks, and the peasants seized the land. Within three days all banks and
insurance companies were nationalised which meant that through the
shareholdings 80% of industry and much of the land was taken over by the
state. 

By April 4, the radical army officer¹s organisation, the MFA, issued a
statement describing the revolution¹s Œtransition to socialism¹. The whole
of Portuguese society was in revolutionary ferment and embraced the idea of
a socialist revolution. No wonder the British daily newspaper, The Times,
carried an editorial with the headline "Capitalism is dead in Portugal". It
almost was. But, because the revolution was not completed, the capitalist
class was able to make a comeback and regain its control over society.
Through the agency of the Socialist Party (which was advised by the German
Social Democratic Party, SPD, acting as a conduit for the American CIA) it
was possible to breathe life back into the corpse of Portuguese capitalism.
Denationalisations were eventually carried through over a period of years
and the Portuguese Socialist Party has become one of the main parties of
Portuguese capitalism.

As explained above, the events in Venezuela following the attempted coup did
not go nearly as far as they did in Portugal. Following the defeat of the
coup, Chávez immediately sought to reach agreement with capitalism. No
nationalisations were carried out and only a limited purge of the PVDSA and
the officer caste was carried through at that stage. Chávez has recently
negotiated to establish some joint ventures with the multi-national
companies in the oil industry.

Marxists are optimists and confident in the development of the socialist
revolution. We enthusiastically look to the struggles of the working class
in Venezuela and have a positive approach to the revolutionary events which
are unfolding there. Yet it is not the duty of revolutionary socialists to
dress up or exaggerate the movement which has so far taken place. This
method does nothing to strengthen the revolution or allow the working class
to take it forward to a successful conclusion.

Woods seems very reluctant to criticise the MFA and its role in Portugal. He
says of them "It is not a question of trust. That is a moral category, not a
scientific one. What is decisive is not the moral character of the leaders
but the programme and policies. Many of the officers in Portugal were very
honest men who sincerely sided with the masses. Many of them even wanted to
carry through a profound social transformation in Portugal, but they did not
know how to carry it out."

We agree, but couldn¹t the same be said about Allende, Andres Nin indeed of
Che Guevara and many others? We have no way of measuring the sincerity of
individuals all we can do is put to the test the programme, ideas and
actions defended by individuals and groups. If they defend what we think are
incorrect ideas and methods then surely it is the duty of Marxists to say
so.

Woods then continues: "The real responsibility for the failure of the
Portuguese revolution lies not with the left wing army officers, but with
the reformist leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties who between
them wrecked the revolution. In passing we must add that the ultra-left
pseudo-Marxist sects also played a lamentable roleŠ"

So everybody is responsible ­ except the left-wing army officers. The roles
played by the forces mentioned by Woods varied. The Communist Party and the
Socialist Party leaders certainly were responsible for eventually ensuring
that capitalism was able to regain control of Portuguese society. The
counter-revolution was carried through the medium of the Socialist Party.
During the Spanish Civil War the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communist
Party (PCE) also played lamentable roles. However, did this mean that
Trotsky was any less severe in his criticism of the POUM?

Woods does not specify which "left" sections of the MFA he is referring to.
This organisation itself was not homogeneous but split into different
tendencies. The "moderate" wing of the MFA around such individuals as Melo
Antunes collaborated with the SP in initiating the rolling back the
revolution. However, the Œleft-wing¹, precisely because it did not know what
to do, made a series of mistakes and tried to impose their position from
above with no organised basis amongst the working class. They thereby
allowed the Socialist Party and others to present themselves as the
defenders of democracy against Œthe undemocratic army officers¹.

These mistakes were also an important contributing factor which led to the
defeat of the revolution and it does not benefit the interest of the
workers¹ movement to try and gloss over them. It certainly will not assist
Woods in offering the Œcorrect advice¹ to Chávez! The defeat of the
tremendous Portuguese revolution which Œalmost¹ overthrew capitalism
illustrates the crucial necessity for a mass revolutionary socialist party.
Such a party, which draws on the relevant international historical
experiences of the working class, can provide the necessary leadership to
assist the working class to take the necessary steps to overthrow capitalism
and establish a genuine regime of workers¹ democracy in which the working
class is consciously and democratically controlling and managing society and
taking the necessary steps to begin building socialism.

