[Mayworks-org] 'Canada, Quebec and the Left' The Bullet, February 1, 2007

[The Bullet]

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(((( T h e B u l l e t ))))~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

 A Socialist Project e-bulletin .... No. 41... February 1, 2007

________________________________________________________

Canada, Quebec and the Left: 

Outflanked Again?
 **Nathan Rao**

The surprise Conservative motion recognizing that the "Québécois form
a nation within a united Canada" and the unexpected selection of
Chrétien protégé, technocrat and Clarity Act point man Stéphane Dion
as Liberal leader have shown (yet again) just how important Quebec is
to Canadian political life. And for at least the fifth time in the
last quarter century, the Left has been caught flatfooted by
developments shaped by Quebec's weight in the federation and its
enduring national aspirations. Still, the present context is fluid
enough that the Left can win a hearing for a very different approach
to the "constitutional" file. We cannot and need not allow ourselves
to be outflanked by the cynical manoeuvering of the Conservatives or
bamboozled by the Liberals into a "patriotic alliance" against
virtually the entire spectrum of Left-progressive opinion in Quebec.

If nothing else, the Conservative motion and the cliffhanger Liberal
leadership race confirm that we are living through a period of
tremendous volatility in elite-level politics, particularly electoral
volatility, in this country. The present volatility is striking in
several respects, not least that, save for the honourable exception
of the new left-wing Québec Solidaire party in Quebec,
social-movement and activist-Left politics in the country are at a
very low ebb indeed. It is safe to say that the turbulence "above"
has not been caused by upheaval from "below" - not in the immediate,
massive country-wide marches in-the-street sense at any rate.

Of course, the paradox of social stability and the elite and party
consensus on neoliberal policies, alongside electoral volatility, is
hardly a new feature of Canadian politics. More so than that of many
other places, Canada's history is an extremely fragmented affair,
driven by conquest, dirty tricks and repression of sporadic episodes
of rebellion, followed by elite-level bickering and accommodation
lorded over the country's multi-ethnic working classes and dominated
peoples -- first and foremost Aboriginal peoples, but also the people
of Quebec and French-speaking minorities in the rest of Canada.

Though difficult, it is necessary to chart a way forward out of the
current mess from a Left-progressive perspective: against the
neoliberal, technocratic, authoritarian drift of mainstream political
and institutional life, and toward a radical solution genuinely
reflective of Canada's complex multinational, multi-ethnic and
regional realities.

With this in mind, this essay presents five arguments about the
present situation in the country. First, while the Conservatives have
more margin for manoeuvre in the present context, the most likely
outcome is that neither they nor the Liberals will be able to form a
majority government out of elections held any time soon.

Second, the Bloc Québécois' (BQ) confused and ultimately supportive
position on the Harper motion has highlighted the impasse of
mainstream sovereignism as represented by the BQ and the Parti
Québécois (PQ). Both parties are unable and unwilling to break free
of the neoliberal policy straitjacket and institutional ground rules
of the Canadian state.

Third, neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals can resolve what
can be described as the longer-term crisis of legitimacy and
representation of their parties and of the federal system itself,
especially in Quebec. Quebec remains at the heart of the longer-term
"crisis of representation" of the federal system, a crisis further
exacerbated by the way neo-liberalism has narrowed the social base of
party-electoral-institutional politics in the country.

Fourth, after the relatively upbeat period stretching from the
anti-globalization protests of 1999-2001 through to the 2004 and 2006
federal elections under NDP leader Jack Layton, the Left finds itself
in a tight spot once again. Passiveness in the area of
social-movement struggle is combined with a threat to the modest
electoral gains made in recent years.

Finally, the social and political Left should see the current fluid
context as a window of opportunity for advancing a radically
different, multinational vision of the federation, as a central
component of an anti-neoliberal project - in line with the Bolivarian
project for the Americas taking root across Latin America.

