[IPSM] Analysis of Wasase Book & Movement

[dustin]

WASASE: A Strategy of Contention, or A Study in Confusion?

Analysis of ‘Wasase’ movement

by Warrior-publications at hotmail.com

Introduction

Wasase is both a book and a movement headed by University of Victoria
professor Taiaiake Alfred, a Mohawk from Kahnawake.  The book was
published in 2005, and the first official gatherings of Wasase (the
movement) began in 2006, comprised largely of Indigenous university
students drawn to Taiaiake’s philosophy.

Due to its academic orientation, many warriors & grassroots organizers
remain unexposed to the movement’s philosophy and/or fail to fully grasp
its intentions and methods.  This does not mean, however, that either the
book, the movement, or Taiaiake himself is not without influence.  The
availability of the book, and Taiaiake’s public profile as an academic,
have meant that certain aspects of his work have indeed permeated our
ranks.  Furthermore, the activities & statements of Wasase may be given
more legitimacy & consideration due simply to the aura of respectability
attached to Taiaiake.  As will become clear, this is more likely to be a
source of confusion than clarity.  This is especially so as Taiaiake
attempts to promote his strategy over & above others.

The book is a sort of ‘warrior manifesto’ that attempts to define Native
people’s realities, why our struggles for self-determination have thus far
failed, and why Taiaiake’s theory is the solution to our problems. 
Taiaiake, it becomes clear, believes his vision & strategy are more
authentically Indigenous in spirit & nature than all others.  Through
Wasase, Indigenous peoples will be transformed and revitalized to
successfully make non-violent social change.

Countering the ‘Violent Insurgents’

Much of Taiaiake’s initial effort in Wasase is spent denouncing ‘violent
insurgents,’ whom he apparently sees as his main political rivals
(although they’re never named, aside from a brief & superficial reference
to Ward Churchill).  For Taiaiake, in fact, the choice between violent
armed resistance and non-violent means “is the most important decision the
next generation of Onkwehonwe will collectively make” (p. 21, Onkwehonwe
is a Mohawk word meaning ‘original person’, or native).

Taiaiake is very clear that these two forms of struggle are “unique
disciplines that require commitments that rule out overlapping allegiances
between the two approaches.  They are diverging and distinctive ways of
making change
” (p. 21).

But is this really true?  In fact, resistance movements by their nature
utilize the entire spectrum of conflict, from passive non-violent forms to
armed actions.  When an entire people are mobilized into struggle,
everyone participates & contributes in whatever way they can, whether it’s
passing on information, not co-operating with government officials, or
firing a rifle.  Nelson Mandela, a former resistance fighter in the
African National Congress in S. Africa (which had an armed guerrilla
force), stated in a Time magazine article on Gandhi that,
“Violence and nonviolence are not mutually exclusive; it is the
predominance of the one or the other that labels a struggle” (Mandela,
“The Sacred Warrior”, Time, January 2000).

The problem with Taiaiake’s attempt to set up a clear division between the
‘violent insurgents’ (bad) and non-violence (good) is that when it comes
to resistance movements, he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. 
Consider his descriptions & comparison of armed resistance vs. non-violent
action:

“This is the political formula of the strategy of armed resistance: facing
a situation of untenable politics, Onkwehonwe could conceivably move
toward practicing a punishing kind of aggression, a raging resistance
invoking hostile & irredentist negative political visions seeking to
engender and escalate the conflict so as to eventually demoralize the
Settler society and defeat the colonial state.  Contrast this with the
strategic vision of non-violent contention: Onkwehonwe face the untenable
politics and unacceptable conditions in their communities and confront the
situation with determined yet restrained action, coherent and creative
contention supplemented  with a  positive political vision based on
re-establishing respect for the original covenants and ancient treaties
that reflect the founding principles of the Onkwehonwe-Settler
relationship.” (p. 21)

>From where does Taiaiake conjure up this ‘strategy of armed resistance’? 
We’re never told who these proponents of armed resistance are, nor is
there any source material to back up Taiaiake’s descriptions. 
Nevertheless, Taiaiake’s bias is clearly evident in his choice of words. 
Those who advocate armed resistance are ‘punishing’, ‘raging’, ‘hostile’,
and ‘negative’, while the non-violent strategists are ‘determined yet
restrained’, ‘coherent’, ‘creative’ and ‘positive’.  He uses moralistic &
judgmental terms (without providing real examples) even though later on he
states “non-violent action coupled with a capacity for physical
self-defense is a strategic choice, not a moral choice” (p. 52).