The question of winning junior officers and soldiers over to the side of the
revolution is important in all revolutions. In some Latin American
countries, like Venezuela, where a strong tradition of radical left populist
trends with the army exists, this question is even more important. The
question of splitting the state machine at a certain stage in the revolution
assumes a critical importance. The workers¹ movement needs a programme and
to take concrete initiatives aimed at splitting the state machine along
class lines.

"Civilians get in the way"

The socialist revolution requires both the leadership and the conscious
participation of the working class. The working class, because of its
potential collective consciousness and cohesiveness as a class, is the only
class able to draw others oppressed by capitalism behind its banner and lay
the basis for the building of a new socialist society. Sections of the armed
forces, including the junior officers, can be won to such a struggle and
play an important role.

However, without the democratic check of the working class, those sections
of the military who can find themselves playing a leading role can
inevitably develop administrative or bureaucratic tendencies towards
Œcommandism¹. Without a clear understanding of the role of the working class
in the revolution and of being subjected to its democratic check and
control, even the most Œhonest¹ and well intentioned officers can develop
such tendencies and attempt to impose their will over the working class from
above. Similar characteristics can also be seen amongst the left-wing
guerrilla organisations in the neo-colonial world.

Despite having some heroic fighters in their ranks, without an understanding
of the leading role of the working class they see their job as
Œsubstituting¹ themselves for the workers and masses. The role of the
masses, from their incorrect perspective, is to support the guerrilla forces
and not consciously lead the movement. They consequently tend to fear
independent initiatives and actions taken by the working class itself, which
is outside of their control.

In the past Chávez has indicated that he has this outlook. The British
writer, Richard Gott (an enthusiastic supporter of Chávez) in his biography
"In the shadow of the liberator"; gives a revealing account of a meeting
which took place, prior to a failed Œleft-wing¹ military uprising in 1992
led by Chávez, against the corrupt right-wing regime which was in power at
the time.

Participants in the meeting raised the question of a general strike and a
civil uprising and the need for "civil society" to have an active role in
the Œrevolutionary movement¹. Gott relates: "That is exactly what Chávez did
not want. Absolutely not! Chávez did not want civilians to participate as a
concrete force. He wanted civil society to applaud but not to participate,
which is something quite different. In this meeting a discussion erupted
during which Chávez intervened and stated bluntly; ŒCivilians get in the
way¹Š" (Page 64/65). Possibly Chávez has changed his opinion since then but
the issue still remains to be clarified and will be posed during the course
of the unfolding confrontation between revolution and counter-revolution.

Woods makes no effort to explore these questions which revolutionary
socialists need to address as they constitute an important element in the
stormy upheavals taking place in Venezuela. Possibly his reluctance to raise
criticism of the junior army officers in Portugal is because it will
complicate his intentions of advising their counterparts in Venezuela today.
If he enters the arena of the mistakes of the MFA then it will lead him
directly to the role and methods of the radical officers in Venezuela and
possibly bring an end to further encounters with Chávez.

The traditional organisations and the trade unions.

Revolution and counter-revolution test all of the ideas, methods, strategy
and tactics of Marxists. One of the distinguishing features of the
Woods/Grant group is its attitude towards the former traditional workers¹
parties. The CWI recognised the qualitative change which had taken place in
these organisations in most countries following the collapse of the former
Stalinist states. From being parties with a bourgeois reformist leadership
but with a working class ranks and file when the working class looked to
these organisations as "our party", they have become completely bourgeois
parties. The CWI, at the same time as building our own revolutionary
socialist parties, has also argued and campaigned for the establishment of
new mass workers¹ parties. The Grant/Woods organisation rejects this
analysis, refuses to acknowledge the qualitative changes which have taken
place in these parties and are imprisoned in a past historical period.
Consequently they still argue for critical support of the former bourgeois
workers¹ parties such as the British Labour Party of Blair. They still form
a part of this and other similar parties. The IMT would no doubt tell us
that in Chile Marxists should still be inside the Socialist Party, the main
prop of Lagos¹s government which has been an out-and-out opponent of Hugo
Chávez. 