A Crisis of Political Representation

There is currently a "crisis of political representation" in Canada.
This has several aspects: the regional fragmentation of the party
system in Canada; the lack of proportional representation and the
marginalization of many political viewpoints from electoral
representation; the under-representation of urban voters; and the
failure of the federal system to accommodate the Aboriginal and
Quebec peoples within Canada. The most recent expression of this
crisis was the inability of any pan-Canadian party to form a majority
government in either the June 2004 or the January 2006 federal
elections.

This failure of the two main parties has its immediate origins in the
organizational and electoral collapse of the federal Liberals in
Quebec in the wake of the sponsorship scandal and the revelations of
the Gomery Commission about this scandal. This collapse was in turn
the result of the rot that had set in to the system of patronage and
kickbacks the federal Liberals had established in Quebec to "rebuild"
the party after Trudeau's unilateral repatriation of the constitution
in the early 1980s severely undermined the party's historic foothold
in the province and consigned the federal Liberal Party to the
doghouse during the Mulroney years. The "rebuilding" was stepped up
once the Liberals returned to power in Ottawa in 1993, under
Trudeau's constitutional comrade-in-arms Jean Chrétien, and were in
short order confronted with a referendum on sovereignty in Quebec and
the breathtakingly near victory of the pro-sovereignty forces.

The further collapse of the Liberal machine in Quebec created a big
void in the party-electoral sphere of mainstream politics. It is no
surprise that the Conservatives would seek to exploit this for
tactical-electoral reasons. The unexpected Conservative
mini-breakthrough in the 2006 elections, going from nothing to a
10-member Quebec caucus -- on the basis of vague promises to address
Quebec's traditional fiscal concerns, overtures to the Liberal
provincial government of former federal Tory leader Jean Charest, and
an active pursuit of the Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ)
hard-Right electorate in a handful of ridings in the Quebec City area
-- gave them further reason to pursue this tack. The Conservatives
know as well as anyone that, given the country's other divisions, the
size of Quebec and the importance of Quebec representation for
achieving political legitimacy, a sizeable Quebec caucus is vital for
securing a stable majority.

In light of these shorter term electoral calculations, some panic was
surely setting in Conservative ranks: far from building on its gains
in the January elections, the party was dropping in the polls in
Quebec. Opposition there is strongest to Harper's hard-Right stance
on the Afghanistan "mission", the Kyoto Protocol, gay marriage and
recent Israeli aggression in Lebanon and the occupied territories.
Once the Liberals chose a new leader, it was also inevitable that
they would recover somewhat from their 2006 electoral nadir in
Quebec. This would, of course, improve the Liberal seat tally and/or
split the "federalist" vote and hand seats back to the BQ. Harper
made a quick but focused decision to "push the envelope" of the
Quebec national question, offering symbolic recognition of Quebec's
distinctiveness in Canada, in an attempt to restore his party's
fortunes in the province and short-circuit the political gamesmanship
of the other parties around this issue.

The Harper initiative also sought to exploit the wide margin for
manoeuvre the Harper minority government appears to enjoy, at least
for the time being. After the defection of the Quebec-sovereignist
wing of the Mulroney alliance, followed by years of division between
the traditional Tory party and the Western regionalist and
ideological hard-Right Reform Party, Harper has emerged as the
Conservative champion. He has no challengers in sight, the antics of
a few Mulroney-era hucksters like Garth Turner notwithstanding. Bay
Street has, moreover, effortlessly shifted its allegiances from Paul
Martin to Harper and Finance minister Jim Flaherty and cut them a
tremendous amount of slack, as the corporate world's prompt
acquiescence to the stunning volte-face on income trusts most
recently proved. From such a position of strength, Harper can afford
to rile some of his supporters in the rest of Canada in exchange for
making inroads into Quebec and (he hopes) resurrecting the old
Mulroney-era alliance with a section of Quebec nationalists.

This is made still easier by the fact that the Bloc Québécois has yet
to recover from the shock it received in the 2006 elections --
blindsided by the Conservatives' ability to occupy some of the
wide-open space created among federalist voters in Quebec by the
Liberal collapse. With a relatively friendly federalist premier, Jean
Charest, in office in Quebec City, the Harper Conservatives decided
that this was as good a time as any to strike. It is also not at all
clear that Charest will last another term; closer collaboration
around the national question is deemed to be in the electoral
interest of both the federal Conservatives and the Quebec Liberals.