Regarding this strategic choice, Taiaiake states:
“Are we ready to kill & die for the cause of self-determination?  If the
answer is no—and I believe most Onkwehonwe would say no—then our strategy
& tactics must be shaped instead to reflect the level of conflict
tolerance and willingness to engage in direct action that actually exists
among our people” (p. 51).

While it is true that our methods must reflect levels of conflict our
people are capable & willing to engage in, it is also true that most of
our people are colonized and, to greater & lesser extents, assimilated. 
The very thought that social change is necessary is, as a result,
weakened.  Taiaiake himself alludes to this:

“[T]here is no cultural base for mass action, nor is there any crucial
mass of strong people to support actions and strategy that have any hope
of challenging state power
  This must change if we are to survive” (p.
59).

Later, Taiaiake adds:  “There are no movements for change among indigenous
peoples generally because the sad fact is that there are hardly any more
warriors
” (p. 82).

According to Taiaiake, then, there is no support for any form of armed
resistance, and yet at the same time no ‘cultural base for mass action’
and “hardly anymore warriors.”  His solution appears to be to distance
himself as much as possible from any hint of ‘violent resistance’ in order
to build up support for non-violent mass action as the only viable
strategy.

On the other hand, he observes that there is widespread feelings of anger
& hostility among Native youth that lead to support for violent forms of
action.  In fact, he describes it as being a “very strong force” in Native
communities (p.58).  So then there is support for armed resistance, even
widespread support.  But Taiaiake has an answer for this as well:  armed
resistance is a futile strategy that has never been successful, one that
has only lead to “frustration & failure”, and not based on ‘authentic’
Indigenous ways of life.

Thus, his efforts to divide the resistance movement along the lines of
‘violence vs. non-violence’ is the first step in establishing support for
mass action.  In order to do this, he must both discredit ‘violent
resistance’ and at the same time legitimize ‘non-violence’ as a superior
strategy for change.

The Myth of Gandhi & Non-Violence

According to Taiaiake, “non-violent resistance
 has been historically
widespread and effective against all types of repressive regimes” (p. 52).
Despite such a sweeping endorsement of non-violent resistance, he offers
no example other than Gandhi, which he promotes as “The middle path
between raging violence and complacency
 The Indian mass movement against
British colonization was not passive, but militantly pacifist, and it
actively confronted power in a strategic, creative & tactically diverse
manner without using violence
 the basic Gandhian approach  is a solid
conceptual foundation for Onkwehonewe resurgences” (p. 55).

Anyone who’s done any research on India’s struggle for independence knows
that Ghandi’s non-violent campaign was but one part of a mass movement
that also involved widespread armed resistance, massacres, bombings,
riots, etc.  At times, Gandhi’s non-violence campaigns themselves caused
massive unrest, riots and armed attacks on government soldiers, police and
Europeans.  He himself cancelled non-violent campaigns due to such
anti-colonial rebellions while condemning the people’s use of violent
forms of resistance.  He was surprised by the people’s level of hatred &
ill-will to the colonial regime, and convinced they needed more
indoctrination to pacifist beliefs.  Gandhi’s movement itself was promoted
by the British & business interests in India as an alternative to
anti-colonial rebellion (just as the US government promoted Martin Luther
King over Malcolm X).
In response to a recent effort by US-based ‘aid’ agencies to promote the
movie Gandhi as well as its message of nonviolent struggle among
Palestinians (the Gandhi Project), Ali Abunimah (editor of the Electronic
Intifida), wrote in The Myth of Gandhi and the Palestinian Reality:
“While one can admire Mohandas Gandhi’s nonviolent principles, one can
hardly point to the Indian experience as a demonstration of their
usefulness in overthrowing a colonial regime.  Indeed, Gandhi’s concepts
of satyagraha, or soul power, and ahimsa, or nonviolent struggle, played
an important role during the Indian independence struggle, however the
anti-colonial period in India was also marked by extreme violence, both
between the British & Indians and between different Indian communal
groups.  Anti-colonial Indians committed a wide variety of terrorist acts;
the British government was responsible for numerous massacres and other
atrocities; and communal violence before, during, and after independence
claimed the lives of millions of people.  One simply cannot argue that
Indian independence was achieved in a nonviolent context.”