In relation to Venezuela the IMT seems to be caught in somewhat of a
contradiction on this question. Rather bizarrely, Woods concludes ŒMarxists
and the Venezuelan Revolution¹ with a quote from Ted Grant regarding the
traditional mass organisations: "From within their ranks, among the working
class fighters will come the forces of Marxism-Leninism. Outside of the mass
organisations nothing of lasting substance will be created." How does this
apply to Venezuela? To which parties or organisations is he referring to?
What does this concretely mean in Venezuela?

In more recent material, where Woods deals with the trade union question in
Venezuela, he drops this point and appears to have done a volte-face on
their Œhistorical law¹ relating to the traditional mass organisations.
Venezuela has a somewhat unique situation in the trade union organisations.
The CTV (Confederation of Venezuelan Workers) is the traditional union
confederation. However, it represents a minority of the working class and in
particular a more privileged section of it. The leadership of this
organisation are corrupt gangsters, entirely linked to the old political
elite.

Yet, Woods simply ignores the "historical law" of his own organisation when
dealing with the CTV. He correctly argues in ŒTheses on revolution and
counter-revolution in Venezuela ­ Part One¹: "A particularly pernicious role
is being played by the so-called Œtrade union leaders¹ of the CTV. These
corrupt and degenerate labour lieutenants of Capital have long ago sold
their soul to the bosses and the CIA. They have abdicated any right to be
considered a legitimate part of the labour movement." (Does the same thing
not apply to Blair in Britain or Schröder in Germany? TS) Woods correctly
goes on to argue for the building of the newly established Bolivarian union
federation, UNT, and a campaign to win over any remaining genuine workers
from the CTV to it.

This illustrates the dishonest political methods of this organisation. What
Woods in fact does on this issue is simply put to one side, without any
explanation, his wrong analysis when it does not fit in with the reality
that exists on the ground.

Of course all Marxists can make a mistake. But if an analysis is proved
incorrect, does not apply and needs to be changed or amended it should be
explained honestly and openly. It should not be put aside by sleight of hand
in the hope that nobody will notice the error. This is not the first time
the IMT has used such a dishonest method. In Italy when the PRC was first
formed in 1991 (after its initial core split from the renamed Italian
Communist Party, PDS), in opposition to the CWI majority leadership at the
time, Woods and his supporters ignored it and announced it would have no
future. Marxists, they argued should remain in the PDS. When events did not
fit in to this schema they changed tactics with no explanation and joined
the PRC. 

International solidarity and opportunism

The opportunism of the IMT on these questions in Venezuela is inevitably
also shown in the international solidarity campaign that they have launched,
ŒHands of Venezuela¹. Obviously, no socialists is opposed to supporting and
organising international campaigns of solidarity for the working class in
Venezuela and in opposition to the attempts of reaction to seize power. The
CWI has frequently undertaken such campaigns. We are currently conducting a
solidarity campaign for Nigeria, the Campaign for Workers and Democratic
Rights in Nigeria. In the 1970s, during Franco¹s dictatorship in Spain, we
organised the Spanish Young socialist Defence Campaign. During the 1980¹s we
organised the Chilean Socialist Defence campaign. In all these campaigns we
have raised the need for international solidarity and independent action by
the working class. 

However, this is not the method used in the ŒHands off Venezuela¹ campaign
of the IMT. They do not raise the need for independent action by the working
class or the need for socialism. The founding statement of the campaign
speaks of "the unwarranted interference in the democratic processŠ" by US
imperialism! Unwarranted from whose point of view? From the standpoint of
the ruling class the intervention is entirely warranted.

They also say that, "The United States government has no moral standing to
give the Venezuelan government and people lessons in democracy" (emphasis
TS).