The Harper "Québécois nation" motion and the selection of Stéphane
Dion as Liberal leader partially fulfill each camp's short-term
objectives - increasing the party's appeal in Quebec in the case of
the Conservatives; overcoming internal division and presenting a
united public face in the case of the Liberals. However, while it is
by definition hazardous to forecast election results in such a
volatile period, both parties' gains appear both insufficient and
mutually exclusive.

The Impasse of the Bloc Québécois and the Parti Québécois

While it makes sense to describe the main political contest in Quebec
as one between "federalists" (the Quebec Liberals) and "sovereignists"
(the PQ), the term "federalist" does not quite apply to the position
of the mainstream pan-Canadian parties on Quebec. "Centralist" would
be a more accurate label. 

Whatever their differences about socio-economic policy or even about
the rights and responsibilities of provinces, the pan-Canadian
parties are unanimous in asserting the primacy of the central
Canadian state over recognition and accommodation of Quebec's
national reality within the federation.

Within Quebec, on the other hand, the majority of "federalists" and
all "sovereignists" take Quebec's national status and demands as a
starting point, the debate being about (among other things) how best
to pursue the Quebec national project in relation to the Canadian
state. This is why the two main Quebec parties rejected both the
Trudeau constitutional deal of the early 1980s and the more recent
Clarity Act. Both ran roughshod over the prevailing conception in
Quebec that Quebec is (or should be) an equal partner in a
bi-national (or multinational) federation. From the Confederation
debates in the mid-19th century until the present day, this has
remained the dominant conception in Quebec of its place in Canada.
Outside Quebec, though, the emergence of the Canadian national
project in the post-War period - and especially from the late 1960s
onwards -- has tended to negate the very idea of a federal pact
between the "Canadian" (or "English-Canadian") and "Quebec" (or
"French-Canadian") nations.

Though it has deep roots in Quebec history and its internal social
and political struggles, the rise of the modern Quebec sovereignty
movement has also been a response to the assertion of this one-nation
nationalism from the demographically and economically dominant
Canadian (or English-Canadian) nation. While talk of the death of the
sovereignty movement is patently absurd, it is clear that it has been
in an impasse for some years now. Currently, the BQ has no
perspective beyond its current role in Ottawa, and the PQ has nothing
to offer beyond administering a somewhat gentler form of neoliberalism
than the Quebec Liberals.

Below the surface consensus around the leadership of Gilles Duceppe
(BQ) and André Boisclair (PQ), pressures have been building to break
out of this impasse in one way or another. Some of these tensions
came out into the open in late 2005 and early 2006, which saw a PQ
leadership race and the founding of the Québec Solidaire party.

In October 2005, former Mulroney cabinet minister, BQ founder and PQ
premier Lucien Bouchard issued the Pour un Québec lucide (For a
clear-eyed vision of Quebec) manifesto. This regressive document
seeks to take the neoliberal transformation of the sovereignty
movement even further. While its release was a major media and
political event, it was not openly supported by a large number of
mainstream sovereignist spokespeople. Former PQ leader and Quebec
premier Bernard Landry, for example, found the manifesto represented
too open a break with the sovereignty movement's traditional
social-democratic pretensions. PQ leadership candidate (and current
leader) André Boisclair adopted a more conciliatory tone.

Within a few weeks, the sovereignist academic, party and
social-movement Left responded to Bouchard's initiative by issuing
the Manifeste pour un Québec solidaire (Manifesto for a Quebec based
on solidarity). In early February 2006, the Québec Solidaire party
was launched by many of these same people, out of the merger of the
Union des forces progressistes (UFP) and Option Citoyenne. 

Neither initiative will break the sovereignty movement out of its
impasse in the short term, but they provide some idea of future
debates and battles.