Other critics of the ‘Gandhi myth’ assert that he may have been an asset,
if not an agent, for the British crown, used to suppress & control
anti-colonial resistance.  In India & the Raj: 1919-1947; Glory, Shame and
Bondage, Suniti Kumar Ghosh describes Gandhi’s non-violence as,
“an ideal weapon with which to [weaken] the anti-imperialist spirit of the
people.  Gandhi himself declared that his satyagraha technique was
intended to combat revolutionary violence.  It may be borne in mind that
this prophet of non-violence, though violently opposed to the use of
violence by the people in the struggle against British imperialism,
actively supported, whether in S. Africa, London or India, the most
violent wars launched by the British masters and, towards the close of his
life, was in favour of war between India & Pakistan and approved or
suggested the march of troops into Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad

“British imperialism recognized him as the national leader.  Like General
Smuts, many Viceroys including Willingdon regarded him as an asset.  In
combating the militant forces of anti-colonial
 struggle, the British
ruling classes counted on his help and he never failed them
  The Indian
business elite hailed him: his message of non-violence, his satyagraha,
his faith in the raj, his political aspirations, his abhorrence of class
struggle
  his determination to preserve the status quo, his ‘constructive
programme’ intended to thwart revolutionary action—all these and more
convinced them that in the troubled times ahead, he was their best
friend.”
(see “http://archives.econ.utah/archives/pen-1/1997m11.a/msg00039.htm”)

What did Gandhi’s movement achieve in the end?  Was it any more successful
than other revolutionary struggles that Taiaiake so casually dismisses as
being ultimately counter-productive?  Not really; India remains dominated
by Western imperialism and wracked by extreme poverty, state violence, and
social conflict.  Gandhi’s stellar reputation as a saintly ‘messiah’ of
the poor is itself a subject of debate.  So much for Ghandi and his
example of ‘non-violent’ resistance.

Wasase ‘Warriorism’ & Guerrilla Insurgency

Just in case the reader is still inclined to support the ‘violent
insurgents’, Taiaiake throws in a little psychological evaluation, stating
that it is “clearly a gendered concept rooted in machismo and
valorizations of violence
  (which explains why there is such a mocking
distaste for this approach among females)” (p. 58).

Ironically, two of his main subjects for interviews on ‘warriorism’ are
James Ward & David Dennis, former members of the now-disbanded West Coast
Warrior Society (WCWS), a group that was renowned for its drunken partying
& debauchery.  When the WCWS first formed as a security force within the
Native Youth Movement (Cheam 1999), it was mostly women in the group that
had a ‘mocking distaste’ for the group’s machismo and valorization of
violence Taiaiake so easily ascribes to others.  Yet, Taiaiake promotes
them as models of Wasase ‘warriorism’.

The WCWS & the more recently formed Warrior Alliance (neither of which
appear to have had many, if any, female members) are clearly examples of
the physical self-defense that Taiaiake uses to prop up his strategy of
‘resistance’.  Yet, police repression of the WCWS, including raids &
arrests of members (although minor), show the ability of the state to
easily counter any incipient armed defense force.  These warriors’
rejection of the strategy of guerrilla warfare, and especially its
emphasis on clandestine organizing, was clearly shown in July 2005 when
both Dennis & Ward were arrested in Vancouver while making a ‘legal’
purchase of weapons & ammunition.  Whether one describes an armed group as
‘violent insurgents’ or a ‘warrior society’ or a ‘self-defense force’
makes no difference to the state’s security apparatus.

