[IPSM] Justice for Joe David

[Devin Butler]

{If you're trying to follow the current situation in Kanehsatake, the 
following document provides a great deal of thoroughly researched info and 
analysis, writen by a non-Native activist.  Also, visit www.cmaq.net/fr for 
frequent updates from the Kanehsatake Independent Media Centre}

JUSTICE FOR JOE DAVID

Who is Joe David?

Joe David is a Kanehsatake Mohawk schooled in the traditions of the 
Longhouse. He is an artist - he used to sculpt and paint but now due to 
paralysis, is looking into other mediums. Joe participated as a Warrior in 
the resistance of the summer of 1990, known as the "Oka Crisis", or the 
"Siege of Kanehsatake". In June of 1999, Joe was the victim of police 
brutality. He was shot twice by the Kanehsatake Mohawk Police after a tense 
twelve-hour standoff. As witnesses to the police operation, Joe's family 
lodged a complaint with the police ethics commission. They said the police 
were over-aggressive, negligent and unprofessional in their duties. Joe has 
filed a civil suit to try and get compensation for his losses but has yet to 
see justice served in this matter. Since justice for Joe goes beyond 
individual compensation to the sovereign rights of all Indigenous peoples, 
this pamphlet will examine not only the details of the police operation that 
lead to Joe's shooting, but also the methods by which Canada continues to 
colonize First Nations today; the neo-colonial impetus behind the federal 
government's First Nations Policing Policy; the particular circumstances 
leading to the creation of the Kanesatake Mohawk Police; and the unique 
features of the Kanesatake Police Force. While Joe's story could be dated 
back to "time immemorial", we will start in 1990 with the Oka crisis.

What Was the Oka Crisis?

Although it symbolized much, much more the issue behind the Oka crisis was 
18 hectares of Mohawk ancestral territory including a hand-planted forest of 
pine trees, and a graveyard in which both of Joe's grandparents were buried. 
The town of Oka was hell-bent on letting the local golf club expand it's 
course 9 holes, right over the Mohawk burial site. Adding insult to injury, 
Oka's mayor also issued a permit for a private developer to construct 60 
luxury homes around the golf course perimeter. Resistance to this project 
began March 9th, 1990 with what many deemed an ineffective march of about 
100 people to the golf club parking lot. Stopping this encroachment was 
imperative for the peoples of Kanehsatake - their survival as Sovereign 
peoples depended upon it. So frustration quickly led to determination and 
March 10th marked the first day in what would become a 6 ½ month occupation 
of the "disputed", yet unceded territory of the Pines. Joe spent many long, 
cold nights doing security for this camp.

On July 11th, the first day of a 78-day "siege of Kanehsatake", the Surete 
du Quebec (SQ) arrived en masse to raid the encampment. They fired teargas 
at the women and children holding the front line, attacked the main blockade 
with a bulldozer, and finally entered into the camp with their guns firing 
wildly. In the teargas, gunshots and confusion that followed, one SQ officer 
was killed. In all likelihood his death was the result of "friendly fire". 
Tensions between the SQ and the occupiers were at a peak. It was at this 
point that Joe, an avowed pacifist, felt there was no choice but to join in 
the armed self-defense of his community. According to the Great Law of 
Peace, Warriors, or the rotiskenrahhehteh, are "the men who carry the burden 
of peace". All able bodied men have the responsibility to help defend their 
people, including the duty to take up arms in emergencies, to resist 
invasion, or to declare war on a foreign nation who refuses to accept the 
Great Peace. Members of Joe's family and community had come under fire, as a 
traditionalist it was his duty to protect them.

The governments unwillingness to negotiate from a position of mutual-respect 
as promised in the 1645 Two Row Wampum Treaty reaffirmed the sovereigntists' 
militant stance. The Wampum Treaty established that Mohawks were a nation by 
international standards. Therefor negotiations to resolve the crisis should 
have been on a nation-to-nation basis. Yet the government insisted on 
negotiating with the Kanesatake Band Council, rather than the 
traditionalists or Warriors. They repeatedly put forward an "offer" for 
peace which was the same "framework agreement" for the land issue that had 
been rejected by Kanesatake in 1989. The government then promised to buy the 
contested areas of land to give to Kanesatake in trust. This land was their 
land already! The Mohawks simply wanted their sovereignty and territories 
respected. They steadfastly refused the governments "offers". The 
governments' response was to launch its largest ever domestic military 
operation. From August 20th - Sept. 26th the Pines were surrounded by 2,650 
soldiers of the Canadian army with armored personnel carriers, tear gas, 
concussion grenades and thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition.

While the army used tactics of psychological terror, Joe worked with the 
faithkeepers in conducting spiritual ceremonies for the people in the Pines. 
He also joined the negotiating team at the Trappist monastery and, because 
nobody else wanted the job, became the military liaison. The army eventually 
encircled the encampment, made incremental forward, and squeezed the 
remaining occupiers into the Treatment Center (TC). On Sept. 26th, the 
warriors decided they could probably continue the fight better from their 
homes. They were trapped behind razor wire, surrounded by armored personnel 
carriers, had low flying fighter jets constantly buzzing above them, and 
snipers hidden throughout the forests around them. Medical and food supplies 
were being tampered with if not completely stopped. When they left the 
Treatment Center, Joe and 50 others were arrested and went to court as a 
member of what later became known as the "TC Forty". After spending 
approximately $100 million on policing the crisis, a Canadian jury found the 
TC Forty "not guilty" of any "criminal" wrong-doing in July of 1992.

Setting the Context: Contemporary Colonialism in Canada

The Oka crisis and the subsequent creation of First Nations Police forces, 
as well as the shooting of Joe David are all elements of a larger political 
context. It is one in which Indigenous sovereignty and title to land are 
extinguished, and First Nations communities are assimilated into mainstream 
Canadian society. The first full-blown Canadian federal policy proposed to 
achieve these ends was put forward by Jean Chretien in 1969 when he was 
Minister of Indian Affairs. It was called the "White Paper". This 
legislation purportedly would resolve, once and for all, Canada's "Indian 
problem". What is this problem Canada has with Indians? Well, it seems that 
despite First Nations forced internment on reservations and forced 
attendance at residential schools; despite the banning of their cultural 
traditions and governments; despite the banning of Indians from Canadian 
courts to pursue Treaty rights, the Indian's have not died off as a peoples. 
First Nations have refused to abandon their traditional ways. They insist 
Canada has no right to rule over their affairs, and that Canadian title to 
their lands has never been legally obtained through surrender, sale or 
conquest. Now, this is a major problem for Canada.

Without even the facade of consultations with First Nations peoples, Jean 
Chretien pushed his "White Paper" as the policy that would "liberate" 
Indians from their lands and old ways that were holding them evolutionarily 
captive. He claimed he could bring Indians into the 20th century. Through 
Chretien's dream, entitled the "White Paper", Indians would assimilate 
themselves into the greater "Just Society" of Canada. The introduction to 
his dream began:

"The government believes that its policies must lead to full, free and 
non-discriminatory participation of the Indian people in Canadian society. 
Such a goal requires a break from the past. It requires that the Indian 
peoples' role of dependence be replaced by a role of equal status; a role 
they can share with all Canadians." (Eagle Shield, Vol.7, No.1, pg. 5)

One of the aims of the White Paper was to get rid of the Indian Act and 
Section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Chretien said these acts 
"discriminated" against Indians by ascribing them special legal status. This 
legal status, he argued formed a barrier to their full assimilation into 
Canada. It made them too different to be equal. The "White Paper" logic was 
that if Canada could take away the laws making Indians a distinct peoples, 
then they would gratefully become full-fledged Canadian citizens with all 
the "rights and privileges" that citizenship bestows. Indian communities 
could become "self-governed" municipalities of the provinces, and have 
access to the same good services, through the same channels and agencies, as 
all other Canadian municipalities. The "White Paper Land Act" would 
transform "lands reserved for Indians" (plus some of the land quantum's 
promised in Treaties) into municipal public lands and private "fee-simple" 
lands, so that Indians could buy sell and lease their land like all other 
capitalist Canadians. Chretien wanted "to even out the playing field" so 
that Indians could participate in the capitalist game. And those damn 
historical artifacts called Treaties, well they could be shelved in the 
Canadian government archives forevermore.

Because Chretien's dream served his own interests so well, he never imagined 
there would be a rebellion to defy it. Welcome to Chretien's nightmare. The 
First Nations peoples of Turtle Island were not sympathetic to Chretien's 
delusions of grandeur. They did not want to become "Canada's people". They 
organized resistance and by 1971 Chretien's "White Paper" was defeated. 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau said of this defeat:

".let me just say that we will be meeting again and we will be furthering 
the dialogue. And let me just say we're in no hurry if you're not. A hundred 
years is a long time and if you don't want an answer in a year, we'll take 
two, three, five, ten or twenty - the time you people decide to come to 
grips with the problem. We won't force any solution on you because we are 
not looking for any particular solution." (Eagle Shield, Vol.7, No.1, pg. 5)

Now, 32 years later in 2002, Chretien is tabling this same "particular 
solution" as non-optional legislation. The "White Paper" policy supposedly 
buried in '71, has continued from that time to operate underground. It has 
been establishing roots like a tenacious weed in First Nations communities 
and organizations. Through Core Funding programs, consultation shams and 
well funded "negotiation processes", the government of Canada has been busy 
co-opting as many native "leaders" as it can. This select group, now 
heralded as the heroes of the "Indian Movement" through slick media 
campaigns, will be used to push Chretien's revamped "White Paper" 
initiatives through parliament. And Chretien has been "softening-up" First 
Nations communities to a "process of provincial jurisdiction" by 
deliberately "furthering an evolutionary process of provincial and Indian 
inter-involvement" (Eagle Shield, Vol.7, No.1, pg. 7). Many bands now have 
special agreements and funding in place with the provinces covering services 
such as health-care, education and policing, which make the roots of this 
dastardly weed increasingly difficult to pull.

This time, the vision of "Indian independence" is supposedly the dream-stuff 
of the latest Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, Robert Nault. Deceptively 
renamed the First Nations "Governance Act" , public information regarding 
the policy has been kept low-key so as to "avoid a Native backlash like that 
against the 1969 paper" (Eagle Shield, Vol.7, No.1, pg. 7). Although Robert 
Nault tries to circumvent the issue, on many occasions he has admitted that 
the implementation of the Governance Act will amount to the dismantling of 
the Indian Act, and bring into effect the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. On a CBC radio interview in January of 2002, Nault said that: ".we 
can't wait for self-government agreements across the country to replace the 
Indian Act which is what self-government agreements do." (Eagle Shield, 
Vol.7, No.1, pg. 7)

The dismantling of the Indian Act cancels out tax immunity clauses for 
Indigenous peoples. Finance Minister Paul Martin said in the Toronto Sun 
that: "Forcing natives to pay income tax is part of the process towards 
self-government.it's obviously tied to self-government" (December 21, 1994). 
He was referring not only to local property taxes though, but also to 
federal and provincial income taxes. This would make Indians bona fide 
"tax-paying" citizens of Canada, bringing First Nations under the Canadian 
Charter, including Section 15 that deals with "non-discrimination". This 
means that people who once regarded themselves as members of distinct 
Nations will be treated as ethnic minorities, just as any other ethnic 
group. And as reserve lands become privatized and significant numbers of 
non-natives enter First Nations municipalities as business and/or land 
owners, they will expect to vote and to participate in local municipal 
governments, as they will have the right to under Section 15. Other sections 
of the Charter will give non-native corporations or individuals the right to 
buy or lease land for their purposes from natives who have "fee-simple" 
holdings, and municipalities will not be able to bar them from doing so 
simply because they are non-native. This would be "discrimination". The 
cumulative effect then will be the assimilation of First Nations peoples 
into Canada, by bringing Canada into Aboriginal communities. Because these 
newly minted Aboriginal municipalities will be under provincial 
jurisdiction, they can only hope that provinces will not merge them into 
neighboring non-Native municipalities, or decide to abolish them entirely.

The only new powers of the First Nations municipal governments will be the 
exercise of some by-laws and collection of local taxes and levies. Once 
reserve lands are privatized, First Nations municipal governments would 
management these lands as profit-making assets. Revenues for municipal 
functions are raised by leasing or selling lands to off-reserve businesses 
and/or developers; or by using the land as collateral for loans. 
Incorporated municipalities, by definition, exist on a land base that 
includes public spaces (for municipal buildings, parks, etc.) and private 
"fee-simple" holdings, which can be sold, used as collateral for loans, or 
leased. Nault's view is that the Land Management Act (another non-option 
tied to the Governance Act) will provide municipal councils with a source of 
revenue on top of what they'll pull in from local taxes and levies, called 
"Own Source Revenues". If loans go unpaid and the land is forfeited, the 
lender will be free to use the land in whatever capacity they wish.

There is a lot to be outraged about with this legislation. Except the media 
has exerted a stronghold in defining the limits of such a debate. Deliberate 
leaks by federal government officials have provided the media with the 
opiate to seduce the Canadian masses into sharing the "Self-Governance" 
illusion. Over the past several years, stories of Band Council corruption 
have been splashed across covers of the mainstream press. Inasmuch as Band 
Council corruption does exist amongst some officials, as amongst the 
majority of Canadian politicians, there is a critical difference in how 
these stories of corruption get played out. When Band Council corruption is 
exposed, the media declares them incapable of running their own government, 
while avoiding issues regarding the unconditional support by Canadian 
officials that these Band Council's receive. And sovereignty, meaning 
Indigenous peoples' control over local governance functions, is never 
postulated as the solution to these corruption problems. No, the motivation 
behind these corruption stories as compared to stories of Canadian 
corruption is much more sinister than simply trying to keep Band Councils 
"clean".