The impasse of the sovereignty movement has further widened Harper's
margin for manoeuvre, allowing him to "recognize" Quebec on the
cheap. The adopted motion is meaningless in constitutional terms and
illogically asserts that the "Québécois nation" only exists (!)
within a "united Canada." The motion re-affirms the stricture
entrenched by the Clarity Act that Ottawa must be the ultimate
arbiter when it comes to Quebec's future relationship to the
federation. It is also significant that the motion states in French
and English that the "Québécois" form a nation, and not Quebec tout
court. This further defuses any kind of constitutional implications,
let alone more subversive political ones, by reducing the matter to a
recognition of the "Québécois" -- all those people defined (by whom?)
individually as "Québécois". This has little to do with the
definition of the Quebec nation generally accepted in Quebec itself:
the really existing collective, sociological and political entity of
Quebec with its set of accumulated experiences and aspirations, not
to mention institutions and borders.

Still, the motion cornered a fumbling BQ into accepting a conception
that dovetails nicely with mainstream sovereignism's de facto embrace
of a far less troublesome brand of "French-Canadian" cultural
nationalism in the Bleu tradition. The Conservatives will undoubtedly
couple this gesture with a few token tax reforms in their next,
pre-election budget as a response to Quebec's demands around the
"fiscal imbalance". All this could be enough to stabilize or even
increase Conservative support in Quebec in the coming elections.

The Crisis of Federalism

It is difficult, however, to see how the Conservatives will resolve
federalism's longer-term crisis of legitimacy and representation in
Quebec. For the present volatility is not solely a matter of tactical
manoeuvering between the main parties. It can be traced to three
inter-related sources. First is the now quarter-century old exclusion
of Quebec from the constitutional dispensation entrenched by the
Trudeau-led Liberals in the early 1980s. Second is the way in which
neoliberalism has narrowed the base of party-electoral-institutional
life and exacerbated the age-old centrifugal forces at play in this
country. Third is Canada's integration into the American post-Cold
War push for further economic integration, geopolitical cooperation
and military expansion, rechristened the "War on Terror" in its
post-911 period.

Generally speaking, the Conservatives are more hardline on the matter
of deepening the neoliberal counter-revolution and aligning Canadian
foreign policy with American imperialism; and the Liberals are more
hardline in their rejection of any kind of accommodation with
Quebec's national aspirations. But the parliamentary vote on the
Harper "nation" motion, the strong showings in the Liberal leadership
race of empire-lite candidate Michael Ignatieff and Israeli apologist
and free-trade convert Bob Rae -- and the prominent role both now
play in the Dion-led party -- show that the lines between the two
parties on these important questions are blurred to say the least.
Nor should we forget that the idea for the Clarity Act was first
hatched by none other than Stephen Harper in his days as a Reform MP,
and that this post-1995 referendum "get tough on Quebec" approach was
shepherded into law a few years later by none other than Stéphane
Dion during his tenure as Chrétien's minister of intergovernmental
affairs.

Indeed, practically the only thing that today's Liberal Party retains
of the Trudeau-era party is the hard line against Quebec. One needn't
have a romantic view of Trudeau to see that his approach to social
programs, the public sector, regional inequality, Canada-U.S.
relations and world affairs would be at significant odds with the
position of today's Liberals on these questions. It is almost amusing
to see the Trudeau-esque posturing of someone like "kingmaker" Gerard
Kennedy -- until recently a loyal cabinet minister in an Ontario
Liberal government that has left much of the Mike Harris disaster
untouched while aggressively pursuing a regionalism-of-the-rich
agenda by demanding that more of Ontario's taxes stay in the
province, and de facto in its wealthy southern zones. Kennedy's calls
for "Canadian unity" are very selective indeed.

More broadly, the overall project of neoliberal counter-revolution in
Canada and across the Americas (through the FTAA) was actually pushed
much further under the Chrétien-Martin Liberals than it had been
under the Mulroney Tories. Jean Chrétien's (evil?) "genius" was to
take the Keynesian and vaguely national-populist party built up from
the Depression onwards from Mackenzie King through to Pierre Trudeau
and wed it utterly and irreversibly to this neoliberal agenda. This
ran parallel to what Blair did to the Labour Party in Britain and
what Clinton did to the Democratic Party in the USA. In short, this
was the Canadian variant of the Blairite "Third Way".