This is perhaps one of the greatest dangers of Taiaiake’s convoluted
‘strategy’: he denounces violence as a form of resistance, but
acknowledges the necessity for armed self-defense against state
repression.  But how are a people to organize & commit to armed
self-defense (from which any genuine defense must arise), when their
movement & ideology are based on non-violence (and especially when so much
of Taiaiake’s arguments against using violence are morally based)? 
Taiaiake both disarms the people with his diatribes against ‘violent
insurgents’, and then at the same time seeks to arm a small, elite
defensive force.  This idea of ‘armed self-defense’ deserves closer
scrutiny.

It is generally acknowledged as foolish for a small, lightly armed force
to directly confront a larger, more powerful enemy.  Yet, this is the only
thing Taiaiake’s ‘armed self-defense’ strategy can do, in fact it’s only
purpose.  Furthermore, as the WWS example shows, attempting to portray an
armed defensive force as somehow legitimate (as opposed to the ‘violent
insurgents’) doesn’t protect it from state repression, but instead makes
it all the more vulnerable.

Regis Debray, in his book Revolution in the Revolution?, criticized the
strategy of ‘armed self-defense’ on these grounds:

“[T]he community practicing self-defense is denied any initiative.  There
is no choice of the site of combat, no benefits of mobility, maneuver, or
surprise.  Since the zone of self-defense is already exposed, it will be
the object of an encircling action and a carefully prepared attack by the
enemy at the moment of his own choosing
  In Vietnam above all, and also
in China, armed self-defense of the peasants, organized in militias, has
played an important role as the foundation stone of the structure of the
armed forces of liberation—but self-defense extended to zones already
militarily liberated
 in no way did it bring autonomous zones into being”
(Revolution in the Revolution?, p. 30).

Quoting a Vietnamese directive to its guerrilla fighters:
“Allowing oneself to be attacked or limiting oneself to passive defense is
to place oneself in the position of being unable to protect the population
and to expose one’s own forces to attrition.  On the other hand, to seek
for ways to attack the enemy is to put him on the permanent defensive, to
exhaust him and prevent him from expanding his activities, to wrest the
initiative from him, and to impede his search operations
” (Revolution in
the Revolution?, quoted on p. 45).

Although Taiaiake offers Oka 1990 as an example of armed self-defense, in
reality it was the threat of an Indigenous uprising across the country (an
insurgency) that limited lethal repression, and not any capacity for armed
(or even non-violent) resistance that existed in either Kanehsatake or
Khanawake.  We can see how, by 1995, new methods were employed by police
to counter Indigenous resistance, both armed & unarmed, at Gustafsen Lake
& Ipperwash.  At Gustafsen Lake, the armed self-defense carried out was
nearly over-run & massacred by heavily armed police.

The strategy of the guerrilla seeks to overcome the superior forces of our
enemy by, as noted above, choosing the time & place of combat, for
example, or by using surprise and secrecy, mobility & maneuver, etc.  The
guerrilla thus enables a resistance movement to have some armed (or
militant) capacity with which to intervene & influence events, even when
not able to directly defend a population.

Mao Tse-Tung, a leader in the Chinese revolutionary struggle, who both
popularized and developed the strategy of guerrilla warfare, stated:
“When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances;
harass him when he stops; strikes him when he is weary; pursues him when
he withdraws.  In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other
vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed,
attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated” (War in the Shadows, p.
257, quotes On Guerrilla Warfare).

What Taiaiake dismisses as ‘offensive violence’ is actually a form of
armed defense:
“The protection of the population depends on the progressive destruction
of the enemy’s military potential.  It is relative to the overall balance
of forces: the populace will be completely safe when the opposing forces
are completely defeated” (Revolution in the Revolution?, p. 41).

It should be noted that the “progressive destruction of the enemy’s
military potential” is not just a question of military action (in the
context of an insurgency).  There are many ways this potential can be
reduced that are not based on lethal attacks by armed guerrillas, such as
cutting off infrastructure to prevent troop movements (i.e., highways,
rail lines, sea & air ports, etc.), destroying communications & supplies,
etc., all of which can be carried out by unarmed saboteurs and/or mass
direct action (including blockades).