The tarring of Band Council "leaders" is the quintessential contrast needed 
to win public support for Chretien/Nault's policies. Against this backdrop, 
Nault's "properly designed", "accountable" and "transparent" municipal 
entities suggest a shining path of extrication for First Nations 
communities. The stories also assist in alienating community residents from 
Chiefs who may be inclined to resist the government's intentions - a 
replication of the old divide and conquer strategy. Nault's "Community 
First" tactic of by-passing Chiefs and Councils "if necessary" to enlist the 
support of community residents, then appears perfectly justified because 
Band Council opposition is interpreted as protection of their own corrupt 
interests.

Additionally misbehavin' band councils may experience cuts to funding. For 
example, on September 21, 2001 the Chief Negotiator for land claims in 
Kanehsatake, Chief Crawford Gabriel, met with the Federal Negotiator Mr. 
Eric Maldoff and Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
representative, Mr. Walter Walling. The purpose of the meeting was to 
procure funds necessary for a legal opinion on Bill S-24 and the Land 
Governance Agreement. Chief Gabriel felt that a legal opinion was imperative 
and wanted to bring this information back to the community for consultation. 
Chief Gabriel advised the officials that the legal review was required 
before any negotiation process could begin. Under a previous Kanehsatake 
Band Council, a faulty consultation, voting process and work plans had 
started the flow of negotiations for this Bill and Agreement, and the 
current council wanted the situation rectified.

Kanehsatake's demands were simply that a second, informed community 
consultation take place once the legal review was finalized: that a 
pre-determined method of consultation and respect for all community members 
be put in place; and, that a pre-determined level of support for the Land 
Governance Agreement be set. Chief Gabriel was saying that fifty percent 
plus two, which was the total of the vote that set the process in motion, 
was not good enough for a lands issue. Gabriel made it very clear to both 
Mr. Walling and Mr. Maldoff that if their community once fully informed said 
no - then the answer was "NO".

Mr. Walling curtly responded to Chief Crawford Gabriel that Kanesatake had 
already met the minimum requirements set forth by Canada and Bill S-24 had 
to be respected. He then advised Crawford that the only "vehicle" for 
getting money was at the negotiating tables and advised the Council to sit 
there "in order to flow moneys to the community". Chief Gabriel asked 
Canada's representative what their official position was, to which Mr. 
Maldoff responded that if Kanehsatake implemented Bill S-24 that moneys 
would flow to the community, but if not - they would get nothing (source: 
Quarterly Report of the Office of John Harding, Chief Shakohentehtha, 
November 20, 2001).

So if the government is willing to resort to blackmail with Band Councils, 
what happens with regular First Nations peoples who are not supportive of 
this new legislation? Well.Robert Nault has already publicly declared that 
the weight he will assign to voices of community members is entirely 
dependent on what they are saying. On September 27th 2000, for example, 
Nault issued this warning to opponents of the Act through the Ottawa Citizen 
newspaper:

"Don't push me because I won't cave. I'm not going to change my mind simply 
because somebody's going to put the political heat on me. I'm not going to 
change my mind because someone decides to set up a roadblock or someone 
decides to hang out at my office somewhere. If they want to spend some time 
occupying my office, by all means, go ahead." (Eagle Shield, Vol.7, No.1, 
pg. 13)

With Nault proclaiming that he will not be moved by the wishes of "his 
people", or persuaded by non-violent civil disobedience, what options will 
be left for Indigenous peoples to protect their internationally recognized 
title to the land and sovereignty rights?

Under the current neo-liberal regime of corporate globalization, the federal 
government is under great pressure from the "international community" (i.e. 
economic elite) to get sovereignty, resource and land issues with native 
peoples settled - once and for all, with "finality and certainty". The 
corporate demands of neo-liberalism, through bodies such as NAFTA and the 
WTO, require that all so-called "barriers" to trade, resources and markets 
be removed. In this context native sovereignty, collectivized lands and 
rights to natural resources are indeed barriers. To accommodate terms of 
these trade agreements, the Liberal government in Ottawa is forcing 
Self-Governance on First Nations communities through non-optional 
legislation. At the local level, an Indigenous economic elite, comprised of 
businessmen, politicians and lawyers, largely within the band council 
system, are the main supporters of this self-government. It is through their 
support that it will be put in place. Millions and billions of dollars are 
at stake for the new Indigenous elite and their partners in crime - the 
transnational corporations (Zig-Zag, Winter, 2001).

Those opposed to these extinguishment policies will be branded as criminals, 
terrorists, or zealots - as radicals with no support from their communities. 
As the gap between the wealthy elite and growing lower/underclass expand, 
greater forms of repression against sovereigntists and social control of the 
poor with be introduced. As in all periods of colonial expansion, police 
will be used to aid in the transfer of wealth (lands and resources) from one 
group to another.

First Nations Policing Policy: Building up for the final conquest

Due to the social unrest displayed during the Oka Crisis, and the widespread 
support their resistance garnered throughout Turtle Island, the federal 
government wasted no time in launching it's 1991 "First Nations Policing 
Policy". In a whirlwind of activity $116 million in federal funding 
magically appeared; tripartite agreements were signed between native 
councils, federal and provincial government bodies; and subsequently, native 
peacekeepers and/or police forces were established. By 1998, 194 bands (68% 
of those eligible) had signed on for First Nations "stand-alone" policing. 
On average, bands receive $1million on top of regular band council funding, 
and create 10-15 new on-reserve jobs.

On the surface, it may seem that the federal government's delegation of 
policing authority is a gesture of respect for First Nations sovereignty 
over their own affairs. Drawing from the results of a survey of First 
Nations police officers and management, government researchers in the field 
concluded:

There is little doubt that First Nations policing is quite wrapped up in 
political symbolization. Policing and justice, it has been argued, are the 
jewels in the crown of self-government. National First Nations political 
leaders have stressed that policing issues have to be seen in the context of 
self-government issues, and even government officials have linked policing 
and politics, commenting that policing is the easiest way to facilitate 
native self-government in the justice field (Murphy, C. & Clairmont, D., 
2000, pg.30).

Scratch below the surface though, and buried beneath the "self-government" 
rhetoric are police services like any other Canadian municipal police 
services - with the small exceptions that police are hired from the local 
band membership and are given a little more discretionary power around 
contested crimes such as cross-border "smuggling". Beyond this, First 
Nations "stand-alone" police forces enforce federal and provincial laws; are 
trained at provincial police institutes; and are ruled by provincial Police 
Acts. They collaborate with their counterpart provincial police 
organizations (i.e., the SQ, OPP, and RCMP) and call them in for back-up 
and/or special policing services and resources.

It turns out then, that one man's jewel in the crown, is an other's thorn in 
the side. Signing into tripartite agreements is not an innocuous activity. 
Tripartite agreements undermine Native sovereignty. This is how it works. 
Through the First Nations Policing Policy, the federal government gives 
First Nations permission to police their own land base if, and only if they 
conform their operations to federal and provincial policing regulations. As 
soon as a Nation agrees to do this, they place themselves under the 
jurisdiction of the Canadian state and are said to be "voluntarily" ceding 
their sovereignty. Sovereign nations don't need permission to do anything on 
their own territories; it is their right to have control over all community 
affairs. What the feds have done now is devised a way to worm themselves out 
of the burden of "responsibility" for "protecting" First Nations 
communities, and have delegated authority for policing reservations onto the 
provinces (whether they like it or not). The provinces then delegate 
policing functions to First Nations police forces. This is a far cry from an 
autonomous First Nation police (David Barsamian, 1995).

So barring the "respect-for-sovereignty" rational - which could have been an 
influence if the government actually gave a damn about the various 
recommendations put forward by its own Commissions and Inquiries into First 
Nations/Canadian conflict - there is a need for serious scrutiny into the 
motives behind the government's First Nations Policing Policy. One 
possibility is immediately evident. Public Relations. In recent years, 
Canada has drawn some heat from the international community for its 
day-to-day police interactions with First Nations peoples, and its handling 
of "crisis" interventions such as the Oka Crisis. For example, in 1991 the 
International Human Rights Federation issued a report describing a litany of 
abuses by the Quebec police and Canadian army during the Oka Crisis. It said 
the police systematically discriminated against native people at Oka by 
arresting Mohawks under improper conditions and harassing anyone with a 
native face. Amnesty International put Canada on its list of human rights 
abusers citing six cases of police mistreatment of Mohawks warranting 
serious investigation (Geoffrey York & Loreen Pindera,1991). By having First 
Nations police officers apply law-and-order in First Nations communities, 
Canada not only sidesteps allegations of racist police harassment and abuse, 
but also gains reinforcement, both physically and symbolically, for the 
implementation of assimilationist legislation. Native police willing to 
enforce Canada's rules sends out an implicit message that these rules are 
for the "good" of, and accepted by, the majority of First Nations peoples. 
This is just the kind of backing Canada needs to avoid further scandalizing 
its reputation as a "liberal democracy".

But there are many in First Nations communities who do not welcome this 
development. They remember history, and are not tricked into believing that 
just because First Nations police are Indian that they will not enforce 
colonial government policy. Native Indian Agents also helped commit genocide 
against "their own" peoples. And police forces have always been used in 
First Nations displacement and genocidal policies. Take a look at the 
history of the RCMP for example. In 1873 the Crown government of Canada 
created the North West Mounted Police (NWMP, later the RCMP) to protect 
Canada's western border from the possibility of American encroachment. Over 
time, the NWMP were also given responsibility to provide policing services 
to communities throughout the prairies being settled by European immigrants 
(FNCPA & HRDC, 2001).

But the First Nations communities long established in the prairies were 
themselves threatened by the European settlers. Allegedly in order to 
"protect" Aboriginal peoples, the government sent the NWMP to these 
communities as well. As European settlers kept coming with expectations of 
the "good life", the Crown shifted its policies regarding land tenure and 
surprise! policing policy shifted too. The authorized force of the NWMP was 
increased from 500 to 1,000 men, and they began moving Indians to reserves 
and were responsible for keeping them there (FNCPA & HRDC, 2001). The police 
became intimately involved in administering treaties and Indian affairs 
generally. Whenever an Indian Agent needed assistance in enforcing 
government policy on Indian people, he called the Mounted Police. Indian 
children who ran away from residential schools were sought, beaten and 
returned by NWMP officers. Indian adults who left reserves without a pass 
from the Indian agent were apprehended by the Mounted Police (FNCPA & HRDC, 
2001).

In 1885, the Mounted Police eagerly participated alongside regular military 
forces in suppressing the North-West Rebellion. They also took on the task 
of apprehending and meting out punishment to rebels. Eighteen Metis and 30 
Indians were apprehended and convicted. Louis Riel and eight Indians were 
executed. Riel was hanged in Regina following his trial; the Indians were 
executed publicly in the Mounted Police stockade at Battleford, 
Saskatchewan. The police also punished any Metis and/or Indians whom were 
simply suspected of supporting the rebellion, even if they had never 
committed any actual offenses. The Metis were virtually wiped out as a 
distinct national and political group. The police burned and looted their 
homes, confiscated their horses and destroyed their property (FNCPA & HRDC, 
2001). This is the role that police play in times of colonial expansion - 
herding the masses through violence, or the threat of it, and stamping out 
dissent. First Nations police officers will be no different. While 
government policy brings displacement and poverty to First Nations 
communities, creating disorder, the police will be there to enforce the 
restoration of public order. They will force the marginalized to accept the 
status quo.

Colonization is not just a historical event. When the federal government 
decided to invest over one hundred million dollars to implement First 
Nations policing without consulting First Nations peoples, and rather than 
funding a body to enforce respect of aboriginal treaty and sovereignty 
rights, it did so because it was in their own best interest. Installing 
First Nations police forces in First Nations communities, before the 
implementation of the Governance Act which will displace Aboriginal peoples, 
verges on the conspiratorial. Displacement does require that those who 
benefit from it are "protected" from those who do not. Desperate people do 
more and more desperate things to survive, or to commit slow methods of 
suicide. A recent government funded survey of First Nations police services 
found that "bands with independent funds (resource royalties, investment 
income) have topped up governmental funds [for policing], and there are 
signs that this could happen more frequently in the future if bands 
experience some economic growth" (Murphy, C., Clairmont, D, 2000, pg. 5 ). 
When economic growth is unequally distributed the guilty rich suddenly 
develop a desire for higher security thresholds. And like a drug-dealer, the 
Canadian government offered the first hit (of the billy-club) for free. As 
economic disparity and political rebellion increase, the bourgeoisie's 
dependency on the police will drain large portions of Band Council budgets 
in order to restore colonial order.

Like the protection supposedly "intended" by forcing the NWMP in native 
communities and by interning indigenous peoples in reservations; like the 
civilization "intended" by kidnapping native children for forced attendance 
at residential schools; First Nations policing will have a genocidal impact 
on First Nations peoples. The law of policing under capitalism is the 
protection of a very small group of elite who benefit from its policies, 
from those most marginalized by them - politically, economically and/or 
socially, or any combination thereof. Rarely, if ever, will you find police 
in hot-pursuit of corrupt politicians or business men who hand down their 
paychecks. Like the "good student" of the residential school era who were 
rewarded for telling on others who dared speak their own tongue, the First 
Nations police officer will be used to enforce colonial "civilization" - the 
extinguishment of Indigenous sovereignty and communal lands.

Forced Enforcement - The Kanesatake Mohawk Police

In order to fully appreciate the impetus behind the policing agreement 
signed in Kanesatake, we will take a quick look at the political trajectory 
from the 1990 Oka crisis till 1997 when the force was created. During the 
crisis of '90, the federal government insisted on negotiating with someone 
more "respectable" than the community activists, or Mohawk Warriors whom 
they were depicting as "criminal extremists" and/or "terrorists". They 
didn't want to set a precedent by caving into the demands of those who dared 
to organize their own autonomous self-defense. Jerry Peltier, who'd been 
working as a consultant for the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA), fit the 
image. Without support from the community, Peltier declared himself the 
"legitimate voice" of Kanehsatake. Peltier was rewarded for his 
collaboration soon after the crisis ended with a $250,000 donation from the 
DIA to run in a federally forced leadership referendum and band council 
election. Despite overwhelming community opposition, a legal challenge and a 
voter boycott, Peltier was installed as the Grand Chief. Democracy in 
Kanehsatake - in the form of public meetings and posting of band membership 
lists - quickly disappeared (Dan David, 1995-96).