It was one thing for the old Trudeauite Liberal warhorse Chrétien to
pull this off - and quite another to expect shipping magnate and
party latecomer Paul Martin, Chrétien's hatchet-man in the Finance
ministry, and the gang of hacks and careerists in Martin's entourage
to sustain this enterprise for any length of time. This was all the
more unlikely since two key conditions for Chrétien's success had
been the other right-wing camp remaining divided and shut out in
Quebec - a state of affairs that could not last eternally.

The first condition disappeared once ultra-neoliberal former National
Citizens Coalition head Stephen Harper emerged as the unity figure for
the alliance of hard-Right ideologues, social conservatives, Western
regionalists and residual traditional Tories that make up the new
Conservative Party. The second condition disappeared when the Liberal
Party's fortunes in Quebec plummeted in the wake of the sponsorship
scandal and the Gomery Commission's further revelations about the
scandal.

There is no fundamental disagreement between the centre-Right
Liberals and the hard-Right Conservatives around the three
cornerstones of Canadian ruling-class politics today: "one Canadian
nation" constitutional rigidity, embrace of the neoliberal agenda and
support for U.S.-led imperialist expansionism. With such a platform,
neither party can resolve the longer-term crisis of legitimacy and
representation of the federal system, especially not in Quebec.

The Left in a Tight Spot

The Left cannot avoid dealing with these "constitutional" questions -
or afford to squander this opportunity to tackle them in the present
relatively fluid context. We have a supportive ally in Quebec ready
to respond to any and all overtures from sincere and principled
forces in English-speaking Canada.

To be sure, this will be difficult to put into practice in the
current defensive period. But unlike what we have tended to see since
the famous "free trade" debates in the late 1980s, there is an
undercurrent of goodwill towards Quebec among many Left forces in the
rest of the country. This can be found among younger people brought
into politics by the anti-globalization protests at Seattle and the
Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001 and the anti-war
protests of 2003 to the present day; and among older leftists and
progressives unimpressed by the stale patriotic rallying cries of a
corrupt Liberal Party so totally committed to the corporate agenda.

Adopting a new approach on Quebec and the constitution is crucial not
only a matter of principle, but also a strategic pre-condition for
building a durable pan-Canadian alliance of the Left, achieving true
democratic reform and breaking out of the maddening "jurisdictional"
dead-end around socio-economic questions at the municipal and
provincial levels (healthcare, labour laws, child care, housing,
public transit, and so forth). Such an alliance represents a far more
viable and "winning" strategic orientation into the medium term than
continuing down the path of the parliamentary horsetrading and
zigzags on Quebec in which the NDP has become entangled (especially
since the 2004 elections).

This means pushing for a re-opening of the Constitution and preparing
now for the day when it is re-opened, as it necessarily will be one
day. Better to begin cobbling together a solution on our own terms
now than to play catch-up in a context of crisis. We do not want to
find ourselves outflanked yet again by Liberal and Conservative
elites, as was the case in relation to the Harper motion and, most
recently before that, during the Meech Lake and Charlottetown
episodes in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

While following through on the will of party members is often another
matter. The position in favour of withdrawing Canadian forces from
Afghanistan taken at the recent NDP federal convention shows that the
party can take an independent position if pressed to do so. Nor should
we forget that Jack Layton made tentative moves towards the
sovereignist Left after winning the leadership in early 2003. He took
a strong position against the Clarity Act, met with UFP
representatives and ran federal NDP candidates with connections to
the UFP in the 2004 elections. By the end of the 2004 campaign,
however, facing "patriotic" pressures from the national media and
within the party, Layton had already reversed his position on the
Clarity Act. And after running to the rescue of the Liberal minority
government in 2005, prominent among his other justifiably harsh words
for the Conservatives was that they were in cahoots with "the
separatists".

In the latest twist, the NDP is trying to buy time before the next
elections, which it rightfully dreads, by helping the Conservatives
look good on the environment. While parliament is a mug's game at the
best of times and the NDP has been placed before some unenviable
choices since the 2004 elections, it's hard to escape the feeling
that the party has painted itself into a corner by banking too much
on high-stakes wheeling and dealing. The party's zigzags on Quebec
are a key component of this ultimately self-defeating strategy.