Mao was very clear on the offensive nature of guerrilla warfare: “the
operations of a guerrilla unit should consist in offensive warfare” (On
Guerrilla Warfare, quoted in War in the Shadows; the Guerrilla in History,
p. 258).

An example of how the offensive nature of guerrilla warfare contributed to
the defense of a population is seen in Mao’s guerrilla campaign in
Northern China, August, 1940.  Over the previous year, Japanese occupation
forces had carried out large-scale construction work, building hundreds of
miles of new roads & railways, with armed forts along rail lines and
roads.  Deep, wide trenches & high walls were also built alongside roads &
rail lines.  This was part of a plan by the Japanese to literally divide
and break up base areas of the Communist guerrillas (areas where they had
support and were established).  They also carried out scorched earth
policies, destroying crops to deny food to both the population & the
guerrillas.

Mao’s response was a massive guerrilla operation entitled the Hundred
Regiments Offensive, beginning in August 1940.  Over a period of 3 months,
according to a US intelligence report,
“Guerrillas made hundreds of cuts in rail lines; derailed trains, blew up
small bridges & viaducts, attacked & burned stations; destroyed switches,
water towers, and signal control equipment, and other wise seriously
damaged and temporarily disorganized the railway system in North China. 
As a substantial dividend, Japanese garrison forces necessarily
concentrating on counter-guerrilla operations and major restoration
projects, were unable to get into the countryside to confiscate the autumn
harvest.”
(War in the Shadows, p. 261).

A major flaw in Taiaiake’s analysis appears to be his limited
understanding of what an insurgency is.  Taiaiake’s portrayal of
insurgents as armed killers randomly carrying out acts of ‘terror’ (or
fantasizing about it) not only mimics state propaganda, it is also
simplistic.

An insurgency is not just a guerrilla force, but a resistance movement
comprised of many diverse people & groups.  Consequently, there are many
diverse tactics & strategies used, both non-violent and violent.  In fact,
military action is only one small part of an insurgency, which combines
political, economic, psychological and cultural aspects as part of an
overall resistance (even military counter-insurgency experts grasp this
basic understanding of the nature of insurgencies).  The degree to which
armed force is used depends on many variables, including social
conditions, terrain, enemy actions, and its acceptance as a necessary &
viable strategy by the population.

Taiaiake’s idea of armed self-defense appears less as a strategy of
resistance than an effort to draw in genuine warriors, exploiting what I
term the ‘Simple-Soldier Syndrome’: warriors who want to be seen as doing
their duty of defending their people, without the burden of analysis as to
how the struggle is to be carried out.  Taiaiake is convenient to these
warrior-types as he appears to have the intellectual capacity & analysis
that legitimizes their simple-soldier approach.  But this is an illusion.
This is what Mao, who had real experience in not only leading a resistance
movement but achieving victory over enormous odds against both the Chinese
ruling class & Japanese imperial army, had to say about the simple-soldier
syndrome:
“There are some militarists who say: “We are not interested in politics
but only in the profession of arms.”  It is vital that these simple-minded
militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between
politics & military affairs
  Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare
must fail, as it must if people & their sympathy, co-operation, &
assistance cannot be gained
  because guerrilla warfare basically derives
from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation”
(War in the Shadows, p. 255, quotes Mao’sOn Guerrilla Warfare).

Although our movement is not engaged in armed resistance, we can see that
it does indeed form a part of our strategy, as do other forms of struggle
such as sabotage, direct action, riots and civil disobedience.  Although
we may characterize our current level of struggle as a ‘low-intensity
conflict’, there is no denying that violence is a part of it.  People are
assaulted, beaten, shot & killed.

Despite the imbalance of power between our people and those of the
colonial state, we must find the means to resist the ongoing destruction
of land, environment, & community.  At the same time, we must prepare for
an uncertain future that holds the potential for even greater crises &
conflict.  For these reasons, even though we are not engaged in armed
resistance under current social conditions, the strategy of the guerrilla
(based on asymmetrical warfare) is more relevant to our movement than the
philosophy of Gandhi (based on mass civil disobedience).