Peltier's "leadership" did nothing to help resolve community conflicts, 
rather it exacerbated, crystallized, and created new factions. He was not 
popularly supported. Despite repeated requests for provincial and federal 
bodies to intervene, Canada refused to break bonds with their council. In 
1992, Peltier threatened that if the provincial police intervened in the 
affairs of Kanehsatake without his permission, there would be another Oka. 
While getting rid of the SQ was not such a bad thing, Peltier and his 
council simply replaced one tyranny with another through the creation of 
their own 20-person enforcement team. The enforcement team consisted of some 
members of the federally-funded Community Watch Team, which was controlled 
by the band council's so-called "minister of justice" Robert Gabriel, while 
others were actually members of band council itself (Dan David, 1995-96).

As a private, rather than democratically controlled operation, this team set 
about enforcing personal agendas. They intimidated those opposed to the 
operation of a high-stakes bingo hall; they attacked residents whose homes 
they declared they'd "laid claims" to (in one case, by shooting at the home 
for three hours straight!); and they tried to silence people who were 
vocally opposed to marijuana being cultivated within the territory. The 
crucial part of this story, however, is not in the kind of development 
projects that they supported, but is in how official federal and provincial 
bodies responded to a group of fourteen women from Kanehsatake who decided 
to organize to put an end to what they viewed as a violent dictatorship. 
They appealed to various Mohawk, provincial and federal bodies to put an end 
to the violence, but to no avail. Peltier simply said the women were 
"losers" who wanted political power (Dan David, 1995-96).

Officials from the Mohawk Round Table, an Ottawa-based forum where chiefs 
from the three Mohawk territories sit with federal and provincial officials, 
washed their hands of the women's concerns by saying they couldn't do 
anything unless the grand chiefs could agree on what to do, or come to 
consensus on whether to prioritize the issues at all. Although policing was 
an avenue the women wished to pursue, their suggestions were never granted 
any serious consideration. In October of 1995, they met with the Aboriginal 
Justice program in Ottawa and again, got no response. They filed affidavits 
blaming the band chief, his council, Quebec's public security minister and 
the federal minister of Indian Affairs for allowing the violence. They still 
did not get anywhere. On August 24, 1995, the Quebec court rejected their 
appeal to have Peltier purged, citing insufficient information to support 
their complaints. Then the Band council offered the women $200,000 to drop 
the case - an offer they steadfastly refused (Dan David, 1995-96).

Yet suddenly, in 1996 the officials changed their tune. Despite the years of 
pleas by these women, Kanehsatake Band Council decided it would get its own 
police force and by 1997, the Kanehsatake Mohawk Police (KMP) were instated. 
This decision had nothing to do with safety concern for the community that 
the women had been expressing. Instead, it turns out the band council Chief 
in charge of the justice portfolio needed Quebec's permission to operate a 
casino in Kanehsatake (Excelsior, Inc.). Quebec stipulated they would only 
approve the application if a policing agreement were signed. The result? 
Band Council rushed to sign, seal and deliver law-and-order to the 
Kanehsatake community.

With the assistance of the Surete du Quebec and Daniel Beaudry (Director of 
the Office of Safety of Quebec for the regional municipality of County of 
Two Mountains) who did some pre-selection of candidates, individuals were 
chosen to become law-enforcement officers. One was summoned from his 17 ½ 
year job with the American military, and another recruitment was an 
ex-military and an ex-cop from Akwasasne who was found to be too aggressive. 
Eight of the twenty-one applicants were selected for interim positions. In a 
rush to get the recruits trained, the regularly scheduled 2 and ½ year 
training program at John Abbot College was reduced to 6 months. One 
instructor was told that they were not permitted to fail any of the 
candidates, and rumor has it that some of the selected candidates that 
failed portions of their training and psychological testing are now on 
active duty. The Quebec Native Women's Association has condemned the 
training of all the Aboriginal law enforcement officers in the province. 
They feel that the rush to provide "law and order" has resulted in 
incomplete, inadequate, and incompetent training, and incompetent police 
officers.

On December 15, 2000, the Mohawk Council of Kanesatake released their "Audit 
Observations and Recommendations" for the Kanesatake Police Service. It 
provides corroborating evidence that recruitment standards are not being 
followed. It states:

Our audit has demonstrated that insufficient documentation is kept by the 
Kanesatake Police Service to justify that recruitment and selection of the 
police officers were made in accordance with section 4.6 of the Agreement. 
The police officers personnel files do not include a copy of the certificate 
of Indian Status, the high school diploma, a set of fingerprints and no 
indication regarding a criminal record. Also, the medical examination report 
and the police basic training course certificate were missing for some of 
the police officers." (Kanesatake Police Service Audit, April 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000)

>From April 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000, $1.3 million was provided to 
Kanesatake to operate their own policing services. The period covered by the 
Policing Agreement is April 1, 1999 to March 31, 2002. This term, the 
Kanehsatake Mohawk Council has asked Quebec for more financial resources in 
order to triple the policing budget and hire more police officers. The 
Public Security Minister is currently studying the request.

Already, suspicions have been aired regarding the role that the police are 
playing in land negotiations for Kanehsatake. On April 25th 2001, a letter 
from a band member was read to Parliament in regard to Kanehsatake's Land 
Governance Agreement and Bill S-24. The letter opens with an invitation to 
Parliament to come to Kanehsatake and hear the community's opinions. The 
minister read:

Last year when the agreement was to be initialed, no one from the community 
was invited/advised or told to be present for such a historical signing, 
other than the Chiefs of the Council, INAC representative Walter Walling, 
and Mr. Eric Maldoff, federal negotiator.Mr. Robert Nault was [also] in our 
community to sign or initial this agreement, and ironically it was done on 
Aboriginal Day, where our members were celebrating in the Pines area. Mr. 
Walter Walling of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, was 
seen riding in a Kanesatake Police Vehicle, making sure that trouble makers 
(opposition to the agreement) were not in the area! Why was he doing this? 
Is it in the Federal Government's interest to have their public servants do 
community police work, or is it to cover up the fact that the Minister was 
here and that we were not permitted to attend this event because it was 
supposed to remain a secret? (37th Parliament, 1st Session).

As the push for Chretien and Nault's "Self-Governance" deal intensifies with 
the passing of legislation, we can expect First Nations Police will be 
"helping out" more and more to insure its implementation. Upon the signing 
of the policing agreement in Kanesatake, Solicitor General of Canada Herb 
Gray said, "As a priority issue for the federal government, this agreement 
marks an important step in the relationship between the Government of 
Canada, the Government of Quebec and the Kanesatake community". Grand Chief 
James Gabriel added, "This agreement is a major achievement for all parties 
concerned. It reflects the Mohawk Council of Kanesatake's new spirit of 
cooperation in addressing issues with the two levels of government" 
(www.sgc.gc.ca, December 19, 1996). Pretty warm and fuzzy language for what 
some see as the Council's spirit of co-optation into the Canadian state 
agenda.

Crisis #2 - Joe Takes a Stand

It all started on June 5th, 1999. Joe was returning home with a six-pack of 
beer and a couple of movies and was ready to kick back and enjoy the 
evening. When he pulled into his driveway and got out of his truck to pick 
up the mail, he noticed a local youngster riding his four-wheeler around the 
front yard. This was a common phenomenon. The ruts in Joe's land had become 
so deep that they acted as a kind of joy-riding circuit. This was pissing 
Joe off, but a couple days earlier he'd caught a different youth in the act 
and had been able to negotiate an agreement with him that the vehicle only 
be driven on the back of the property. Wanting to strike a similar deal with 
this youth, Joe ran towards the boy and yelled that he wanted to talk to 
him. The boy just started speeding up and driving away. Joe ran faster and 
when the boy simply went faster too, Joe yelled and gestured for him to get 
the hell off his property. The boy took off, went home and phoned the 
police. He told the police that Joe had threatened him.

Corporal Tracey Cross just arrived on shift when Constable Clayton Leprette 
told him about the youngsters complaint. Cross had been involved as a police 
trainee in a 1997 incident at Joe's. On July 11th, the anniversary date of 
the SQ raid of the Pines, (which Joe thought was of no coincidence) the cops 
entered Joe's property without a warrant, and conducted a search using 
high-powered flashlights. They shone the lights into Joe's home and all 
around his property. The next day Joe lodged a four-page complaint against 
the police for their unwarranted presence at his home that he thought was an 
excuse to taunt and intimidate him because he acted as a Warrior during the 
Oka Crisis. The cops claimed that they had been in pursuit of a stolen 
vehicle that had entered Joe's property. They claimed they didn't know 
anyone was living at Joe's address. Joe's complaint was dismissed.

So Tracey Cross got dispatch to run Joe up. Dispatch told him that Joe was 
flagged violent and suicidal. At the Police Ethics Commission inquiry, Cross 
admitted this information could have been entered into CPIC due to Joe's 
role as a Warrior during the Oka crisis, or simply because he owned a gun. 
In any case, this was the information they had. When Cross and Leprette 
pulled into Joe's driveway they drove all the way around Joe's house so that 
the car would be facing the highway in case they needed to make a quick 
exit. They were both in a state of "heightened alertness".

Joe was upstairs in his living room watching a movie when he thought he 
heard a car pull up in his driveway. Joe looked out the upstairs window at 
the back of his house, and when he couldn't see anything went downstairs to 
look out the front window. He saw two Kanesatake Mohawk Police officers 
arming themselves with shotguns. Insulted by the cops' excessively 
intimidating approach, and outraged that those who had traded sovereignty 
for a badge were going to "exercise" their power over him, Joe went back 
upstairs to collect his own rifle. He would not put up with their bullying 
just because they wore a uniform. He wanted to meet them as equals. By the 
time he came back downstairs and opened the door, all he could see was an 
empty patrol car. Or as Joe put it: "By the time I got outside - I guess 
they saw me through the window - they had hauled ass and left the car 
there".

For Joe David, community acceptance of the police force, especially by some 
Longhouse people, was a de facto renunciation of traditional ideals - the 
ideals that galvanized the "grassroots fighting spirit" during the Oka 
crisis. He felt betrayed and isolated in his fight for native sovereignty. 
So when he saw the police car left behind in his driveway, he reacted 
strongly. Joe said: "After all the build up through the years, I just pumped 
my rifle dry into their car out of frustration and anger. And it felt good." 
Then he yelled, in case the officers were still in range: "Get off my land, 
this is Mohawk land. You have no jurisdiction here!" Moments later, he went 
inside his home, called a friend and said, "I think I just did something 
really stupid." Joe understood the cops would not respond kindly to someone 
shooting up their vehicle.

The cops, of course, told the story differently. Cross and Leprette said 
that they approached Joe's house, with their firearms holstered, and in 
friendly manner. Cross said he knocked on Joe's front door 3 times, then 
later testified it was 4 or 5 times, before Joe stuck his head out of the 
second floor window and asked: "What do you want?" Cross said he then 
greeted Joe in Mohawk and asked if they could speak with him. Apparently 
Joe, from the 2nd floor window (which doesn't exist at the front of his 
home) said menacingly, "I'll be right down" and smiled in a "weird manner 
that was really scary".

Leprette claims he looked at Cross and said: "I don't like that"; Cross 
agreeing said: "Neither do I". So they both went back to the car for cover. 
Allegedly Joe then came out through the sliding glass door at the side of 
his house, cocked his rifle, pointed it at them and yelled: "Get the fuck 
off my land!". "He's got a gun!", Tracey Cross said as he fled to the left 
of vehicle pulling his firearm out of the holster. Leprette fled to the 
right. Cross said that Joe was coming towards the vehicle so he ran into the 
high brush area and then Joe fired a shot towards him. Cross dropped and 
began to crawl as he did "under fire in Yugoslavia", and Joe allegedly shot 
at him again, narrowly missing. Cross made his way to Joe's neighbor's 
house, radioed for back-up, then asked the neighbor to drive him to the 
police station.

Joe admits he made a pretty big mistake in shooting-up the police car. But 
he did not try to shoot the police. The police, on the other hand, did have 
motives for going into the investigation of the complaint with some 
prejudices. Joe had been a Warrior during the Oka Crisis and was a supposed 
"squatter" on his own territory. Joe's house, like 73 others in the 
community, was bought by the federal government at the end of the Oka Crisis 
from non-aboriginal holders. The deeds to these houses were supposed to be 
handed over to and administered by the band council. When Joe moved back to 
Kanehsatake in 1996, after a 3 year absence, the negotiations were still 
dragging on. Many people had simply decided they would move in. When the 
band council tried to collect rent, most residents refused to pay on the 
basis that the band council was a foreign authority. Living in these homes 
became an act of resistance in itself. Some members of the band council, as 
well as members of a federally-funded Community Watch Team controlled by the 
council's "minister of justice", had previously "claimed" the houses for 
themselves. Serge Simon, one of the residents, received a visit from this 
enforcement team in the middle of the night. They blasted away at his home 
with rifles for three straight hours while Serge hustled his children into 
the basement. Joe knew that moving into one of these homes would be 
challenging the powers of colonial authority, but he chose to resist the 
intimidation and danger.

But resistance, while it should always be honored and celebrated, is not 
however a healthy state of being. Under these circumstances, Joe was often 
apprehensive about leaving his home. He loved the tranquillity of the land 
and had set up a studio where he could paint and sculpt. He had a computer 
room and had received a grant to write a book about his experiences during 
the Oka Crisis. It was a place of healing for him, because Joe like many 
others in the community, had symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
stemming from the Oka Crisis and its aftermath. It was because of his love 
and need for this space that he felt such a strong resentment towards those 
political factions who out of greed and by force, could take it all away 
from him.

Joe's resistance to the officers lead to a tense twelve-hour stand-off.