As Woods says in relation to Portugal regarding the question of Œtrust¹
being placed in the army officers "it is a moral category, not a scientific
one". It is certainly hypocritical for US imperialism to give such lectures
but moral standing is not a scientific Marxist approach to the question of
US imperialist intervention.

In ŒEncounters with Hugo Chávez¹, Woods tells us how impressed Chávez is
with the campaign and the signatures of those who have backed this. Some are
trade union representatives from various countries including Spain. Chávez
obviously has the impression however that these forces indicate widespread
support for the revolution in Venezuela. Chávez comments to his secretary,
"I told you so. These are not just individuals. There are shop stewards,
trade union secretaries, workers¹ leaders. This is what we need". A layer of
workers¹ representatives who have signed this petition which is good but it
is a dishonest method not to give Chávez an accurate indication of what they
represent. It is a wrong method to exaggerate what such support represents.
Why leave Chávez with the false impression about what the signatures really
represented? Chávez was particularly impressed by the message from the IMT¹s
Russian section Rabochaya Demokratiya. Yet with about 10 members throughout
the whole of Russia and only 1 in Moscow it is hardly representative of the
mass of Russian workers! It is certainly not enough to conclude that events
in Venezuela have yet inspired the international working class.

This opportunism of the IMT is taken from Venezuela and then applied to
other countries. The largest IMT section is in Pakistan. They are using the
experience of Venezuela there as well. However, it is not being used to draw
out the lessons of the tasks for the working class and peasantry in
Pakistan. 

In an interview in the radical German daily paper Junge Welt (3 May 2004)
Manzoor Ahmed, MP for the PPP and member of the IMT, says: "Venezuela is a
model for Pakistan. The steadfastness of the Chávez government against the
pressure of the counter-revolution and the US government encourages the
revolutionary forces in Pakistan." A model for Pakistan to follow?

He continues and draws a parallel between Chávez and the PPP leader Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto. Bhutto¹s populist PPP government was overthrown in a military
coup in 1977. Manzoor Ahmed then proceeds to quote Bhutto who he says just
before his execution in a personal balance sheet concluded that having made
an attempt to "reconcile opposing social interests" the coup had forced him
to conclude that "...the search for a middle course, modus vivendi or
compromise was a utopian dream. The class contrasts are irreconcilable, and
at the end one class must come through."

These are very significant conclusions drawn by Bhutto prior to his
execution. However, if he did draw such conclusions it was unfortunately too
late. Having come to power with enormous support and high expectations
amongst the masses in Pakistan, his populist government balanced between the
implementation of some reforms to brutal repression of the workers and
peasants. Under his rule, the Federal Security Force was established with
over 30,000 in its ranks. This force was used to crush strikes in Karachi
between 1972-3. It was under his rule that workers¹ leaders were imprisoned
for "unfair labour practices", i.e. strikes. Between 1973 - 75 a generalised
insurgency took place in Balochistan where 10,000 were butchered and 50,000
were forced into exile in Afghanistan by Bhutto¹s government.

Bhutto was also Foreign Minister when the Bangladesh (East Pakistan at the
time) based Awami League won a majority in the then unified Pakistani
parliament. The President and General Ya Ya Khan refused to accept this and
in 1971 declared war against what was to become Bangladesh. It seems that it
is not only the role of Chávez that the IMT is reluctant to confront or
explain to the international workers¹ movement!

The questions that arise from the process of revolution and
counter-revolution in Venezuela go to the heart of the role and duty of
revolutionary socialists when participating in and analysing such events.
There are important lessons relating to the role of revolutionary
socialists, strategy, tactics and programme to be drawn from the events in
Venezuela by the working class movement throughout Latin America and
internationally. It is vital to steer a clear course between opportunism,
centrism and ultra-leftism. It is in order to assist this that we have
produced these comments as a contribution to the discussion on the lessons
of and the tasks facing the revolution in Venezuela.

http://www.socialistworld.net
website of the committee for a workers' international
PO Box 3688, London, Britain, E11 1YE
Tel: ++ 44 20 8988 8760
Fax: ++ 44 20 8988 8793
cwi at worldsoc.co.uk