Wasase’s View of Global Resistance

Taiaiake’s analysis of the international dynamics of anti-colonial
resistance are nearly as simplistic as his views on violence:
“revolutionary struggles using direct armed confrontation have failed to
stop capitalism’s expansion” (p. 50).  Here, Taiaiake attempts to use
anti-colonial resistance, mostly from the post-WW2 period, as proof of the
failure of armed rebellion.  He dismisses the examples of Cuba & Vietnam
as exceptions, and points to an alleged failure of anti-colonial struggles
to “produce long-term or generally successful resistances” (p. 51),
Never mind that Vietnam dealt a stunning blow to US imperialism, from
which it has yet to fully recover (i.e., the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’), or that
many movements in Africa, the Middle-East, & Asia succeeded in forcing out
foreign invaders & occupiers and raising the standards of living for their
people (in some cases, far more so than Taiaiake’s example of Gandhi). 
Taiaiake’s dismissal of these struggles as ultimately failures is all the
more ironic considering that he uses a quote from Che Guevera (whom he
describes as embodying the revolutionary spirit of “hatred & violence”) on
the strategy of anti-imperialism:
“We must bear in mind that imperialism is a world system
 it must be
defeated in a world confrontation.  The strategic end of this struggle
should be the destruction of imperialism.  Our share, the responsibility
of the exploited and underdeveloped of the world, is to eliminate the
foundations of imperialism: our oppressed nations, from where they extract
capitals, raw materials—instruments of domination—arms and all kinds of
articles
”

Taiaiake then states: “The question for us today is: What kind of ‘world
confrontation’ is necessary to bring about not the Gueverian military
‘defeat’ (which has proven impossible to achieve) but the transformation
of imperialism?” (P. 51).

Typically vague, Taiaiake doesn’t say what he means by ‘transformation’,
and neglects the real point of Che’s statement:  the global imperialist
system is based on extracting cheap raw materials & labour from the
oppressed nations of Africa, Asia &
S. America.  By fighting against this system, by denying them easy access
to such resources, the imperialist nations are weakened.  The ‘world
confrontation’ Taiaiake searches for but cannot see is unfolding before
his very eyes, in the many resistance movements now fighting around the
world (the same ones he describes as failures, although much later he
concedes that these struggles were successful, but that “Things are
different now,” p. 234).

Che’s strategy was-- and is-- not unique.  One of the first to articulate
this was Mao, who conceived of protracted people’s war on both national as
well as international levels.  In Mao’s strategy at a national level, the
insurgents fight for and take control of the rural areas, cutting off the
urban centers & weakening them, before the final offensive to seize them. 
Mao saw the cities as the centers of political, economic & military power
for the imperialists.  Similarly, on a global level, the oppressed nations
form the rural areas (or periphery), which are fought for and liberated,
in this way ‘cutting off’ the imperialist centers (the ‘cities’).  One
need not be a Maoist or a Gueverist to see the logic in this strategy.
Although he dismisses the anti-colonial revolts following WW2 as
ultimately counter-productive, there is no doubt that these struggles,
even though exploited as ‘proxy wars’ between the US & USSR, weakened the
colonial powers.  They contributed, in many ways, to the present crises
facing the global system.  Their inability to defeat imperialism,
something Taiaiake uses as proof of their failure, is part of a process
that is still underway and which also requires the development of real
resistance within the imperialist centers themselves.

While he acknowledges the globalized system we are all now a part of,
Taiaiake seems unable to understand the relationship between ‘local’
struggles (i.e., Cuba & Vietnam) and their impacts on not only the global
system but our own struggles.  The 1960’s-70’s period of resistance in N.
America, for example, was directly influenced by struggles such as Cuba &
Vietnam.  Without the Viet Cong, there may well have been no American
Indian Movement.

And what about the growing potential for global ecological, economic, &
military crises we are now faced with, crises that will drastically change
the social conditions we find ourselves in today?  Taiaiake has nothing at
all to say about these, even though they will have enormous effects on our
people & resistance movements, and are factors that any real liberation
struggle must take into account in determining strategy.  The potential
for systemic collapse, greater social conflict and state repression, all
of which will alter the conditions under which we fight, appear to be
non-issues.  Wasase proceeds as if nothing will change until we adopt
Taiaiake’s views.