The Criminalization of Sovereigntists

Under Canadian colonial rule-of-law, First Nations peoples have never ceded 
their territories, nor their inherent right to sovereignty. For the 
government of Canada to craft the 1991 First Nations Policing Policy, in the 
midst of a resurgence of sovereigntist militancy, was indeed crafty. While 
sovereigntists who take a stand against band council authority may be deemed 
trouble-makers by those who don't share their views; opposing, challenging, 
and not surrendering to the authority of the police, well, that is in itself 
a "crime". Police everywhere rely enormously on public support. As the 
saying goes, obedience is 9/10ths of the law. In a survey of Canadian police 
officers it was found that they are extremely intolerant of what they called 
"insolence" and "lack of respect". They define these as:

...not only physical aggression and other overtly hostile acts that threaten 
officers' safety, but also resistance in the form of actions or statements 
that merely challenge officers' authority or legitimacy (e.g., denying an 
officer's accusation or questioning an officer's judgment) and even passive 
acts of noncompliance (e.g., failing to respond to an officer's questions or 
requests) that imply that officers are "not taken seriously" (J. Reiman, pg. 
10 ).

By definition then, this makes sovereigntists who refuse the jurisdiction of 
First Nations polices forces ripe for targeted police abuse of power. 
Considering that police violence and trumped up charges for arrests are 
often a result of such encounters with federal, provincial and municipal 
police forces in Canada, it is safe to expect similar responses by First 
Nations police forces.

This shift is a significant one. Policing does not occur in a political 
vacuum, and most native communities have several competing political 
factions - the most obvious between traditionalists and Indian Act, Band 
Council factions. Even though First Nations policing is supposed to be 
autonomous from band council, they do share a political ideology that allows 
them to work under Canadian jurisdiction. And they share an interest in 
maintaining the authority vested in them by Canada; they are the social and 
economic benefactors of these policies. Therefore, sovereigntists represent 
the greatest threat to their shared interests.

Consequently, it is those who stand to lose most from sovereignty who are 
armed and legally authorized to use force. They have the discretion to 
arrest, or not, based on their personal assessments of individuals and 
situations. If they believe militant sovereigntists are "criminals" for 
blocking highways, or defending themselves with arms, this perception will 
influence their day-to-day interactions with these people. Even though the 
Mohawk Warriors were judged "not guilty" by a Canadian jury, some still hold 
them responsible for "bringing on" the violence of the police and army. They 
feel that "peace" between Canada and First Nations requires "getting rid" of 
the Warriors, by any means at their disposal.

In the world of police "intelligence", a shell game has been played in terms 
classifying exactly what kind of threat it is that sovereigntists pose to 
the larger society. How groups are classified determines to what degree they 
can be spied upon, provoked, infiltrated, sabotaged, interrogated, etc. It 
provides the media slant, as well as the charges laid, percentages of jails 
terms to be served, and powers the police are allowed to exercise. The 
following are just two examples of how Canadian Intelligence Units classify 
native sovereigntists. Within the same year, two separate reports were 
conducted, each with its own contradictory conclusion. The first is a 1999 
report from the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence 
(SIRC). It states:

"The previous Senate Special Committees on terrorism and Public Safety 
included militant First Nations organizations, such as the Mohawk Warriors, 
within the typology of terrorism. In testimony before the Committee, law 
enforcement [including Pierre Goulet, Acting Director General of the 
Aboriginal Policing Directorate] and security intelligence personal 
expressed their view that most persons within such groups are motivated by 
the prospect of personal gain. They have no political or ideological 
motivations other than as a cover for their criminal activity[italics 
added]. The Committee has, therefore, excluded such groups from review. In 
doing so, however, neither the Committee nor the security intelligence 
community down-plays such groups or persons within them as threats to law 
and order, or even as threats or potential threats to the security of 
Canada." (SIRC Special Report on Terrorism and Public Safety, January 1999).

A year later, journalist Stewart Bell wrote about a 1999 Secret RCMP 
Intelligence report, that was released to the National Post under federal 
Access to Information legislation. He wrote:

"Court decisions and corruption on native reserves are fueling an increase 
in aboriginal militancy", according to a secret RCMP report. [T]he report 
cites concerns about rising 'aboriginal criminal extremism'.predict[ing] 
militants would continue to exploit aboriginal discontent, which it blamed 
partly on band corruption. "Despite billions of dollars going into 
aboriginal programs, abject poverty remains a fact of life on many reserves, 
even those which have prospered from oil and gas holdings. Powerful factions 
control the finances and enrich their families and friends," the report 
says. "Communities dependent on government funds also find themselves in 
this situation. This polarization has led to violence in the past and will 
likely be played out again in 1999 and beyond. Aboriginal extremists will 
most likely play major roles in provoking or sustaining militant action in 
these communities"..The report by the RCMP's intelligence branch examines 
Canada's underground extremist activity, which it defines as crime committed 
for ideological purposes (The National Post, September 23, 2000).

See their confusion? They say both that "such groups are motivated by the 
prospect of personal gain.[and] have no political or ideological motivations 
other than as a cover for their criminal activity" and that they are part of 
"underground extremist activity" which is "crime committed for ideological 
purposes". The crucial factor underlying both misconceptions is 
Intelligence's ignorance (as well as the media's) regarding Canada's ongoing 
colonization of First Nations peoples. They do not see that there is 
essentially a war being waged against First Nations. And wars are waged 
using all means of national power - diplomacy, military force, economics, 
ideology, technology, and culture. Sovereign Nations, when attacked through 
any of these means, have the right to fight back. Self-defense is not 
criminal, whether it be economic through the "smuggling" of cigarettes 
across the artificial borders cutting through their territories, or military 
through the taking up of arms. Defending sovereignty is not an act of 
terrorism. That Warrior Societies, and other militant sovereigntists, have 
only armed themselves in self-defense in the face of deadly confrontations 
with Canadian police and military forces is a reflection of their 
consideration, control and discipline. Since the ban on Natives using the 
courts has been lifted, the tactic most often used by sovereigntists is the 
judicial process. The real enforcement problem is getting Canada to uphold 
many of the court rulings that have been in the favor of First Nations 
peoples.

First Nations police forces, however, adopt the interpretations of 
criminality and terrorism as defined by Canadian Intelligence sources, and 
Canadian legislation. Recently, definitions of both "organized crime" and 
"terrorist groups" were significantly broadened with the passing of Bills 
C-24, and C-36 respectively. These bills also vastly expanded the powers of 
police to spy, infiltrate, disrupt, entrap, provoke, violate, interrogate, 
imprison and sabotage groups who fit these definitions. For example, Bill 
C-24, the Anti-Organized Crime legislation, redefined a criminal 
organization to mean three or more persons whose main purpose or activity is 
either committing indictable offenses, or making it easier for others to 
commit them. It also introduced three new organized crime offenses into the 
Criminal Code. The first makes it a crime punishable by up to 5yrs in prison 
to recruit for a "criminal organization". The second, to aid, abet, counsel 
or commit any indictable offense as a member of a criminal organization is 
punishable by up to 14 years. And the third offense, is being a leader, 
whether formal or not, who knowingly instructs anyone to commit any offense, 
indictable or summary, and can lead to life imprisonment. Sentences are 
served consecutively, and parole eligibility is set at 50% of the sentence 
served. For the last 10 years the RCMP Intelligence Units have been 
classifying Warrior Societies as organized crime in their annual 
Environmental Scans. There is reason to be alarmed.

Under this law, a freedom fighter can end up spending their whole life in 
prison if they organize a roadblock and the police believe they are "the 
leader" of a Warrior Society. In their typology, the Warrior Society is a 
criminal organization. If somebody from the community donates their car for 
the roadblock, they have aided and abetted the criminal organization in 
furthering their goal of committing this "offense" and could be sent to 
prison for up to 14 years. The person who does the call-around for the 
action, if they recruit people to the cause, even as cooks to provide meals 
for those maintaining the roadblocks, can get 5 years in prison for just 
performing this duty. The list goes on and on.

In 1997, when this legislation was first introduced to Parliament, the 
Manitoba Warriors, both alarmed and insulted, sent the Justice Minister a 
communiqué to try and enlighten him in regard to the role that Warriors 
play. The first paragraphs read:

.proposed changes to the Criminal Code (Bill C-24) are wide-ranging and 
meant to outlaw Native Warrior Societies and label them as "organized 
crime". This sweeping new legislation will restrict the rights and voice of 
Indian people across this continent. If we can't voice our opinion and show 
our opposition to what the Canadian Government is doing to our Nations, then 
how are we to survive? The Warrior Society has been demonized and labeled as 
a criminal organization by the government and media as part of a strategy to 
criminalize the Rotiskenrakete. Mr. Rock, here is an explanation:

The Kaienerekowa - Great Law of Peace has provided a way for the People to 
pursue justice, harmony and survival. The Rotiskenrakete - Warrior Society 
is part of this. The understanding of the word "rotiskenrakete" is "the 
burden of peacekeeping and harmony is on our men". The 
Warriors/Rotiskenrakete are also protectors of the Haudenosaunee - People of 
the Longhouse, and of the Kaienerekowa - the Iroquois Constitution. It is 
the collective responsibility to our present and future generations that our 
ways continue.The responsibility of the Warriors and Women is an honorable 
task. Hence, Mr. Rock should be educated as to what a Warrior Society really 
is. It is the power of the people in action (Rotiskenrakete/Warrior Society 
Communique, May 1, 1997).

One of the scandals of the Oka Crisis was that the Communications Security 
Establishment (CSE) had broken their mandate, which only allows the 
targeting of foreign communications, and illegally spied on the Mohawks from 
a hotel site located in Oka (Roslin, The Nation). Under the organized crime 
bill (C-24), not only is electronic spying a justified activity, but so too 
is the commission of any crime by an officer of the peace (except sexual 
assault and murder) in the pursuit gaining evidence for charges as well. 
Besides, with First Nations police officers not only working from within 
First Nations communities, but also for some who have lived in the community 
their entire lives, information gathering on dissidents becomes a much 
easier task. I think it is fair to say First Nations policing is in 
character much akin to the "community policing" that was implemented in 
African American communities in the early 1970's. Especially by those forces 
who suddenly felt that it would be "equitable" to hire black police 
officers. Lets take a brief look at this history.

In the 1970's, American police had come to view inner-cities as "enemy 
territory". Inner city riots and other forms of civil disobedience and 
political organizing reflected an outright defiance of police authority. The 
police scrambled to find ways to regain control over urban areas and 
populations. One trend was to further militarize the police, providing them 
with equipment to monitor and brutally repress particular populations. The 
other was for police to present themselves as friendly members of the 
community who understood local problems and were there to serve and protect 
in "partnership" with newly "empowered" residents. Community police officers 
would attend all sorts of community meetings to gather information from 
"good citizens" regarding those they deemed "undesirable". What the "good 
citizens" did not understand, was that law-and-order solutions would not 
solve the problems in their communities, because those problems were 
fundamentally rooted in social, racial, and economic injustice.

The community police officers shared the information gathered from "good 
citizens" with police intelligence units. Radical groups organizing for 
profound social and economic change as a solution to their community's 
problems were smeared as criminals and terrorists. They were infiltrated and 
manipulated by the police; they were terrorized, arrested and imprisoned. 
And because Black communities did have reasons to feel insecure, and the 
"crimes" committed in their communities were visible due to poverty, unlike 
the much more damaging but invisible corporate crime, the community police 
were able to rally support for their cause, and for the use of violence in 
implementing their law-and-order regime against the poor and against 
dissidents. They used the divide and conquer technique. In the May 1995 
issue of "Law and Order", a trade journal for police, a leading proponent of 
community policing described the aim of community policing as such: "The 
military calls changing an enemy's or population's thoughts 'Psychological 
Operations' or 'PSYOPS'. Community Oriented Policing does the same thing".

The similarities between the policing of Black communities in the 70's, and 
First Nations communities today, could not be clearer. First Nations police 
officers are being urged to attend community activities such as various 
social service boards, pow wows and sweats, special events at schools, and 
making visits to elders. In this way they can get a sense of who is radical 
and who is moderate in the community, and convince the more moderate 
elements that it is in their interest to collaborate with them. Just as the 
Black communities were being cleansed for a new wave of yuppie urban 
dwellers, First Nations territories are being prepared for the next wave of 
Canadian settlers. If First Nations municipalities are to become more 
economically "self-reliant", then they will have to be conducive to big 
business. That is, sanitized municipalities without pesky eyesores such as 
the poor, or pain-in-the-ass interferin' traditionalists.

Just think.if First Nations peoples were really being offered sovereignty, 
and could act on behalf of the wishes arrived at through consensus in their 
communities, don't you think that Native police forces would be busting the 
corporate criminals that rip them off and dump toxins into their 
communities? Or maybe they would be investigating the political corruption 
of Canada's installed puppet-governments. First Nations police could bust 
developers, politicians and corporations who are in violation of their 
treaty rights.

And if there is any doubt as to what capacity First Nations police officers 
will be allowed to serve in crisises resulting from Native land disputes, 
the example of Bob Wood, an ex-RCMP First Nations police officer in British 
Columbia serves as a clear illustration. Bob Wood was working as a 
negotiator for the RCMP during the Gustafsen Lake Sundance ceremony. The 
sovereigntists had finished their ceremony and according to Bob, would 
probably soon leave the disputed area on their own. "Maybe a little more 
negotiation," he said "and it would have been settled peacefully" (CFRO, 
1997).

Bob Wood recommended to the RCMP, after negotiating with the Sundancers for 
two solid months, to "not send in the Emergency Response Team...not to, you 
know, start anything.a show of force, because we were pretty sure it was 
over with." The next day Bob, and the two other First Nations police 
officers involved were pulled off the assignment. The RCMP mobilized the 
largest contingent of officers (including RCMP SWAT teams and the Joint Task 
Force-2) in Canadian history. They laid siege to Gustafsen Lake despite, or 
even in spite of Bob's recommendations. Bob quit the police force in 
disgust. It became clear to Bob that First Nations peoples would never have 
their sovereignty respected so long as Canada had authority over them (CFRO, 
1997).

