[mobglob-discuss] results of the venezuelan signature drive?

[michael a. lebowitz]

         Things still are very unclear as the result of the petition drive 
to generate a recall referendum for Hugo Chavez (as Greg Wilpert's article 
for www.venezuelanalysis.com below explains). I'll write separately with 
some of my own observations. The only thing I'll add now to his comments is 
to stress that 3.8 million was a critical number for the opposition because 
they sorely wanted more signatures than elected Chavez (and which will be 
necessary in a referendum if it occurs) so they could declare that he had 
been defeated and should resign now.
         in solidarity,
          michael

How Many Signatures? On Watching a Train Wreck in Progress
Wednesday, Dec 03, 2003Print format
By: Gregory Wilpert

Watching Venezuelan politics now is like watching a train wreck in 
progress, with two trains rushing towards each other and the date of the 
collision being the announcement of the CNE’s signature count, which should 
be sometime in the second week of January. All of a sudden the most 
important question in Venezuela’s political future has become, How many 
people signed the presidential recall referendum petition? Contradictory 
numbers abound, particularly from the opposition.

First, on Monday, the last day of the petition drive, opposition leader 
Henry Ramos Allup indicated that the opposition had collected four million 
signatures. Then, Tuesday morning, one of the major dailies, El Nacional, 
ran a headline saying that there were 3.8 million signatures. Later that 
day, Enrique Mendoza, representing the opposition coalition Democratic 
Coordinator said that the correct number is 3.6 million. Sumate, the NED 
and USAID funded organization that organized a petition drive against the 
president last February and which provided logistical support to the 
petition drive this time, said that the figure is 3.4 million. Finally, 
opposition leader Henrique Salas Römer, who has been steering a somewhat 
independent line from the rest of the opposition, has said that the real 
figure is at 2.8 million.
Government supporters, of course, provided their own figure, based on 
figures collected by their petition observers, which said that the total 
number of votes was 1.95 million (adjusting it downwards from an earlier 
figure of 2.2 million). The figure to beat in all of this was 2.4 million 
signatures, which is 20% of the electorate.

There are two indicators which make me suspicious that the actual figure 
might be closer to the government’s number than the opposition’s. First, in 
the last night of the opposition’s petition drive, there was practically no 
media coverage of the opposition’s victory celebration. In the past, 
whenever there was any kind of opposition demonstration, the media would 
devote all of their programming to it (think of the post-election parties 
that take place all around the world after an election, which the media 
almost always cover, whether the party lost or won). This, at first, seemed 
an indication of the opposition’s possible demoralization or confusion over 
the actual numbers of the petition. At the same, time, Chavistas held a 
fairly large and enthusiastic victory celebration in front of the 
Miraflores Presidential Palace, which was organized only in the last minute.

Second, the turn-out for the four days of the petition drive did not seem 
like what it would have to be for the opposition to collect over three 
million signatures. While the first day there was a large turnout 
throughout Caracas, the second to fourth days turn-out in the city’s lower 
class neighborhoods dwindled to almost nothing. There is photographic 
evidence that this pattern existed throughout the country. While there were 
numerous reports that the supplies of petition forms in the upper and 
middle class neighborhoods were exhausted, this is attributable to poor 
planning, which provided forms for only 66% of the voters in all 
neighborhoods, whether Chavista or not. As a result, in the generally the 
less populous middle and upper class ones, where easily more than 66% of 
the population is Anti-Chavez, petition forms were in short supply.

The problem with such widely diverging signature counts is that it fuels 
myths that exist on both sides of Venezuela’s political divide; that each 
side has the support of the overwhelming majority of Venezuelans. Talking 
to representatives and examining the websites of each side showed that both 
were convinced that they had roundly beaten the other side. This conviction 
produced a kind of euphoria in both sides. Oddly, neither side seemed to 
notice that the other side was saying and feeling almost exactly what they 
were saying and feeling. Rather, they each believed that the other was 
demoralized.

This complete conviction on the part of both Chavistas and Anti-Chavistas 
of having beaten the other bodes very badly for Venezuela’s near future. 
Ultimately it is up to the National Electoral Council (CNE) to pronounce 
the verified number of signatures that the opposition collected in the 
petition drive for a presidential recall referendum. However, if each side 
is so convinced that they are the winners, before the official result is 
proclaimed, one side is bound to be supremely disappointed and to claim 
that the only reason the decision went against them was because they were 
cheated of their victory.

In all likelihood, given the claims of fraud and both sides’ tendency to 
exaggerate, the actual result of the petition drive will be around the 
number of signatures required, 2.4 million signatures. In other words, the 
opposition will probably just barely reach their goal or just barely fail it.

Perhaps the greater danger for the country, in the short-term, is if the 
opposition fails its mark and does not have the recall referendum it so 
desperately wants. If it fails, it will cry foul and its more radical 
elements will launch into yet another campaign of destabilization, in the 
hope of attracting government crack-downs, international attention because 
of supposed human rights violations, and an eventual collapse of the 
government due to a combination of ungovernability and international 
pressure. It thus seems much more preferable, in the name of short-term 
stability, if Chavez were to face the recall referendum, a process which 
should be much more transparent and clear-cut than a messy and 
untransparent petition drive.

However, in the long-term, a recall referendum will not solve any of 
Venezuela’s basic problems and it seems obvious to me that Venezuela’s 
opposition will be much less capable of solving them than the Chavez 
government. Unfortunately, for Chavez and for the country’s future, it is 
always easier to say what you are against. Thus, it is quite possible that 
if Chavez is faced with a simple yes or no vote, he will lose, while if 
faced with a competition between various presidential candidates (or even 
one) he would win. The big unresolved question will thus be whether Chavez 
will be allowed to run again, should he lose a recall referendum. 
Venezuela’s Supreme Court is to rule on this issue sometime soon. Until 
there is a ruling from the CNE on whether there will be a referendum and 
from the Supreme Court whether Chavez may run again should he lose, for the 
sake of the country’s future, it would be a good idea if both sides curb 
their enthusiasm and their sense of triumphalism.

---------------------
Michael A. Lebowitz
Professor Emeritus
Economics Department
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, B.C., Canada V5A 1S6
Office Fax:   (604) 291-5944
Home:   Phone (604) 689-9510


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