Even more ironically, perhaps, Taiaiake holds up the Zapatistas as an
example of “rebellions of indigenous truth against capitalism” (p. 59),
whatever that is, without once noting that the Zapatista’s are an
Indigenous insurgent movement.  The EZLN is, in fact, a guerrilla army
(but apparently one that Taiaiake approves of, simply re-labeling it an
‘Indigenous resurgence’).  Although the Zapatistas are unique as an
Indigenous insurgent movement, there is no denying that they established
themselves as a political-military force through violent, armed
resistance—a capacity they maintain to this day.

A Confusing & Convoluted Strategy

Taiaiake’s attempt to promote direct action seems poorly thought out,
almost as if he didn’t understand what direct action means.  In his attack
against the ‘violent insurgents’, Taiaiake portrays them as being
possessed by an impotent rage that cannot even find a suitable target at
which to strike (due to the decentralized nature of colonial & capitalist
power in society); militants “punching the air.”  Then he offers this:
“The target of direct action must be the most immediate danger and cause
of our collective stress: the racism that is still rampant in Settler
society” (p. 61).

Racism?  And how do we take direct action against racism, a belief system
deeply imbedded in settler society?  What targets are there to take action
against?  Taiaiake offers no suggestions.  And is racism really the
greatest and most immediate danger?  What about capitalist development
that directly threatens land, environment, people, culture, as well as the
survival of future generations?  What about direct action campaigns
against corporations, or violence against women & children, or drug
dealers?

Taiaiake wants to appear as both a respectable, rational, reformist type,
as well as a warrior revolutionary.  Compare his comments on restoring
ancient treaties as the key to “peaceful co-existence” (quoted above, from
p. 21) to this militant-sounding outburst:
“[S]ome of us want to reform colonial law and policy, to dull that
monster’s teeth so that we can’t be ripped apart so easily.  Some of us
believe in reconciliation, forgetting that the monster has a genocidal
appetite
  I think that the only thing that has changed since our
ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost
heart.  Against history and against those who would submit to it, I am
with the warriors who want to beat the beast into bloody submission
 “ (p.
37)

Yet, just shortly before this, Taiaiake cautions “And, of course, violence
begets violence.  The implication of an approach to making change using
armed force to attack institutions and the structure of power is an
ensuing culture of violence that is, in its very existence, the negation
of the ideal of peaceful coexistence at the heart of Onkwehonwe
philosophies” (p. 23).

Then, later, we find Taiaiake retreat from even using ‘violent language’. 
Instead of using the word enemy, Taiaiake offers the word adversary, which
“implies that we have the objective of transformation driven by compassion
achieved through teaching generating relations of love” (p. 202).

Such nonsensical approaches only serves to disarm our people, who need to
strengthen their fighting spirit, not dampen it.  As a resistance
movement, we use a language of combat & conflict because it more
accurately reflects the nature of our struggle and the attitude we need to
fight.  While it may appeal to Taiaiake’s groupies that he appears as both
a ‘bad-ass’ warrior and a sensitive, compassionate soul (a Native
‘mahatma’?), the result can only be confusion.

Towards the end of the book, Taiaiake finally offers up a concrete example
of what he envisions an Indigenous ‘resurgence’ to look like, derived
largely from his reading of Gandhi it would appear:
“[A] widespread movement & intensive, coordinated collective action by
Onkwehonwe to reoccupy their lands and reassert their rights & freedoms”
(p. 267).

The question, he asks, is whether the government will respond with
violence to counter such a mass action.  His answer?  No, because the
“settler public as a whole would reject the use of state violence
 because
of the social chaos it would quickly
 produce” (p. 268).
Although such a mass movement would be a major accomplishment, it should
be borne in mind that ‘mass’ is a relative term.  In a country with a 
population of some 30 million, and Natives comprising some 2 million, how
massive & widespread could such actions be across the country, for example
in remote northern communities?  Perhaps such a movement would be more
successful if it carried out mass sabotage of infrastructure, but this
doesn’t appear to be part of Taiaiake’s plan (his views on sabotage are
not clear: is it violent or non-violent to destroy property?).