Crisis #2 - The Stand-Off

Back at the station Constable Tracey Cross calls the Chief of the Kanesatake 
Mohawk Police, Terry Isaac, and reports to him that Joe just tried to shoot 
him. He calls in all the KMP officers and asks dispatch to phone and 
evacuate all residents living in the area. Cross orders Clayton Leprette to 
evacuate the civilian population, calls in the ambulance service, and calls 
in the Surete du Quebec (SQ) to help establish roadblocks. A short time 
later, when Joe's father shows up at the police station, Cross explains his 
version of events and suggests that he try calling Joe. Joe's father agrees 
to call, but no police actually do follow-up to see if he had reached him. 
Then Leprette comes back and informs Cross that some people refused to 
evacuate. One person testified that she refused because she believed the 
police were over-reacting. Finally, when Terry Isaac arrives at the station, 
Cross is posted to the St. Germaine roadblock.

At the station, Terry Isaac told Joe's father, sister Denise, and brother 
Walter that his "plan was to wait things out, for two or three days if 
necessary". He said that all of his men had been informed of his position. 
He wanted to "resolve the situation through negotiation". In March of 2002, 
Isaac still maintained that this was his plan and that he never wavered from 
it. How seriously Isaac's men took his position however is debatable. 
Corporal Bobby Bonspiel testified he put his Emergency Response Team badge 
on as soon as he got to the police station because he had been informed that 
it may be a tactical operation. In fact, all members of the tactical team 
were suited up in their tactical gear.

As Joe's brother, Walter, was leaving the police station to go to the 
roadblocks, a black van came "flying into the yard". Larry Ross jumped out, 
ran into the police station, then came back out with a rifle. Walter said to 
Larry, "hey calm down, lets talk about this". But Larry would not. So Walter 
went back into the police station and told Terry Isaac: "You have to put a 
handle on this Rambo!" By this time Larry Ross had taken off. Terry Isaac 
just reassured Walter that they were going to wait things out. Isaac told 
him "don't worry about it, I'm in charge here".

Not worrying was easier said than done. Several people testified that they 
too had fears about Larry Ross being on the scene. It was well known in the 
community he had vowed to "get rid of the Warriors" any way that he could. 
It was also rumored he had been dismissed from the Akwasasne police force 
because he was a little too "trigger-happy". In his own testimony Ross 
admitted to having asked a community member about whether or not Joe David 
was a Warrior. He told the Police Ethics Committee he made this inquiry 
because the Warrior Society was an "organized criminal syndicate". Larry 
Ross said the man had confirmed his suspicions about Joe being a Warrior. 
The prosecutor asked Larry if he knew or had inquired about what kind of 
criminal activities Joe was involved in. Ross said he didn't know, he said 
he had never asked. He had seen a picture of Joe though, dressed in full 
Warrior gear. It was a picture of Joe taken during the Oka Crisis.

When pushed Ross finally admitted that there are two types of Warrior 
Societies - one that "protects get-rich-quick schemes" and another that is 
traditional. The prosecutor asked if Larry had questioned the community 
member about Joe's involvement in the Oka Crisis. Larry said: "A little. We 
would talk a little, then it would come up again another time. It was an 
on-going conversation." One could say it was an illegal conversation. Cops 
are not supposed to use their position to gather information on individuals 
for personal reasons, and if it were not personal then this information 
would have been submitted as part of a criminal investigation. But Larry did 
not instigate a criminal investigation. He said: "there was not evidence to 
substantiate a criminal investigation". When the prosecutor insisted that 
Ross didn't need evidence to start investigating if he had "reasonable and 
probable grounds" to believe that Joe was involved in a criminal 
organization, Ross simply responded that he was "not at liberty to discuss 
intelligence operations. That would be different."

So after trying to convince Terry Isaac to tighten the leash on Larry Ross, 
Walter went to the roadblock to try and help out with the situation. He was 
taking his helmet off at the roadblock when Benny Etienne, Joe's neighbor, 
pulled up in a van. Benny yelled at Clayton Leprette: "If you guys don't 
take care of this wacko by the time I get back with my beer, I'm going to 
take care of him myself!" Nobody responded to Benny and he got back into his 
van and drove off towards the village. Walter went over to Constable 
Clarence Simon and said to him: "Did you hear that bullshit?" Clarence said 
yes. Denise David, who was further down the road heard Benny's statement 
too.

By this point, all KMP officers were on the scene.

When Joe's friend, Daniel Nicholas came to visit him, he reported that the 
SQ were on the scene and that he was unsure if there would be a community 
reaction to them. He told Joe that things were getting pretty intense. Joe 
decided that he needed to go and see things for himself. Maybe something 
could be worked out to de-escalate the situation. As he walked down his 
driveway he could see a number of vehicles parked on the road, and a very 
bright light coming from behind a big concrete block that was across the 
street from his driveway. He was walking with his rifle by his side. Someone 
yelled from behind the concrete block, "Joey, show us your gun". Joe lifted 
the gun above his head. He was too afraid of the cops to put it down.

Joe yelled out that the police could come get their car from his property if 
his father was to come with them. He was hoping, of course, that this would 
de-escalate the situation. Nobody responded to him. Joe yelled out: "I want 
to see a peacekeeper". Larry Ross, who was behind the concrete pillar and 
bright light yells back: ""I'm a peacekeeper". He said Joe looked really 
confused and attributed it to drugs or alcohol. Joe said he couldn't see 
where the voice was coming from, so he said: "Where the fuck are you?", and 
when Larry wouldn't show his face: "Fuck-you peacekeeper." Joe said "You are 
just like the ones who killed Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull! Go on! Shoot me 
in the back then. I know that that's what you want to do". Then he walked 
back to his home with his gun held over his head.

Several times throughout the Police Ethics Inquiry, members of the 
Kanesatake Mohawk Police insinuated that Joe wanted to be shot down by the 
police. In cop terminology this is called "cop-assisted suicide". The theory 
goes that there are suicidal people who don't have the courage to pull the 
trigger themselves, so instead, they provoke the police to shoot them. The 
foundations for this allegation in Joe's case were: 1) that Terry Isaac had 
heard through the grapevine that Joe had told someone it "was his dream to 
have a shoot out with the police", and 2) because he'd said: "Go ahead and 
shoot me then" at the end of his driveway.

Having dreams and fantasies about revenge on oppressors is common. If Joe 
did say this, it does not mean he was going to try manifest this dream in 
reality. Joe's statement about Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse was not an 
invitation for the police to shoot him! It was a historical reflection, and 
contemporary political commentary on the betrayal he felt about some of the 
community's acceptance of the police force. Native cops and military have 
killed native freedom fighters. They always have, and always will. Joe 
wanted people to understand this. He yelled from the driveway: "You have no 
jurisdiction on Mohawk territory".

Joe's father heard the yelling from the direction of Joe's house. He saw a 
couple of the police running in the ditches near Joe's. He said to Terry 
Isaac : "Keep these guys under control, we don't trust them". He didn't 
trust their antics. Isaac reassured Joe's father that he was in charge. "How 
long are you willing to wait?" his father asked. Isaac answered: "I'm in 
charge, as long as it takes."

At midnight Tracey Cross received the order from Larry Ross to do a roving 
patrol on highway # 344. Shortly after midnight Marie and Denise noticed 
three officers looking very agitated. They were scurrying back and forth 
between the two roadblocks. It was Larry Ross and Tracey Cross, and one 
other they could not identify. They heard one of them say: "Fuck this shit, 
lets go in and get him!" They were walking with their rifles out. The upper 
roadblock, in particular, seemed more tense. Mike Dupont arrived on the 
scene at around midnight. At 1am, he asked Terry Isaac what was going to 
happen. Isaac told him that he was going to take care of the situation 
through negotiation. Dupont heard that there was a negotiator coming from 
Akwasasne, but he didn't remember who told him. At approx. 2am, Tracey Cross 
saw Quebec Hydro arrive and was told by Ross to provide security for them.

The power to Joe's house was cut off and the lights went out. Marie and 
Denise were not notified that this would happen. They were surprised at this 
tactic. It seemed an aggressive, provocative move. Denise went back to the 
van to talk with Marie because she was getting really scared. When the hydro 
got cut it scared the shit out of her. She thought, "They said they were 
just gonna wait it out, and now they're running back and forth with their 
guns out".

Denise got a phone call from Walter to say that their cousin Pam was coming 
from Akwasasne. She had good negotiation skills, so Denise went to tell 
Terry Isaac that: "Pam can help in this situation". In the meantime the SQ 
had also offered a negotiator but Isaac refused them saying he already had 
everything under control. Larry Ross had taken a barricaded person/hostage 
negotiation course, and even though he hadn't even tried establishing 
contact with Joe, Isaac was going to rely on him.

Marie saw Benny Etienne come back from the village in a noisy car. He 
slammed the door and yelled: "I'm going to talk to Isaac about this". He 
walked up to the roadblock and was visibly angry. Benny stated in his police 
report that when he was stopped by the officers at the roadblock, he told 
them: "I have to pass, I'm not going to let that "mutt" stop me from going 
to my house". Pam, who was talking to Terry Isaac at the time, saw Benny 
too. It looked to her like he'd been drinking. Larry Ross approached Pam and 
Isaac and said that he'd "like to go and get the cruiser out". Isaac told 
Ross to hold off.

At around 3:45am, Larry Ross told Tracey Cross to come to Mountain Rd. When 
Tracey arrived, Benny Etienne was approaching Larry and telling him that he 
had looked in Joe's window and saw him lying on the couch. Larry Ross asked 
Benny if Joe had a weapon, but Tracey Cross didn't hear his answer. The 
prosecutor asked Tracey if Benny seemed drunk, if he knew him, or if he knew 
if Benny had "helped" the police before that night. Tracey answered no to 
everything. Larry's report of this encounter was that Benny told him Joe was 
laying on the couch, arms down to the side, and his gun between his legs. He 
said that Benny told him that Joe may have committed suicide. So Terry 
Isaac, Benny and Larry Ross discussed whether or not they should go check on 
Joe. They never asked Benny if he saw any blood, and nobody heard a gunshot 
indicating that Joe would have shot himself. Terry Isaac didn't check with 
Joe's family or friends to see if Joe was in fact suicidal.

The reason given by Ross and Isaac for involving Benny in the police 
operations that night were inconsistent, and quite often insubstantial. 
Terry Isaac testified that Benny "insisted" on going and therefore went. 
Assistant Chief, Larry Ross said he made the decision to have Benny 
accompany them because they'd be encountering difficult geographical terrain 
and they wanted to be stealth. Ross also claimed he needed to be lead to 
Joe's in order to be sure that they wouldn't get lost and become targets of 
Joe. In the end, the fact that Benny had no training or experience as a 
trail-blazer or scout didn't matter; the actual route that the police took 
to Joe's was straight up Mountain Road until they were parallel with the 
house, then 300-500 meters through small shrubs and Manitoba Cedars. When 
Larry Ross was asked by the Prosecutor if the terrain was indeed 
"difficult", he responded that he "couldn't tell cause Benny was leading".

While Benny and Larry went to "check on Joe's health", Mike Dupont, Tracey 
Cross, and Bobby Bonspiel were told to wait for them on Mountain Road.

Police Tactical Units:
"From the Gulf War to the Drug War"
- Headline from tactical unit equipment ad in leading police magazine -

Since the development of police tactical units in the late 1970's, Canada 
has seen an increase in the number of instances of their deployment to 
"maintain order" in society. Almost every Canadian police force with more 
than 100 officers has one. Nation-wide there are at least 84 tactical units 
- the RCMP has 31 Units of its own! Some of the more highly publicized 
incidents involving tactical units in Canada are; the Oka Crisis in Quebec 
(before it was turned over to the military); the Gustafsen Lake stand-off in 
British Columbia; the ambush at Ipperwash Park, Ontario; and, the RCMP 
tactical units at Burnt Church, New Brunswick (Alvaro, 2000).

Police tactical units in Canada go by a myriad of names, such as: Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Emergency Response Teams (ERT), Entry Teams 
(ET), Tactical Rescue Units (TRU), Joint Task Forces (JTF), etc. Originally 
established to handle 'terrorist' incidents and hostage situations, now, 
less than thirty years later, they are deployed to deal with situations 
"requiring a team of officers with a strong focus on the threatened or 
actual use of violence" (D. Pugliese, 1998). Police argue that this is a 
shift away from the individual officer with discretionary powers, with 
respect to using violence, to a team oriented policing that uses collective 
violence not always as a tactic of last-resort.

Emphasis for emergency response teams is on physical fitness and 
military-style tactics and training. Initial instruction usually consists of 
training for weapons handling, combat techniques, negotiations, laying siege 
to buildings, and sniper skills. Continuous training is considered 
paramount. Officers have to make split-second decisions to see them through 
a crisis. "You hope never to have to use your weapon, but if you do, it has 
to come as an automatic no-think situation," says one (D. Pugliese, 1998).

In the 1980's, as these units began to proliferate and be used for more 
routine policing, criticisms started pouring in from both the public and 
professionals. Judges criticized their methods. Judge Martineau likened the 
tactical teams' methods to "using a sledgehammer to kill a mosquito" (D. 
Pugliese, 1998). Coroners inquests chronicled their mistakes. To their 
critics, the mix of tactical unit's paramilitary mindset, tactics and 
arsenal, together with their increasingly frequent deployment, is a recipe 
for disaster. Joseph McNamara, a former chief of police stated that: "It's a 
very dangerous thing, when you're telling cops they're the soldiers and 
there's an enemy out there. I don't like it at all" (D. Pugliese, 1998).

Victims of tactical teams' over-aggressive approach think that tactical 
squad members are anything but highly trained professionals. They think the 
units are far too aggressive for any civilian policing at all. A growing 
number of criminologists and other experts worry about tactical units too. 
They worry that they are being used where they shouldn't be. 
"Psychologically you're looking at a completely different direction in 
policing," says John Thompson, executive director of the Toronto-based 
Mackenzie Institute, which studies organized violence in society. "You're 
thinking not about making an arrest but instead about crushing the 
opposition. They treat everything like a commando raid." (D. Pugliese, 
1998).