Though still fragile and tentative, Québec Solidaire provides the
first opportunity in a generation to carry a different approach
forward outside the marginal confines of the far-Left, with an ally
in Quebec that is open to such cooperation and has real weight and
prospects for growth. With the Liberals now rebounding from their
previous lows and the Greens threatening it in the polls, the NDP is
entering a new period of crisis and introspection. It may be possible
to push the party back towards the more Quebec-friendly positions
taken in the early days of the Jack Layton leadership.

Toward and Anti-neoliberal, Multinational Alternative

In Quebec, Québec Solidaire has advanced the idea of a "constituent
assembly" as a way to engage and mobilize broad sectors of the
population in fashioning the constitution of a sovereign Quebec,
which would then be submitted for approval in a referendum. This is a
radically democratic approach which the rest of Canada would do well
to emulate - taking the whole matter of how we want to run the
country out of the hands of the "constitutional experts", media
blowhards, bureaucrats and corporate lobbyists that monopolize debate
and entrench division and deadlock.

We can promote such an approach in a way that places socio-economic
questions front and centre. The current constitutional arrangement
ties the hands of those looking to beat back privatization and raise
standards across the country. Far from representing a line of last
defense against capitalist globalization, the federal state and its
provincial, territorial and municipal tributaries are active agents
of the neo-liberalization and commodification of every aspect of life
and politics in this country. No alternative to neoliberalism is
possible without a radical break from the current pan-Canadian
institutional order.

The push for an anti-neoliberal, multinational alternative can build
on the work done by the forces of the left-wing "no" against the
Charlottetown Accord in 1992 -- led by the National Action Committee
on the Status of Women with its proposals for "asymmetrical
federalism" -- and by the critique developed by social-movement
forces of Chrétien and Dion's 1999 Social Union agreement with the
provinces, to the exclusion of Quebec. This can be the contribution
of Canada, Quebec and Aboriginal peoples to the Bolivarian project
sweeping across Nuestra América - uniting the peoples of the
hemisphere against neoliberalism and U.S. imperialism.

Nathan Rao works and writes in Toronto.

**********************************************************************

**********************************************************************

JUST PUBLISHED RELAY #15: Jan/Feb 2007

Available at: http://www.socialistproject.ca/relay

Table of Contents:

Is the Big Ship America Sinking? Contradictions and Openings, Sam
Gindin 

Quebec Solidaire Adopts a Program for Government, Richard Fidler 

A Proposal for a Discussion on Party Building, Ken Kalturnyk and
Karen Naylor 

>From the Food Bank to the Luggage Carousel, Kevin Skerrett

Echoes of the 1930s: The UNITE-HERE Campaign, Sedef Arat-Koc, Aparna
Sundar and Bryan Evans Challenging Wal-Mart, Herman Rosenfeld 

Neoliberalism and Canada's Ruling Class, Greg Albo 

It's Time to Wise Up, Fellow Workers: The IWW in Canada, Len Wallace

The 'I Am Fed Up' Vote: A Quick Look at the Nov. 7 Elections, Bill
Fletcher Jr.

The 2006 U.S. Congressional Election: Hold the Champagne, Simon Enoch


Greek Democracy in the Post-Euro Era -- Michalis Spourdalakis

Continuing Gains in the Struggle Against Israeli Apartheid, Zac Smith


Far From Being the Last Arab-Israeli War, Hassan Husseini

Cuba: The Trials and Tribulations of Socialism, Carlos Torres &
Carolyn Watson 

Cuba's Revolution Marks its 50th Anniversary, John Riddell 

The British Left and the Anti-imperialist Struggle, Ernie Tate 

Venezuelan Solidarity Wins New Ground in Toronto, Suzanne Weiss 

The Orientalist Technique and the Western Media, Nishant Upadhyay 

Pinochet is Gone but Neoliberalism Remains, Carlos Torres 

Epitaph to the death of Death, Carlos Torres

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