In any case, what exactly does Taiaiake hope to achieve through such an
action?  That the Canadian state will capitulate?  It will certainly move
to contain and co-opt such a movement, but in the end do such actions
really lead to liberation when all the institutions of state power &
industry remain intact?  Even Taiaiake’s example of mass non-cooperation
by Indians in India seems impractical for our situation, seeing as Natives
are such a small percent of the population.  How much impact would it have
if Natives withdrew their labour from the Canadian economy, stopped going
to schools, or courts, or somehow boycotted manufactured goods?  Or
stopped paying taxes (hahaha)?

And who’s to say that, as social conflict increases, as economic &
ecological crises intensify, that more settlers will not become even more
vulnerable to state propaganda & counter-insurgency efforts against Native
‘terrorists’?  We can see how, in settler communities surrounding Native
conflicts, there is an increase in racist & vigilante attacks, and
frequently a call for police/military intervention to stop any
inconveniences caused by Natives “asserting their rights & freedoms”
(i.e., Oka, Burnt Church, Six Nations, etc.).  Basing a strategy of
resistance on the level of support or sympathy from settlers, even while
we seek to strengthen these factors in order to divide our adversary, is a
dangerous & naïve gamble to make in an anti-colonial liberation struggle.
Then there’s Taiaiake’s ideas on how such a movement should be organized,
with a small professional staff of “highly skilled & qualified leaders”,
with a large number of supporters indirectly involved, an “impersonal
network
 that relies mainly on electronic forms of communication
” (p.
208).  While this may sound smart, there’s little that’s grassroots or
designed to strengthen community self-organization in such a model. 
Instead, it only replicates the structures & centralization of power that
Taiaiake so consistently criticizes throughout the book.  Although the use
of electronic communications may now be common, it seems contrary to
Indigenous ways to not see the value in real human interaction as the
basis of any movement.  Our movement, for example, has always been
primarily based on families & communities; today, these remain as the main
sources of Indigenous resistance.

Conclusion

Despite these harsh criticisms of Wasase and its approach to resistance,
it is not to say that Taiaiake doesn’t have many good points to make.  His
analysis of the Indian Act system, the promotion of assimilation &
capitalist values by band councils, and the nature of settler society, for
example, are good solid critiques.  The interviews that form a large part
of the book, with Native students, artists, warriors, activists, etc., are
intelligent & insightful.

Like Wasase, however, Taiaiake is a paradox:  although he preaches a
psuedo-revolutionary and militant ideology, the best strategy he can offer
is Ghandi’s reformist (even collaborator) movement based on civil
disobedience.  While he promotes direct action, what actions has he
participated in?  If Gandhi at least led by example, what is Taiaiake
doing besides promoting a confusing and convoluted strategy for
“non-violent” social change?  My overall conclusion: Taiaiake is an
academic anti-warrior posing as a warrior, whose strength is enlightening
people as to the oppressed conditions under which we live, but whose
weakness is in promoting a contradictory & confusing strategy.


Sources

Wasase; indigenous pathways of action & freedom
Taiaiake Alfred, Broadview Press, Ontario, Canada 2005

Revolution in the Revolution?
By Regis Debray, Grove Press, New York 1967

War in the Shadows, the Guerrilla in History; 2,000 Years of the Guerrilla
at War,
By Robert B. Asprey, William Morrow & Co., New York 1994
A two volume set on history of guerrilla warfare.

On Guerrilla Warfare
By Mao Tse-Tung.
A classic on guerrilla warfare written by Mao, widely available as a book
or on internet.

Guerrilla Warfare
by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevera.
Another classic on guerrilla warfare, also available as a book or on
internet.

India & the Raj: 1919-1947; Glory, Shame and Bondage
By Suniti Kumar Ghosh
Out of print book, available on internet.
(see “http://archives.econ.utah/archives/pen-1/1997m11.a/msg00039.htm”)