Even within the Ontario Provincial Police force, regular police officers 
began to distrust those working within tactical units. One tactical unit 
coordinator complained of this lack of trust, and one year later, when the 
OPP did an extensive review of tactical operations, they found that there 
was a reluctance on behalf of police commanders to call out the special 
units. The tactical squads were also having problems recruiting new members 
because many officers viewed the team members as "commando types and not 
police officers" (D. Pugliese, 1998). But the senior OPP leadership would 
have none of it. Faced with their commanders' reluctance, they issued a new 
set of orders that tactical units were to be "used when and where required". 
Immediately, the squads began to be sent out more and more often (D. 
Pugliese, 1998).

In 1989, Ontario convened the country's first and only special commission on 
tactical units. Led by Ontario Police Commissioner Douglas Drinkwalter, the 
commission found that: there was no standardized training for tactical 
units; there was not consistent psychological testing on the officers 
recruited (although some used a self-administered psych test devised in 
1922!); the units were by then specializing in domestic crimes rather than 
their original terrorism and hostage-taking purposes; and standards for the 
use of deadly force varied from Kingston Police Department's requirement to 
use minimum force, to Ottawa and Toronto's police whose snipers were trained 
to shoot for the head, to the OPP who had testified that they shot to kill, 
not to wound because "a wounded suspect could still pose a threat to a 
hostage or an officer" (D. Pugliese, 1998).

Of almost 2,700 tactical deployments in Ontario between 1983 and 1988, only 
75 involved a hostage-taking incident. The rest were for "barricaded 
persons" - lone suicidal people - and so-called high-risk arrests, such as 
narcotics and customs raids and capturing a suspect that might be armed. The 
Drinkwalter report, released in June 1990, still supported the use of 
tactical teams, as long as their primary objective was the "non-violent 
resolution of high-risk incidents to safeguard human lives" (D. Pugliese, 
1998). The report called for standardized training and emphasized that 
mediation, not force, should be the way to diffuse potentially violent 
situations. It also recommended "Rambo-types" be screened out and only 
mature police officers with five years experience or more be selected for 
the teams.

Most of the recommendations have been ignored. Twelve years later, there is 
still no standardized training while the number of tactical and related 
units continue to grow. There is still no basic manual for tactical 
officers. Officials with the Ontario Solicitor General's department say the 
government realizes the recommendations need to be addressed, but "funding 
is scarce", and there are "more serious policing issues to be dealt with" 
(D. Pugliese, 1998).

The line-up for the KMP-Emergency Response Team reads like an Hollywood 
Rambo-cop movie. Larry Ross is both the assistant chief of police, and 
commander of the emergency response team. He served as a ground troop in the 
American army for operation desert shield where he claims he "engaged with 
the enemy". After being "honorably" discharged from the army, Larry worked 
as a police officer for the Akwesasne police. Rumor has it some folks at 
Akwesasne found Larry a little too trigger happy for their liking, and after 
a couple of complaints had been lodged against him, Larry was, he says 
"wrongfully dismissed". Three years later, and without any psychological or 
stress testing, Larry was hired on by the Kanesatake Mohawk Police.

Six months before the incident with Joe, Larry and the rest of the Team took 
a 2 week training course in tactical operations that focused on weapons 
handling and advanced take-downs and combat techniques. In April 1999, Larry 
also took a 3 week course in hostage and barricaded persons negotiations. He 
had a special interest in the Warrior Society, as a "organized crime 
syndicate", and several people had heard him vow that he would "get rid of 
the warriors any way that he could". Larry was fired from the KMP in 
September 2001 after leading a drug raid on a community member's home. He 
said that the raid was a success. But several community members were 
outraged by the raid and demanded that Ross be fired. He was and again, Ross 
is claiming "wrongful dismissal". But council chief Steven Bonspiel, who 
holds the policing and justice responsibilities on band council, said that 
if any drugs had been seized, it would have been a well-publicized event. He 
said that the methods used in the arrest far outweighed the results.

Tracey Cross and Bobby Bonspiel are next in the chain of command in the ol' 
policing hierarchy. Both are Corporals and are also members of the Emergency 
Response Team. Tracey served in the Canadian armed forces, airborne, for 17 
½ years in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions; then worked as a 
non-commissioned warrant officer. During the Oka crisis he was stationed in 
Germany, and he had come under enemy fire in Yugoslavia. Tracey testified 
before the police ethics commission that he left the army with an honorable 
discharge. He also said that he had never been disciplined, nor had a 
complaint ever been lodged against him throughout his military career. 
However, in "John Harding vs. the Mohawk Council of Kanesatake" it was 
revealed that Cross had been found guilty, and was disciplined, for an 
offense under the Military Code of Conduct. It also noted that he failed to 
disclose this information at the time of his hiring by the Kanesatake Mohawk 
Council. Interestingly, the Council obtained Cross' file through an 
undercover agent who had been hired by the KMP despite his own lengthy 
criminal record, and who was arrested for impersonating a police officer in 
his efforts to obtain this file.

Bobby Bonspiel's involvement with the military is an unconfirmed rumor at 
this time, but it is said that he went AWOL from the American military. He 
is the best shooter on the KMP force, and if they had the position, he would 
be more than qualified to be designated a "sharp-shooter".

According to a 1999 survey of Canadian tactical units, there are only four 
tactical teams nation-wide in communities that have a police force of 50 
personnel or more, and that serve a jurisdiction of 51,000 or less (Alvaro, 
2000). The Kanehsatake Mohawk Police serve a jurisdiction of approximately 
1,500 people, and at the time of Joe's shooting had 13 officers. It is 
therefor a pretty safe assumption that the KMP are the smallest police 
force, serving the smallest jurisdiction, to have a tactical unit in Canada.

They established the Emergency Response Team in 1998 - only one year after 
the creation of their police force! This means that several officers on the 
tactical unit had only one year experience as a police officer. The national 
average is 6 years experience, and the Drinkwalter commission recommended at 
least five. Another shocking feature of the Kanehsatake Mohawk Police ERT, 
is their high rate of employing ex-military personnel. Out of the 1,242 
tactical officers in Canada, 6.5% (81) had served with the military, and .8% 
(10) had military special forces experience (Alvaro, 2000). As mentioned 
above, the KMP has three ex-military, one of them with special forces 
experience. So not only does 23% of the whole KMP have military experience 
compared to the 6.5% national average, but they also have 3.7% of all the 
ex-military tactical officers nation-wide. Quite impressive for such a 
small, and such a young police force!

Crisis #2 - The Final Assault

Police are allowed to involve civilians in police operations. Civilian 
involvement usually occurs in emergency situations whereby an officer in 
trouble will order a civilian to perform a particular duty, or in 
hostage-type negotiations where a family member, or loved one may be better 
able to achieve communications and de-escalate the situation. Benny Etienne 
fit neither of these criteria. All KMP officers involved in the Mountain 
Road operation, were tactical team members - they were armed and wearing 
bullet-proof vests. They had their tactical badges, rather than their KMP 
badges, velcroed to their chests. Benny, the civilian was becoming involved 
with a "highly specialized" tactical operation. Neither Terry Isaac, nor 
Larry Ross checked to see if Benny was armed even though he and Joe were 
long term rivals. Whereas many witnesses noticed Benny's state of 
intoxication, as was noted in his own police report, none of the officers 
admitted to noticing if Benny had been drinking, or if he was mad or 
agitated.

Larry Ross explained to Benny that they were going to be entering a 
potentially violent situation, but Benny told him he didn't care. When 
questioned on whether Benny was ever offered a vest, Larry said that he 
wasn't because Benny wasn't a police officer. The prosecutor asked Larry he 
if thought only police officers deserved the protection of life, and a 
frustrated Larry responded: "No, that's not what I said! Benny said he 
didn't care." "But you didn't care about endangering the life of a 
civilian?" Again Larry Ross answers, "That's not what I said!"

When Larry Ross told Tracey Cross to wait at Mountain Road with Mike Dupont 
and Bobby Bonspiel, Cross says that he had not been told that Larry and 
Benny were going to check on Joe. In his police report though Cross had 
written that this is what they were going to, and it even says he asked 
Larry if he wanted Benny to go up there. Cross said that when he wrote the 
report he was inferring. Really, he did not know. What he did know was that 
Larry was setting up an operation, so when Larry and Benny went up Mountain 
Road, Cross and Dupont just looked at each other and shrugged, like "What?" 
It was about 15 minutes later that Larry and Benny came back. Tracey Cross, 
Mike Dupont and Bobby Bonspiel had a quick meeting with them. Tracey said 
that it was Larry who decided that they'd go to the house, look in Joe's 
window, and if Joe was asleep, go in and grab him.

So Benny Etienne successfully leads the troops up Mountain Road, bushwhacks 
Larry to Joe's home, and even manages to look through Joe's window for him. 
The rest of the team were standing about 10 meters from Joe's. Benny had 
fulfilled his function and more. Why did Benny go with Larry to look in the 
window? At first Larry stated it was simply cause Benny wanted to. Then 
clarifies that he "needed Benny to show him exactly which window it was that 
he had seen Joe through". Otherwise Larry would have "had to look through 
several"! Benny did point the window out from where they were standing, but 
Larry could only see the structure of the house, not the window. The cedar 
hedges were in the way. Turns out that Benny was the one who peeped through 
the window because "Benny was in front" of Larry.

Joe is no longer on the couch that Benny saw him on earlier, but Larry says 
that Benny told him he saw movement in the house. In Benny's initial police 
reports however, he said he could not see anything because a curtain had 
been pulled over the window. Larry's story also changes. He explains how it 
was his mission to ascertain Joe's state of health and then secure an inner 
perimeter. This is "standard North American tactical procedure" he says, "to 
ascertain health, then create a perimeter". The prosecutor asks him: "Did 
you create a perimeter? Larry Ross says no, he didn't because BENNY ETIENNE 
said that Joe's back door was unlocked and that they could lure Joe out. 
Benny is being noisy and even though Larry tells him that he's compromising 
their tactical environment, Benny doesn't care. He's hyped. He will not be 
quiet. He even threatens to get louder if they try to make him go away. 
Larry, who Terry Isaac had not delegated authority to (but claims he didn't 
have to because Ross was Assistant Chief and therefor in charge when Isaac 
was out of range) conceded to Benny that the Isaac's plan would have to 
change. Because Benny was compromising everyone's safety, Larry decided to 
include Benny in the plan. Larry said he weighed the situation and decided 
this was the best option.

So what is Larry's new tactical plan? Mike Dupont testified that he was told 
that Benny Etienne would lure Joe out of the house by asking for a beer, and 
all the cops would wait alongside the house, single-file, beneath window. 
Once Joe came out, the cops would subdue and arrest him. There was no 
discussion about who specifically would be grabbing Joe, or who would be 
doing what, as is normal for tactical operations. Dupont says there was only 
about one minute of planning and no specifics were given. Larry Ross just 
tells Benny "OK Benny, you get Joe out the door and we will take him down".

Larry Ross claims he chose Benny for this duty because he "had a verbal 
rapport with Joe, good or bad". The prosecutor asks Larry if he did not 
think it made a difference if their verbal rapport was bad rather than good. 
Larry responded: "Maybe, but....Benny was sure that he would not shoot him 
on sight"!

Neither Mike Dupont nor Tracey Cross thought that Larry's plan was very 
smart. Dupont didn't agree with the plan because it was starting to get 
light, and this would take away from the element of surprise. He was worried 
that Joe would see them. He thought that the plan was too dangerous and 
could provoke conflict. Tracey Cross disagreed with the plan because they 
didn't know where Joe was in the house and he thought it would be better to 
go back to highway #344 and restart negotiations. Tracey Cross said that he 
thought that Bobby Bonspiel agreed with him too, cause when he looked over 
Bobby was nodding his head. But Larry Ross said there would be no change, 
that the "plans" were going to go ahead.

Meanwhile, down on the highway, Pam was suggesting that they get the cruiser 
off of Joe's property, and said that she would take care of Joe if he came 
out of the house. Daniel Nicholas says OK, he will call Joe to see if Pam 
can go see him. Joe's brother Walter suggests that they bring Terry Isaac in 
on the plan. So Terry drives up in his unmarked car, and Daniel makes the 
call to Joe so that everyone can hear. He said: "Hi Joe, it's me Daniel, how 
are you doing buddy? We got your cousin Pam here, is it OK if we come up to 
see you?" Joe responded that he didn't want to see Pam. After the phone 
call, everyone just looked at one another. Walter said: "Well, he's quiet 
now." Isaac said: "we're going to wait it out, even if it takes days". This 
is around 4:30am.

4:30am, it is starting to get light. Isaac has agreed that they will wait 
things out even if it takes days - and all of a sudden they hear a gunshot. 
Marie heard one shot that sounded like a pop, then a few seconds later 3 or 
4 more shots that were faster. Larry Ross comes running down Joe's driveway 
yelling: "I hit him! Get the ambulance up there." He was squatting and 
waving the ambulance to go up to Joe's. Pam was shocked. They had agreed to 
wait. They had made plans which had been negotiated with Terry Isaac. Pam 
(an ex-police from Akwasasne) said there had been no dispatch, no 
communication. It was not normal. Nobody radioed, phoned or anything from 
the time the shots were fired.

Between 11pm and 4:30am, it was a quiet night for Joe; quiet, but not 
peaceful. He tried to watch a movie, but couldn't focus. He started a beer, 
but then thought it was best to keep a clear head so didn't drink it. Joe 
had heard that it was standard procedure for cops to conduct raids in the 
early morning hours, so he was just waiting. What he didn't expect was a 
knock on the door. He was expecting the ERT to bust it down. So when he 
heard the knock, Joe walked down his stairs gingerly. He was afraid. Quite 
fearful, he yelled out: "Yeah?". Then Benny asked him for a beer. To Joe 
this was very strange, out of character. At first he thought maybe Benny was 
telling the truth. "Get out of here!", Joe told him. It was dangerous for 
Benny to be there. After a few seconds, Joe, holding his rifle, whipped the 
door open and saw Benny running with his back turned 2ft. off the ground. 
Joe could also see black shapes crouching beside his porch. They started 
scurrying too.

Joe slammed his door shut right away thinking that it was a trap. A few 
minutes later, hoping the cops had left, Joe opened his door again. He saw 
an AR15 laying on the ground and went to pick it up. Then he ventured 
further to see if he could see the officers. He said: "I walked past the 
cedars at the edge of my house and I saw this group of them, and they 
weren't hiding very successfully behind an oak tree. I went yelling after 
them. That's all I had in mind, yelling at them, telling them to get off my 
land. 'Get off my land! This is Mohawk land, you have no jurisdiction 
here!". He fired one warning shot from his rifle into the air.

Then somebody said: "Its OK Joey, we're going, we're going". Joe knew his 
father was down at the end of the driveway, and he and his father had talked 
lots about jurisdiction. His father used to pull the SQ over and tell them 
that they had no jurisdiction in Kanehsatake. Joe was hoping his father 
would hear him. Then Joe got shot in the leg from behind. He didn't register 
any pain though, and since his weight wasn't on that leg, it didn't knock 
him off balance. Joe remembers thinking that he should look behind him, that 
he should move, but he doesn't think he had enough time to. After a second 
or so Joe was shot in the back. Joe hit the ground hard on his face with his 
cheek. His head bounced cause it hit the root of a tree. He heard two more 
shots after he hit the ground, then somebody shouting: "We got him, he's 
down". Then Joe lost consciousness.

Benny had motioned to the KMP crew that Joe had a gun so Larry Ross said 
"gun!" and they all scattered for cover. Tracey Cross hid behind one tree, 
and Larry Ross and Bobby Bonspiel behind another. Larry alleges that Joe 
shot towards him and Bobby as they ran for cover, and then again when they 
were behind the tree. Larry then leaned over to Bobby and told him to 
discharge a round at Joe, while he ran for another tree. He wanted to 
"expand their range of gunfire". Larry starts running and Bobby Bonspiel 
fires. When Larry is out of the line of fire, Tracey Cross, in a "split 
instinct" gets a shot off at Joe before his magazine gets jammed. One bullet 
passes close to Larry. Larry turns and shoots three rounds in Joe's 
direction. Larry does not know if it Bobby's bullet or his own that hit "the 
target". Tracey Cross yells "suspect down". When Larry turned around he saw 
Bobby standing beside Joe who was on the ground. Larry ordered Bobby to cuff 
Joe and for Tracey to assist. Then Bobby said" "He's hit".

Mike Dupont said he didn't know if Joe had a gun when he first came out of 
his house, because Benny said: "He's coming out, he's got a gun" and Mike 
just ran. He didn't plan to run like he did, he said, but he "would have 
preferred to have a much better plan in the first place". From what Mike 
knows, Larry Ross shot Joe in the leg, and then Bobby shot him in the back. 
Mike Dupont doesn't think the rifle that was found laying near Joe was 
sealed for evidence, and he said there was no talk of sealing off the area 
as a crime scene. The prosecutor asked Larry Ross if it was true Joe was 
running towards them and Larry agrees. She asks: "How did Joe get shot in 
the back if he was running towards you?" Larry Ross said he didn't know.

The ambulance attendants came up, Terry Isaac and Walter were close by, and 
two silhouetted people were standing to the right of the tree. Joe was lying 
on his stomach, face down, legs crossed, handcuffed with his arms behind his 
back. Pam asks: "What the fuck does he have cuffs on for? He's not going 
anywhere!" Pam and Walter turn Joe over onto his back, because he wasn't 
breathing, and they needed to open an air passageway The ambulance 
attendants couldn't cut Joe's shirt because their hands were shaking so 
badly, so Pam cut it herself. Then the ambulance attendants bandaged Joe's 
wounds.

Walter went around to the back of Joe's house and then stopped near the 
cedars cause he saw a person leaning down, reaching for a rifle on the 
ground. Then the guy looked up, and when he couldn't reach the rifle, he 
took off through the fields. It was Benny Etienne. Walter could see his 
sister Denise - she was screaming, getting hysterical. "What the fuck is he 
doing up here!" She was motioning at Benny too.

Meanwhile, Larry Ross and Terry Isaac are assessing the situation as 
"unsafe" and decide to leave the scene right away. They are intimidated by 
"the large numbers of people on the scene". Larry Ross remembers Pam, 
Nicholas and 3-4 others being there as well as the ambulance attendants. 
Then he adds he "thought the Warriors might be coming". Nobody made any 
threats towards him personally. Mike Dupont does not claim to have been 
threatened by anyone either, and said he didn't hear anyone else being 
threatened. Tracey Cross said that Marie, Walter, and Daniel were all 
yelling: "You see, you got him! Are you satisfied now fuckers?" Larry Ross 
had fallen to his knees, and was distressed. So Tracey Cross said to Larry: 
"We have to go now, the situation is getting hostile". A couple minutes 
after the shooting they were gone to the police station. Mike Dupont was the 
last person on the scene and drove the shot-up patrol car away. As he was 
leaving he passed Daniel Nicholas on Joe's driveway. Daniel was crying, and 
saying "The fuckers shot him!"

At the hospital, despite his reluctance to, Walter gave a brief statement to 
the SQ. He was worried about Joe and just wanted to see him. During Walter's 
statement, the SQ officers went in and out of the room. Then, an SQ officer 
came in the room and said that Joe's shirt with the blood and bullet hole 
had been destroyed at the hospital. Walter says out loud, "Oh. OK. There it 
is. This is the cover up." Walter also heard an SQ comment: "For a place 
that had all this shooting going on, there were very few shells left 
behind."

The Future of First Nations Policing?

In addition to criticisms based on the assimilationist impetus of the First 
Nations Policing Policy, the implementation and operations of First Nations 
police services have come under scrutiny by its own rank and supporters. The 
problems identified by police chiefs, officers, researchers, and band 
council members range from a lack of commitment by provincial and federal 
funding bodies, to inadequate recruitment and training practices, culturally 
inappropriate policing styles, and lack of community involvement and support 
for policing.

Some researchers predict First Nations policing will fail. Cursory mention 
is given to inadequate provincial and federal funds, but most failings are 
attributed to First Nations' inability to "stand-alone" financially. As the 
push towards "single envelop" funding to Band Councils intensifies, so too 
will the pressure to prioritize police spending in the budget. "Own Source 
Funding" is presented as the road to kicking their federal-funding 
"dependency" - to truly "standing-alone". In August 2000, it was determined 
that an additional $32 million in capital investments, $13.6 million for 
operations and maintenance and $10 million for other cost relative to 
operating and maintaining a police service would be required to raise the 
level of existing infrastructure to be on par with non-Aboriginal police 
services (FNCPA and HRDC, 2001).

First Nations Police Chiefs say that start-up and self-administration costs 
have been under-appreciated by the funding governments, and that high 
expectations for service and high levels of stressful, resource-draining 
serious crimes have not been appropriately factored into the funding 
formula. They say current funding levels do not yield sufficient officer 
complements to allow for crime fighting and problem-solving activity, let 
alone a distinctive aboriginal policing style. From their perspective First 
Nations police services have been established with lofty objectives and high 
community expectations, but with such inadequate resources that the 
service's failure to achieve even conventional policing objectives is 
likely. They are worried this will lead to the resumption of policing by 
provincial police organizations (Murphy, C., Clairmont, D, 2000).

Police Chiefs also cite the imperative to hire from within the community or 
band membership as a major constraint against building effective police 
forces. One chief observed: "by insisting on hiring from within the own 
reserve we restrict ourselves in quality hiring ... [there is a] limited 
population" (Murphy, C., Clairmont, D, 2000). The limited pool was seen to 
affect the overall quality of the service. The insistence for local hiring 
forces police managers to deal with recruits and officers whose motivation 
and talent for policing are questionable. It was claimed that failure to 
recruit appropriately has led to high stress levels among officers, much 
officer turnover, and significant community criticism of the police 
performance. A common view among police managers was that Band Chiefs and 
Council did not appreciate that "policing is not a make-work project" 
(Murphy, C., Clairmont, D, 2000).

Police managers also complained that their recruits received inadequate and 
truncated training from provincial policing academies. The training did not 
take into account realities of reserve social conditions, expectations or 
controversies about policing, nor aboriginal culture, values, or traditions. 
And the in-service training required to make up for deficiencies, is not 
provided for in the policing budget, and was said to be difficult to provide 
in some of the small, geographically remote First Nations communities. In 
half the police services surveyed, officers had either recently been 
dismissed or were in the process of being dismissed for inadequate 
fulfillment of their duties. Some other officers were seen to be, at best, 
only adequate in the role. While the more "professional" First Nations 
officers leave their communities to join provincial or municipal police 
service where wages, benefits and advancement opportunities are more 
competitive, resentment grows in First Nations communities that are being 
used as experimental police training-grounds.

The promise of a "unique native-style policing" is not the reality for most 
First Nations communities. Such a re-orientation would require different 
styles of training, sovereign control over policies and funding, and 
different attitudes of behalf of police officers. Research shows that police 
officers from minority groups who are trained and supervised in a 
"traditional" manner for the most part act in the same ways as white police 
officers. Combined with the requirements by provinces to focus on 'core 
policing competence', and the considerable demands from Band Council for 
reactive and 'round-the-clock' policing, First Nations police chiefs claim 
that they have limited flexibility for developing alternative policing 
styles.

Besides, most First Nations police officers, like their non-aboriginal 
colleagues, emphasize the satisfaction they gain from pursuing traditional 
crime fighting. Some First Nations police services do attend community 
activities such as pow wows and sweats, visiting schools, holding bike 
rodeos and utilizing some common police programs (e.g., police cards); but 
concretely, there is little evidence of development of restorative justice 
programs, collaboration with local social agencies, problem solving 
activities, or community consultation for consensus on policing priorities. 
Audits and evaluations indicate that First Nations band chiefs often 
disagree with police chiefs on the extent to which the service is indeed 
providing a culturally sensitive type of policing. Community leaders and 
residents say the service definitely falls short of providing 
community-based, problem-solving policing which is culturally sensitive and 
driven by Aboriginal values and traditions.

Most revealing of the unbridgeable ideological chasm between those who 
support policing and those who do not, is the police chiefs interpretation 
of the lack of community and social agency involvement with policing 
programs and boards as stemming from community "apathy" and "lack of civic 
culture" rather than political disagreement. Police chiefs contend that a 
"hand-out syndrome" and a "legacy of estrangement from authority" are the 
primary factors inhibiting police-community collaboration (Murphy, C., 
Clairmont, D, 2000). One First Nations division commander in Ontario wrote 
"my community is not very active in assisting police ... we seem to be the 
only ones concerned about problems in the community" (Murphy, C., Clairmont, 
D, 2000).

The attribution of mistrust of police to historical experiences, rather than 
contemporary sovereignty issues and/or different visions on how to solve 
community problems, illustrates how the police have internalized the racism 
of mainstream Canada and project it onto their own communities. By 
relegating colonialism to the dustbin of history and pathologizing all those 
not "with them", First Nation police and their supporters ignore the crucial 
function that policing plays in continuing colonization, capitalist 
corporate globalization, and discounts valid reasons community members have 
for not supporting the policing policy. Policing is but one possible 
solution to community problems, if the community does not embrace policing, 
then new solutions should be tried.

Even police board members have been accused of not fulfilling their 
functions properly such as buffering the police from band council politics 
and "selling" the police to the community. The police repeatedly emphasize 
that board members need to become better informed about police work via 
ride-alongs and more contact with police officers in their policing roles. 
Only then could they act as true advocates for the police! The hypothesis is 
that the police are just "misunderstood" by the people they are trying to 
help. Kind of like Jesus Christ, they figure themselves martyrs of the 
Indian cause. Rather than scrapping the unsupported policing initiative for 
programs that generate widespread support from the community, the police 
prefer to force people to open their hearts to their message, like the good 
missionaries of the Christian brotherhood.

In general, First Nations police officers recognize that improving social 
and economic conditions are pivotal to dealing with problems of crime and 
social disorder. Nevertheless, their strategy has been to ask for more money 
for more officers to apply law enforcement. Contrary to popular expectation, 
research shows that a greater police presence, while sometimes making 
residents feel less fearful, does not significantly reduce crime. For 
example, the higher per-capita number of police officers in the North, and 
in Saskatchewan is one of the causes of the disproportionate incarceration 
of Indigenous peoples. This was demonstrated when some Indigenous folk who 
felt under-policed, requested that police detachments be established in 
their communities. The result was an almost instant "crime wave," with the 
police making arrests and laying charges for problems that were until then 
dealt with in other ways.

This experience led analysts to conclude that the original problem was not 
so much under-policing as under-servicing, and that what these communities 
really needed were alcohol and family violence workers, traditional healers, 
mental health workers, sexual abuse counselors and the like. According to 
the semi-autonomous Quebec Amerindian Police Service, about one third of all 
calls to police on reserves were requests for services, and 45 percent of 
all service calls ended up with police making referrals to other agencies, 
such as social and health services, probation officers or psychiatric 
specialists (J. Reiman, pg.6).

Furthermore, the crucial question of whether law-and-order is the 
appropriate response to problems rooted in social, cultural and economic 
injustice (i.e. colonialism) must not be overlooked. In one study of 
Aboriginal crime, Hyde and LaPrairie surveyed 25 First Nations reserves in 
the province of Quebec. They found that the communities that had assimilated 
the least, that were the most remote and had the lowest incomes, also had 
the lowest levels of crime. In fact their crime rates were well below the 
national average. The communities that were closest to urban centers, that 
had the greatest integration, the highest incomes and formal education, had 
the highest rates of property crime and the second highest rates of violent 
crime. This says a lot about the impacts of forced assimilation on First 
Nations communities. What is assimilation into a culture founded on genocide 
and the theft of native lands but a criminal culture? This also points to 
the direction in which solutions may lay. Respect for Indigenous 
Sovereignty. Reparations for stolen land, lives and resources. By their own 
standards of law-enforcement, Canada is directly responsible for setting up 
less-than-quality police services on First Nations reservations. The 
populations that First Nations police forces are meant to "serve and 
protect" should not have to bear the costs of these Canadian-made colonial 
policies with their lives.

Police Negligence, Obedience and Excessive Use of Force

Joe David was shot twice and left quadriplegic in a police operation that 
should never have happened. The direct orders by the Kanesatake Mohawk 
Police Chief, Terry Isaac, had been to "wait things out.for days if 
necessary" and to "resolve the situation through negotiations". In March, 
2001 Isaac testified he never wavered from this position and claimed that 
"all his men had been informed of this strategy". In the final instance, 
where Isaac authorized Assistant Chief Larry Ross to go "check on the state 
of Joe's health", Isaac maintains the plan was simply to determine if Joe 
needed medical assistance, and if not, the wait-it-out and negotiate 
strategy would continue. The basis for checking on Joe's health, both Ross 
and Isaac claimed, was because Benny told them Joe was laying on the couch 
with a gun between his legs and could have committed suicide. But they never 
checked with Joe's family members to see if Joe was indeed suicidal, nor had 
they heard a gunshot indicating an attempted suicide. Furthermore, Benny's 
police statement regarding the matter said he had told the police that Joe 
was asleep and that "maybe it's a good time to catch him". Not a word was 
mentioned about Joe's health being compromised.

Terry Isaac was grossly negligent in granting authorization for Benny 
Etienne, a civilian who had just returned from the bar and who had openly 
displayed hostilities regarding the disruption the police operation was 
causing his evening, to "lead" the KMP Emergency Response Team to Joe's 
home. Regardless of the fact the operation was deemed "high risk" enough to 
warrant the use of the ERT, neither Isaac, nor Assistant Chief Larry Ross 
checked to see if Benny was armed. Nor did they see it fit to offer him the 
protections they themselves were afforded - such as a bullet-proof vest. 
Larry Ross claims he explained the dangers involved to Benny, but Benny said 
he didn't care! Ross swore he really did care about Benny's safety, but did 
not offer Benny a vest because he was not a police officer.

And this is true. Benny Etienne is not a police officer. Yet it was he, 
without any particular scouting expertise, who was chosen to lead the 
mission to Joe's. Isaac first testified that Benny "insisted" on going (like 
he couldn't have said no!) and so they indulged his demand. Larry Ross 
stated Benny was needed to "navigate the difficult geographical terrain", to 
guide the police so that they didn't "get lost and become targets of Joe". 
Either way, it seems Benny was allowed to take the reigns not only in 
guiding the police to the proper location, but also in determining the state 
of Joe's health by looking through the window, autonomously verifying Joe's 
back door was unlocked, concocting the plan to ambush Joe. Also, by causing 
disruption enough to compromise the "security of the tactical environment", 
he ensured his own continued participation in the operation.

In Benny's 1999 Statutory Declaration given to the police he claimed that 
when he went to check in Joe's window he "couldn't see because the curtain 
or a piece of cloth was covering the window". The police claim that Benny 
told them that he could no longer see Joe in the chair but could see him 
moving around in the house. This claim, of seeing Joe's movement is however 
an impossibility. At that time, Joe was upstairs in his living room and 
therefore completely outside of Benny's view.

Benny's over-involvement in the police operation, however, no matter how 
hard he pushed it, can not be blamed on Benny. In conceding to Benny's plans 
and allowing his continued participation, Larry Ross was not only disobeying 
the direct orders of his superior, but also demonstrating a complete 
disregard for the safety of his men, as well as Benny and Joe. Larry's 
mission, to check on Joe's state of health had by all means been 
accomplished when he was informed by Benny that Joe was alive, well and 
moving. Larry claims that after retreating to the rendezvous point, he 
ordered Benny to leave. But Benny refused. He said Benny was "out of 
control", making lots of noise and compromising their position. So if Benny 
was such a hazard to everyone's safety, why was he not removed from the 
scene?

Larry's excuse was that he "did not have sufficient man power" to force 
Benny to leave. During examination by the prosecutor, Larry could not come 
up with a good reason as to why the police simply did not tackle Benny. 
Larry says that to take Benny down, and secure a perimeter around Joe's 
house would have been two separate missions. It would have required the 
assistance of at least two more police officers. But Larry did not call for 
the needed back-up. He says he thought it would be "safer" to implement the 
new plan and pacify the belligerent Benny by utilizing his presence. The 
plan - to have Benny knock on the door and lure Joe out of his home so the 
police could tackle him - was devised in absence of any force being 
threatened or exerted by Joe. Despite this, Larry tried justifying his plan 
to use force by saying they needed to keep Joe "from attacking the public". 
Joe was posing absolutely no threat to the public, and Larry Ross' planned 
use of force was not reasonable. It was in the context of Benny's incredible 
threat to their safety that Larry Ross chose to deem Joe the problem. The 
difficulties Larry Ross had with Benny were also conspicuously absent from 
each and every police occurrence, and investigative report submitted by 
Larry.

Ross also insists he was not disobeying orders when he designed the new 
operation because when out of Isaac's range, he said, he becomes the 
commander. He claims it is totally valid to make a change in plans due to a 
change in circumstances. Terry Isaac insisted throughout his Police Ethics 
testimony that he had delegated authority to Larry Ross. But in his report 
filed with the SQ he proclaimed: "I did not delegate authority to anyone". 
When caught on this, Isaac quickly backtracked and said he did not need to 
delegate authority because Larry Ross was the acting chief and therefor 
naturally in charge when out of his range.

The other KMP emergency response team members involved - Tracey Cross, Mike 
Dupont and Bobby Bonspiel - did not feel comfortable with Benny's 
participation, or Larry's "tactical plan". Tracey Cross and Mike Dupont 
openly voiced their disagreement. During the Police Ethics Inquiry Tracey 
Cross said that while it was true that they disagreed and were not 
reprimanded, they were also bound by the Police Act which stipulates 
officers must follow orders from their superiors. Is this true for a "plan" 
formulated in less than a minute with no specific directions given to 
individual officers? Under cross-examination by his own lawyer, when it was 
implied that there was no possible way Mike Dupont could assess Larry's plan 
properly because he was not a trained "planner" for tactical operations, 
Mike responded that "in training for tactical we are told what is dangerous 
and what is not. I could tell that this would be dangerous". For months 
Larry had been unofficially investigating Joe's involvement with the Warrior 
Society. Could Larry's vow to "get rid of the Warriors" have influenced his 
decision to go forward with his plan despite the opposition?

That Tracey Cross, Mike Dupont and Bobby Bonspiel went along with the 
operation, despite their better judgment and knowledge of the dangers 
involved, should not be overlooked as inevitable. Although each agreed that 
the operation should not go ahead, they failed to live up to their 
responsibility to disobey this unreasonable order, and therefore are 
culpable for the outcomes of their actions. It is far too easy for police 
officers to shirk responsibility by saying that they were "just following 
orders". This is not the only option available to them. According to Palmer, 
Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada, an employee may "refuse a 
superior's orders, demonstrate rank insubordination, and the burden will 
fall upon them to show that the order was illegal, unreasonable, or a danger 
to his or her health or safety". To justify their refusal they "must, at the 
time of the refusal, communicate the reasons for such a refusal to his or 
her employer in a reasonable and adequate manner" (John Harding vs. Mohawk 
Council of Kanesatake, 2001, reference 3rd ed,. Markham, c.1991, p.320)

No community is "safe" with police so spineless. We are not served, nor 
protected by blind obedience. Tracey Cross, Mike Dupont and Bobby Bonspiel 
were negligent in not refusing Larry Ross' orders because they had 
explicitly stated they knew it would put lives in danger. Why were they more 
compelled to follow ill-begot orders of Larry Ross rather than direct orders 
of the Chief of Police who said to "wait things out", "negotiate", and check 
on Joe's health, not arrest him? When asked if there was an order to 
apprehend Joe given on June 5th, 1999, Tracey Cross said "No. I was told we 
were going to check and see if Joe was sleeping. We were not going to 
apprehend him as I understood it".

In fact, everyone except Larry Ross understood their superior's strategy. 
And Larry, who was the only officer trained in hostage and barricaded 
persons situations, a training which above all emphasizes negotiation, did 
not even attempt to contact Joe. Larry said that he had not, but Terry Isaac 
was trying. When asked if he tried to get information regarding contacts 
with Joe, or had the means for ongoing communications with Isaac on this 
matter, Larry Ross answered negatively to both. He tried to excuse himself 
by saying he was to busy, and too distracted by having a gun pointed at him. 
Much to his dismay, the prosecutor pointed out that of the twelve-hour 
stand-off there were only a few moments, at most, in which Larry Ross had a 
gun pointed at him. Despite the fact that negotiations were the major 
emphasis of his training, and despite his eagerness to test out other 
tactics gleaned from the same course, Larry Ross never, not even once, 
attempted to establish contact with Joe.

Once the tactical operation that never should have happened was underway, 
the KMP ERT's excessive use of force went from bad to worse. Tracey Cross 
shot at Joe "in a split instinct". Larry Ross discharged his firearm three 
times at "the target". Bobby Bonspiel was not trying to shoot Joe in the leg 
on his first shot. He was aiming for Joe's center mass, his chest 
specifically. Bobby was aiming for Joe's center mass, he was shooting to 
kill rather than wound because, he claims, if he did not "it would have 
allowed Joe the time to get one shot off and possibly kill his supervisor". 
When this attitude, or standard for the use of deadly force was revealed by 
an Ontario Provincial Police officer who testified in the Drinkwalter 
Inquiry into Tactical Units that he shot to kill, not to wound because "a 
wounded suspect could still pose a threat to a hostage or an officer", it 
sounded alarm bells that the guidelines for the use of force needed to be 
standardized. Specifically, the Drinkwalter report recommended that tactical 
team's primary objective should be "the non-violent resolution of high-risk 
incidents to safeguard human lives". It emphasized that "mediation, not 
force, should be the way to diffuse potentially violent situations". 
Assuming that the potential for violence is not originating from the police 
themselves.

Joe only fired one warning shot into the air, and the ballistics report 
corroborates his story. There were five live rounds in the magazine of his 
rifle, and one spent round in the chamber. Yet the police say Joe fired 
several rounds at them. They say that they had to shoot Joe for their own 
self-defense and to safeguard the life of their boss, Larry Ross. Most 
witnesses who testified before the police ethics commission, including two 
police officers, recalled hearing between 5-9 shots being fired. Bobby 
Bonspiel and Larry Ross claimed three of those shots each. Tracey Cross 
fired one round bringing the total of shots by police to seven. Joe David 
did not have a silencer! But due to police negligence the concrete evidence 
needed to determine what happened that day will never be revealed. Justice 
was effectively obstructed when the police left Joe's property about 5-10 
minutes after he had been shot. They left without collecting evidence, 
sealing the area, or even declaring it a crime scene. They left the area 
unguarded for several hours and when they came back they claim the "area had 
been cleaned up" - all the bullet casings were gone. Terry Isaac only 
collected Bobby Bonspiel's 40 caliber, from which he had fired 3 rounds. 
None of the other arms were entered into evidence. Joe's bloodstained shirt 
was destroyed as well. While Joe's brother Walter was at the hospital, he 
overheard an SQ officer say Joe's shirt had been "destroyed". So now it is 
Joe's word against the well tailored stories of the police that will 
determine whether the police use of force was justified. Who's words do you 
think will carry more weight in judicial proceedings?

Several times throughout the proceedings, it was suggested that Joe could 
have been having flashbacks to the Oka Crisis due to post-traumatic-stress 
syndrome. This was supposed to be some kind of rational for his behaviour on 
that day. But Joe realized moments after shooting the police car that his 
actions were irrational. The police on the other hand still maintain the 
righteousness of their actions. Maybe these war vets were the ones having 
the flashbacks, triggered by "engaging the enemy". This is how their SWAT 
training conditions them. It is absolutely essential to be able to 
dehumanize the enemy in order to be able to pull the trigger.

Larry Ross was never submitted for psychological or stress testing before 
becoming a cop. He was trained and served in the American Army; was fired 
from the Akwasasne Police leaving the legacy of a trigger-happy cop behind 
him, and in September 2001, was fired again from the Kanesatake Mohawk 
Police. This firing was a unanimous action taken by the Mohawk Council of 
Kanesatake. Grand Chief James Gabriel said Ross was let go in order to 
stabilize the community. "It was almost a forgone conclusion that this would 
happen. Right from the time he was hired, there was a call from the floor at 
a meeting to fire him. But we have to follow due process," he said. Chief 
Crawford Gabriel commented, "We've had problems with Larry Ross from day one 
and he's had problems too in Akwasasne and everywhere he went. Ross' anger 
stems from years back" (Eastern Door, Oct. 5th, 2001). And for years the 
community of Kanesatake had to live with Ross' anger. Joe bore the brunt of 
it in the name of "process". And what was this "due process" anyway?

James Gabriel said: "bowing to bullying" (Montreal Gazette, September 30, 
2001). Larry Ross was fired after conducting a controversial drug raid which 
culminated in the suspect's, and some of his friends and family members, 
appearance at a council meeting to demand that Ross be fired. James Gabriel 
said that the council was threatened there would be war in the community 
unless the demand was met (Montreal Gazette, September 30, 2001). If it was 
common knowledge Larry Ross had vowed to get rid of the Warriors, in essence 
a vow of political genocide, why was "due process" not sought at this point? 
Why was it not sought when from the very beginning people in the community 
uncomfortable with his track-record called for his termination? Can you 
image what would happen if the Warriors vowed to get rid of Band Council any 
way that they could? It would be called political terrorism.

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